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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPING AND VERIFYING A SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE CYBER
SECURITY OF THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES OF TURKEY

Karabacak, Bilge
Ph.D., Department of Information Systems
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevgi Özkan Yıldırım
Co-supervisor: Prof. Dr. Nazife Baykal

June 2015, 181 pages

Critical infrastructures are vital assets for countries as a harm given to critical infrastructures
may affect public order, economic welfare and/or national security. Today, cyber systems are
extensively used to control and monitor critical infrastructures. Therefore, cyber threats have
the potential to adversely affect the order of societies and countries. In this PhD study, the
root causes of the susceptibility of the critical infrastructures of Turkey to the cyber threats
are identified by analyzing the qualitative data with the grounded theory method. The
extracted root causes are verified by two experts. The set of principles for the cyber security
of the critical infrastructures are determined by introducing the root causes to six experts in a
five-phased Delphi survey. A state-level cyber security maturity model to measure the
readiness level of the critical infrastructure protection efforts is developed by using the set of
principles. Because maturity criteria are grounded on the root causes of the susceptibility to
cyber threats, the maturity model is named Vulnerability Driven National Cyber Security
Maturity Model. The readiness level of the critical infrastructure protection efforts of Turkey
is measured by the participation of ten former/current government officials in the maturity
survey. The root causes, the set of principles, and the results of the maturity survey are
compared with the relevant studies of the academia, non-profit organizations and
governments.

Keywords: Cyber Security, National Security, Critical Infrastructures, Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Maturity Model, Grounded Theory, Delphi Survey
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ÖZ
TÜRKİYE’NİN KRİTİK ALTYAPILARININ SİBER GÜVENLİĞİ İÇİN
PRENSİPLERİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ VE DOĞRULANMASI

Karabacak, Bilge
Doktora, Bilişim Sistemleri
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Sevgi Özkan Yıldırım
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Nazife Baykal

Haziran 2015, 181 sayfa

Kritik altyapılardaki sorunlar toplum düzenini, ekonomiyi ve/veya ulusal güvenliği
etkileyebildiği için kritik altyapılar ülkeler için hayati varlıklardır. Günümüzde, kritik
altyapıları kontrol etmek ve izlemek için siber sistemler yoğun olarak kullanılmaktadır. Bu
nedenle, siber tehditler toplumların ve ülkelerin düzenlerini kötü yönde etkileyebilecek
potansiyele sahiptirler. Bu doktora çalışmasında, Türkiye’deki kritik altyapıların siber
tehditlere yönelik hassasiyetinin kök sebepleri sözel verinin temellendirilmiş kuram
metoduyla analiz edilmesi sonucu bulunmuştur. Kök sebepler iki uzmanın katılımı ile
doğrulanmıştır. Kök sebepler beş fazlı olarak düzenlenen bir Delfi anketi ile altı uzman ile
paylaşılmış ve anket sonucunda kritik altyapıların siber güvenliği için prensipler elde
edilmiştir. Elde edilen prensipler kullanılarak bir ülkenin kritik altyapı koruma çalışmalarının
olgunluk seviyesini ölçmek üzere ulusal bir siber güvenlik olgunluk modeli önerilmiştir.
Olgunluk modeli kök sebeplere dayandığı için Açıklık Tabanlı Ulusal Siber Güvenlik
Olgunluk Modeli olarak adlandırılmıştır. Türkiye’nin kritik altyapı koruma çalışmalarının
seviyesi on adet eski/hâlihazırdaki kamu çalışanının katıldığı bir olgunluk anketi ile
ölçülmüştür. Kök sebepler, prensipler ve olgunluk ölçüm sonuçları konuyu ele alan
akademik çalışmalar, kurumsal raporlar ve hükümet çalışmaları ile karşılaştırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siber Güvenlik, Ulusal Güvenlik, Kritik Altyapılar, Kritik Altyapıların
Korunması, Olgunluk Modeli, Temellendirilmiş Kuram, Delfi Anketi
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1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction consists of prologue, background and statement of the problem, researcher’s
motivation and significance of the study, research objective, research questions,
assumptions, limitations, delimitations, internal threats, and organization of the thesis.
1.1 Prologue
Critical infrastructures are vital assets for the public safety, economic welfare and/or national
security of countries (Alcaraz & Zeadally 2015). Today, cyber systems are extensively used
to control and monitor critical infrastructures (Abou El Kalam et al. 2009). Therefore, cyber
security is an important item on the national security agenda of countries (Young 2012).
Academia have an increasing interest in the protection of critical infrastructures as well (Ten
2008; Apostolakis & Lemon 2005; Eusgeld et al. 2009; Little 2002; Johansson & Hassel
2010). Having been studied by governments and academics within last five years, the
measurement of the state-level cyber security maturity has proved to be a popular topic.
There are some national-level maturity assessment studies (ITU 2014; Hathaway 2013;
Tobias Feakin & Woodall 2014; BAH 2011; White 2012; Kettani & Debbagh 2009).
However, none of the reviewed studies is dedicated to the maturity assessment of the critical
infrastructure protection efforts of countries. Instead, they evaluate the existence of the best
national level cyber practices in diverse disciplines, ranging from cyber-crime response to
privacy protection.
In this PhD thesis, a state-level cyber security vulnerability assessment is performed at the
first step. Secondly, a state-level cyber security maturity model is proposed to measure the
resilience of the critical infrastructure protection efforts of a level. The maturity model is
developed through the use of the vulnerabilities extracted at the first part of the study.
1.2 Background of the Problem
Any physical or cyber infrastructure is called critical infrastructure if a damage to that
infrastructure has a harmful effect on the economy of a country, on social order and/or
national security (USA 2001). The term of Critical Infrastructure was first used at the
Executive Order of President of the US in 1996 (The White House 1996). The Executive
Order identifies two types of threats against critical infrastructures; physical threats and
cyber threats.
The interest of the countries in critical infrastructures has continuously been growing.
Because the harm given to critical infrastructures adversely affects the society, national
security, and economy, governments bear the responsibility to protect critical infrastructures
(Jayawickrama 2006). More than fifty countries have prepared and enacted national cyber
security policies or strategies in the last decade (NATO CCDCOE 2015). The protection of
the critical infrastructures against cyber threats is a leading goal in these strategies.
The interest of the academia in the critical infrastructures has been increasing as well. The
studies on the security of the critical infrastructures can be categorized into five perspectives
(Lopez et al. 2007; Adar & Wuchner 2005). These perspectives from highest (policy) level
to lowest (tactical) level are as follows:
1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

National and international security (Developing policies and strategies)
Business and sectorial security
Organizational security
The security of the information processing and information technologies
Physical security

Some studies may cover only one perspective while some others may cover more than one.
In fact, critical infrastructure protection is an interdisciplinary research topic thanks to the
diversity of the critical sectors and the nature of the cyber systems (Lopez et al. 2007).
Governments mainly carry out studies within the scope of the first perspective. The
academic studies on the first perspective are generally performed by the social scientists
from such disciplines as international affairs and public policy (Harrop & Matteson 2013;
Assaf 2008; Dunn-Cavelty & Suter 2009).
The most of the academic research focus on the availability of the infrastructures. In the
view of availability, there are prominent studies that analyze and model the
interdependencies among the infrastructures, and they usually propose mathematical models
to prevent cascading failures (Johansson & Hassel 2010; Svendsen & Wolthusen 2007;
Rinaldi et al. 2001). These studies can take place in the second perspective.
There are fewer academic studies that specifically concentrate on cyber threats compared to
the studies that consider all type of threats from a reliability perspective. The academic
studies that cover security related issues are generally risk analysis studies that propose
models designed to analyze all kinds of threats including physical and cyber ones. (Baiardi et
al. 2009; Crowther 2008; Kjølle et al. 2012; Flammini et al. 2008; Luiijf et al. 2011; Haimes
et al. 2002; Michaud 2005; Adler & Fuller 2007). The studies in this category can be placed
in either second or third perspective.
There are considerable amount of studies that propose countermeasures and protection
models for SCADA networks. These studies generally focus on the technical details of the
networks such as the usage of data diodes and access control systems (Igure et al. 2006; Ten
2008; Weiss 2010). These studies can be positioned in the fourth or fifth perspectives.
This PhD study is primarily under the first perspective; however, it covers some parts from
the second perspective as well.
1.3 Statement of the Problem
First of all, critical infrastructures are the targets of the cyber threats, as stated in the
background of the problem. State-level policies and strategies play an important role in
tackling with the cyber threats and managing the cyber security of the infrastructures (Healey
& Pitts 2012). The studies that analyze the vulnerabilities of the infrastructures can help
determine state level policies and strategies (Lin 2012). There is a limited number of
academic studies that focus on the state level critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, the reason
for which may be the sensitivity constraints on the critical infrastructure information (DHS
2005; Dunn-Cavelty & Suter 2009; US-GAO 2013; Goldman & Valdez 2004; Reiter &
Rohatgi 2004).
Secondly, the decision-makers in governments and organizations may benefit from the
results of the cyber security maturity assessment studies. They evaluate the current situation
and decide what to do next by looking at the current maturity level (DHS 2014). For
organizations, there are a number cyber security maturity assessment studies which are
developed by academia or governments (Adler 2013; Lessing 2008; Miron & Muita 2014;
Eshlaghy & Pourebrahimi 2011; Karokola et al. 2011; Butkovic & Caralli 2013). However,
2

there is a limited number of studies that measure the state level cyber security maturity.
Moreover, there is currently no academic study that measures the maturity level of the
critical infrastructures protection efforts of a country.
This PhD study combines the concept of the state-level vulnerability analysis and maturity
assessment in a single pot. Firstly, the root causes of the susceptibility of the critical
infrastructures to the cyber threats are extracted by analyzing the data of a state-sponsored
project through Grounded Theory Method. Secondly, the set of principles are determined by
using expert opinion in a five-phased Delphi survey. Thirdly, a state-level cyber security
maturity model is developed by applying the set of principles.
1.4 Researcher’s Motivation and Significance of the Study
The researcher participated in the state-sponsored project named “Information Security
Management in Critical Infrastructures”, between January 2012 and December 2013. Each
critical sector was examined in terms of the usage of information technologies, and the
problems associated with the technology. The project demonstrated that cyber systems were
significantly used in the sectors of energy, telecommunications, finance, government,
transportation as well as the water management in Turkey. The project also showed that
critical infrastructures had significant vulnerabilities associated with the cyber systems. The
motivation of the researcher is to discover the root causes of the vulnerabilities that were
identified in the state-sponsored project.
The following list underlines the points that render this PhD study significant:
1. Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic welfare and/or
national security of the countries. Having been considered as an important part of the
national security, cyber security of the critical infrastructures is a critical agenda
item of the countries, as observable from their cyber security strategies.
2. The measurement and improvement in security can be accomplished through the
utilization of maturity models. A maturity model is a benchmark against which the
current level of capability is evaluated. Goals and priorities for improvement can be
set by using maturity models.
3. The number of the academic studies that propose national level cyber security
maturity assessment is limited. The studies in the literature are usually performed by
nonprofit organizations, international organizations, and government agencies. Most
studies in the literature do not focus on maturity measurement of a specific country;
they rather score and rank a number of countries. No academic study on the maturity
assessment of the critical infrastructures protection efforts of a country has been
prepared until now. Therefore, proposed maturity model is the first academic study
that measure the maturity of the critical infrastructure protection efforts of a country.
4. The most important shortcoming of the current studies is their maturity criteria.
Their criteria are grounded on the best practices. The criteria for a maturity model
that would be more useful for the policy-makers should be grounded on the realistic
and credible data on critical infrastructures.
5. Being a former government official, there was an opportunity for the researcher to
interview the critical infrastructure operators of Turkey, and to reach the data on its
critical infrastructures. The researcher effortlessly reached ten current/former
government officials to conduct the maturity survey as well.
6. As a cyber security expert with fifteen years of experience, the researcher contacted
with the experts without any difficulty. Two experts performed the verification of
3

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.

the root causes. Six experts participated in the Delphi survey to extract the set of
principles for the security of the infrastructures.
With this PhD research, the researcher contributed to the literature:
a. By extracting the root causes of the susceptibility of the critical
infrastructure to cyber threats.
b. By determining the set of principles for the security of the critical
infrastructures.
c. By proposing a national-level cyber security maturity model that measures
the cyber resilience of the critical infrastructures.
Grounded Theory Method, a developmental research technique, was used to extract
the root causes. The researcher was the main participant in the research.
Delphi survey was used to determine the set of principles. The researcher undertook
a passive role during the survey.
The researcher proposed a maturity model by taking the shortages of the current
maturity literature into account. The model is developed to assess the maturity level
of the critical infrastructure protection efforts of a country.
Government officials from various countries may benefit from the list of the root
causes and the principles, and the maturity model.

1.5 Research Objective and Research Questions
The objectives of the research are:
1. To extract the root causes of the susceptibility of the critical infrastructure to cyber
threats,
2. To determine the set of principles for the cyber security of the critical
infrastructures,
3. To develop a national-level cyber security maturity model.
The research method for the data analysis is the Grounded Theory Method, which is an
interpretative and qualitative research method. GTM is not a hypothesis testing, it is rather a
theory generation from data by performing structured analysis. In GTM, the research
question is the phenomenon to be studied (Strauss & Corbin 2008). The phenomenon to be
studied is as follows:
The results of the state-sponsored project showed that:
1. Cyber systems are used significantly in critical infrastructures
2. There are a number of vulnerabilities that originate from cyber systems
In this PhD study, the researcher discovers the possible root causes of the susceptibility of
the critical infrastructures of Turkey to cyber threats. The phenomenon can be written in
research question as “What are the possible root causes of the susceptibility of the critical
infrastructures of Turkey to cyber threats?”
The second research question is “What are the set of principles to mitigate these root
causes?”
1.6 Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations, and Internal Threats
It is assumed that interviewees, experts and government officials have responded accurately
during the interviews, the verification of the extracted theory, Delphi survey, and the
application of the maturity model.
4

Extracted from the data by using GTM, the root causes are bound by the opinions of the
interviewees, the gathered documents, and the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher.
The maturity criteria and weight values of criteria are depended on the opinions of the
experts who have participated in Delphi survey.
The national cyber security maturity level of the Turkey, which is calculated in a pilot
survey, is depended on the answer choices of the government officials. It is noteworthy to
state that the calculated maturity level of Turkey is not an officially produced and recognized
value.
For this study, the critical infrastructure sectors, determined in the second meeting of the
Cyber Security Council of Turkey, are selected as the critical sectors. The analyses are
performed by using the gathered data from these sectors.
As the disciplines of cyber crime fighting, military cyber operations and privacy protection
are not directly associated with the cyber security of critical infrastructures (Klimburg 2012),
they are left out of scope of this PhD thesis.
The vulnerabilities associated with the physical security of the critical infrastructures are left
out of scope of the PhD thesis.
The interviewees might have avoided giving correct and complete information as not to be
responsible for disclosing problems and vulnerabilities. At the beginning of each interview,
it was assured that the interviewee and his/her organization would remain anonymous and no
vulnerabilities that may be associated with the organization would be written within the
thesis. Conducting interviews with nine different organizations from six sectors can be a
mitigating factor for this threat.
1.7 Organization of the Thesis
The contents of each chapter are shown in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1: Organization of the Thesis

Chapter
Chapter 1

Chapter 2
Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Title
Content
Introduction Prologue, background and the statement of the problem, the
motivation of the researcher, the significance of the study,
research objective, research questions, assumptions,
limitations, delimitations
Literature
Critical review of the literature, comparisons of the national
Review
cyber security maturity models
Research
Data collection methods, research population and sampling
Design
strategies, the details of application of GTM, Delphi survey,
role of the researcher and trustworthiness of the research
Findings
The findings of the data analysis with GTM, the discussion
of the root causes, the findings of the Delphi Survey, the
comparison of the proposed model with the literature, the
application results of the maturity survey
Conclusions Discussion of the findings in the light of different regulation
perspectives, contributions to the literature, implications for
future research
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CHAPTER 2

2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature review starts with the definition and the history of the critical infrastructures. It
continues with the taxonomy of the cyber threats against critical infrastructures. Some
national efforts on the protection of critical infrastructures are detailed. Literature review
also contains the summary of the regulatory approaches for critical infrastructures, along
with the application details in Turkey. Finally, six maturity models for the national level
cyber security measurement are summarized and compared.
2.1

Definition and History of Critical Infrastructures

Any physical or cyber infrastructure is called critical infrastructure, if a damage to that
infrastructure has a harmful effect on the economy of the country, social order and/or
national security (USA 2001). The term of critical Infrastructure is first used within the
Executive Order 13010 in 1996 (The White House 1996). The purpose of the order was to
introduce the term “Critical Infrastructure Protection”, to define the problem and to establish
interim commissions to recommend comprehensive strategies and amendments to the
existing laws. The executive order mentioned two types of threats against critical
infrastructures: physical threats and cyber threats. Although critical infrastructures existed
long before the Internet prevalence and widespread use of cyber technologies, the Critical
Infrastructure Protection is defined as an important governmental term because of the
dominant use of cyber systems in infrastructures. The first of the two reasons for this
phenomenon is that cyber systems welcome a novel type of threats; cyber threats. Cyber
threats are asymmetric in nature; an attacker can hide himself easily, and compared to the
conventional threats, cyber threats are extremely cheap and prevalent. Therefore, cyber
threats easily and effortlessly pave the way for harmful attacks against critical
infrastructures. There is a number of materialized cyber attacks against critical
infrastructures, like nuclear plants, electrical grids, sewing infrastructures, flight control
systems and harbors (Condron 2007; Farwell & Rohozinski 2011). As a result, cyber
resilience of the critical infrastructures forms a prominent portion of the national security
efforts of the countries. Secondly, cyber systems caused or increased interdependencies
among critical infrastructures. These interdependencies are considered the main cause of the
cascading failures (Little 2002; Eusgeld et al. 2011). That means, a problem in one
infrastructure may result in a subsequent failure in another. As an example, a problem in the
telecommunications infrastructure may have a weakening effect on the finance
infrastructure, as witnessed in the Russian hackers’ attacks to Estonian networks in 2007
(Ottis 2008). Therefore, countries started to take critical infrastructure protection more
seriously.
Today, cyber systems are vastly used in the monitoring and controlling of critical
infrastructures. SCADA systems, used in controlling energy and water management systems,
are the examples of such cyber systems. Smart grids, smart transportation systems and
remotely controllable local gas distribution systems have been emerging as the vital parts of
the modern society. Apart from SCADA systems, some critical infrastructures are
completely dependent on the conventional cyber systems. For instance, the banking and
finance infrastructure depends considerably on the conventional information technologies.
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The daily operations of banking and finance companies are totally depended on their huge
server parks and network infrastructures. Telecommunications infrastructure is completely
composed of cyber systems. In other words, cyber systems created a new critical
infrastructure called telecommunications. Without telecommunications infrastructures, the
modern society cannot be maintained. Because of the new service models like cloud
computing, Internet can be regarded as a critical infrastructure. The attacks to the Estonian
networks in 2007 demonstrated how much the well-being of a country is depended on the
Internet infrastructure.
Although the Internet is physically distributed, it is logically single. Therefore, the Internet
brings physically such detached things as people, organizations and states together in the
same medium. Therefore, everyone share the same medium with cyber attackers, but with
different motivations; ranging from cyber criminals to state sponsored hackers. Today, some
of the critical infrastructures are connected to the Internet (Lopez et al. 2007). The
infrastructures that do not have any direct connection to the Internet are usually connected to
the internal production networks of organizations. Hence, critical infrastructures are
connected to the Internet after passing one hop (Igure et al. 2006).
The use of cyber systems in critical infrastructures is a necessity without doubt. For some
infrastructures, Internet connection is a rigid requirement to serve citizens and/or customers
suitably. The critical infrastructure operators benefit from cyber systems for the efficient and
cost effective management of the critical infrastructures. For states, however, cyber systems
must be used in accordance with some specific policies due to the attack potential of cyber
threats. At this point, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program comes to the scene. The
importance of the critical infrastructures necessitates the state level coordination of security
efforts according to the some rigid policies, strategies and procedures (Harrop & Matteson
2013). This hierarchical set of rules is called CIPP. CIPP is the national and coordinated
efforts to keep the critical infrastructures protected from both cyber and physical threats
(Assaf 2008). A number of countries, including developing ones, have critical infrastructure
protection programs. Some developed countries, like the US, have been working on this
subject for decades. Most of the developed countries have started to prepare programs within
last five to ten years. Today, countries give an important place to cyber threats in their
CIPPs. In developed countries, CIPP is an important part of the national security efforts. In
other words, national security officials take cyber security into account because of the
widespread use of cyber systems and their vulnerable nature (Nicholson et al. 2012). This
consideration is materialized with the CIPP.
2.2

Critical Infrastructures and Cyber Threats

Cyber threats against critical infrastructures can be categorized in four main groups, which
area hacktivism, cyber crime, cyber espionage, and cyber war (Prichard & MacDonald
2004). However, there is no clear-cut distinction among these groups, as shown in Figure
2-1. These categorized cyber threats can intersect with each other in many different ways. A
member of a hacktivist group may get into a cyber crime activity. The same group may take
part in a coordinated cyber war or cyber espionage. A cyber act can be categorized or
perceived as both cyber war and hacktivism. As an example, while a country can consider a
cyber incident as cyber war, another can consider the same act as hacktivism.
When critical infrastructures are taken into consideration, cyber espionage and cyber war are
much more harmful than hacktivism and cyber crime. The number of cyber espionage and
cyber war activities is lower, compared to the number of cyber crime and hacktivist attacks.
When the economic damage and national security are the main concerns, the impact level of
cyber espionage occurs to be very high, compared to the impact level of other threat types
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(Kshetri 2005). Although cyber espionage attacks are low in number, they cause losses of
intellectual property, which has a great value for a country. Although cyber crime activities
are large in number, the loss is limited to credentials and money. As far as the public safety
is concerned the impact level of cyber war is high compared to the impact level of other
threat types. Cyber war can affect the availability of SCADA systems and corporate
networks.

Figure 2-1: Four Types of Cyber Threats against Critical Infrastructures

According to “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001”, an industry can be defined as “critical” if a
damage or unauthorized access to that system could reasonably
a) Result in the interruption of life-sustaining services,
b) Cause catastrophic economic damages or
c) Cause severe degradation of national security (USA 2001).
By using the damage classification above, the prominent effects of the four threat categories
on critical infrastructures are shown in Table 2-1 (Kshetri 2005; Lewis 2002; Prichard &
MacDonald 2004; Hinde 1998) . Although there is no crystal-clear classification and
correlation between threat and impact types, Table 2-1 shares the notion that cyber espionage
and cyber war are much more harmful than cyber crime and hacktivism.
Table 2-1: Threat Categories versus Impact Types

Threat Type
Hacktivism
Cyber Crime
Cyber Espionage
Cyber War

2.2.1

Impact Type
The interruption of life-sustaining services
Economic damages
Economic damages
Severe degradation of national security
The interruption of life-sustaining services
Economic damages

Hacktivism

Hacktivists create opportunistic attacks against weak targets. The power of hacktivists comes
from their number: Hacktivism is the activity of a group of hackers. For instance, the hacker
group 'Anonymous' is a hacktivist group. The main purpose of hacktivists is not to make
money: they rather protest something. For example, they protest the governmental
restrictions on the Internet and they attack at the websites of public organizations.
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Hacktivists usually perform Denial of Service attacks. A DoS attack can be defined as
purposefully flooding the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system with a huge number of
legitimate service requests. Hacktivists usually target the availability of networks and
systems by performing DoS attacks. In addition to DoS attacks, hacktivists try to deface
websites, especially the ones of public organizations. They do not usually try to deface a
specific website for a long time. Instead, they search for a specific vulnerability on a number
of websites and deface all of the websites with specific vulnerabilities in their search scope.
Hacktivist use botnets or contact with the owner of botnets to perform DDoS attacks to
guarantee the unavailability of networks and systems.
2.2.2

Cyber Crime

In contrast with hacktivists, the main purpose of cyber criminals is to make money. Cyber
criminals are individuals. They usually do not act in groups like hacktivists. They steal credit
card information, bank account credentials and passwords. Banking and finance are the
target critical sectors for cyber criminals. Compared to other threat types, cyber crime does
not have a prominent effect on critical infrastructures.
2.2.3

Cyber Espionage

Cyber espionage is basically the act of stealing documents from the networks of foreign
countries (Lewis 2002). The loss of confidentiality is the major consequence of cyber
espionage. The term Advanced Persistent Threat is used within the context of cyber
espionage. According to the Mandiant, a famous information security company, APT is a
group of sophisticated, determined and coordinated attackers that have been systematically
compromising US government and commercial computer networks for years. The vast
majority of APT activity observed by Mandiant has been linked to China (Mandiant 2013).
According to the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, an amount of
intellectual property larger than kept in the Library of Congress is stolen every year from the
networks maintained by the US businesses, universities, and government departments and
agencies (DoD 2011).
US - China Economic and Security Review Commission prepared a report for the Congress
in 2008. According to the report, China has an active cyber espionage program and its cyber
warfare is so sophisticated that the United States may not be able to counteract or even detect
the efforts (USCESRC 2008).
2.2.4

Cyber War

Cyber war is the coordinated attacks on the specific critical sectors of a country. Every
critical sector is a potential target for cyber war. Most of the cyber security experts think that
Stuxnet virus marks the beginning of real cyber war. Discovered in June 2010, the Stuxnet
virus targeted the availability of Iranian nuclear energy infrastructure (Farwell & Rohozinski
2011; Langner 2011). According to the American media, the US officials secretly ordered
increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear
enrichment facilities, and according to the participants in the program, that significantly
expanded America’s first sustained use of cyber weapons (Sanger 2012; Kahn 2013). The
cyber attacks against the availability of Estonian and Georgian websites and network
infrastructures are the other examples of cyber war. Although Russia did not undertake those
attacks as a government, the coordinated attacks were performed by Russian people. Cyber
war aims more than the availability of systems and networks. For instance, discovered after
Stuxnet, a virus called Duqu affected the confidentiality of Iranian energy infrastructure.
Because of the similarities they bear, it is considered that the source of Duqu and Stuxnet
was the same. Duqu provided services, which include information stealing capabilities, for
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the attackers (Bencsáth & Pek 2012). The latest discovered malware is called Flame, Flamer
or Skywiper. According to New York Times, Flame appears to be part of the state-sponsored
campaign that spied on and eventually set back Iran’s nuclear program in 2010 (Perlroth
2012).
When the Turkish media reports of the last three years are analyzed, it is easily seen that
there is a dominance of the public services and the energy sectors in the news associated
with the cyber security breaches. As an example, it is reported by the Minister of Energy that
one of the possible reasons for the country-wide electricity blackout in March 31th, 2015
was a cyberattack against electricity transmission infrastructure (Melvin 2015). Operated by
the government, the electricity transmission infrastructure was attacked in October 2014 by
the hacker group Redhack, which alleged to erase 1.5 million debt of the citizens; however it
was refuted by the Ministry of Energy (DHA 2014). According to the Bloomberg, the part of
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in eastern Turkey was blasted by a cyber attack in 2008
(Robertson & Riley 2014).The hacker groups Redhack and Anonymous launched successful
website defacement and denial of services attacks against internet services of various
governmental organizations, including Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Security General Directorate, and Higher Education Council.
2.3

Efforts of Governments and Organizations

Cyber security is an evolving topic. Cyber security was almost only a technical subject two
decades ago, when cyber systems were used solely by a small academic and bureaucratic
community. As the time passed, the engagement of the organizations in the cyber systems
increased. Internationally recognized security management standards are thus developed and
adopted by organizations. As the proliferation of the Internet continued, countries started to
consider cyber security a vital parameter of national security. Therefore cyber security has
been considered as the fifth war-fighting domain by countries (Andress & Winterfeld 2013).
Countries started to prepare national cyber security strategies in this era. Especially after the
alleged Russian hackers’ attacks on Estonian cyber infrastructure in 2007 and the Stuxnet
incident in 2011, they increased national coordination activities in order to secure
infrastructures and prompt response capabilities against adversaries. These events triggered
and accelerated national cyber security strategy preparation processes (Tatar et al. 2014).
According to the webpage of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,
more than fifty countries have national cyber security strategies (NATO CCDCOE 2015).
When the mandates in the national cyber security strategies are taken into account, Critical
Infrastructure Protection is seen to have a dominance over other functions. Because cyber
threats are quite prevalent and advanced today, the priority for those countries is ensuring the
cyber resilience of the critical infrastructures. There are a number of cyber incidents
sponsored by conflicting states. Therefore, it is vital for countries to have secure, resilient
and robust critical infrastructures in terms of cyber security. Such infrastructures can be
accomplished by preparing strategies and action plans that contain the action items intended
to reach this goal.
Presidential Policy Directive – 21 defines cyber resilience as “the ability to prepare for and
adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience
includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally
occurring threats or incidents”. Therefore, cyber resilience can be concisely defined as the
robustness of a country against cyber attacks. It is the preparedness efforts of a country for a
cyber war. Therefore, cyber resilience is something parallel to the defensive actions of a state
(Harrop & Matteson 2013). The offensive strategies and efforts cannot be regarded within
the cyber resilience efforts of a state. Hence, there is a strong relationship between critical
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infrastructure protection programs and cyber resilience. A critical infrastructure protection
program is the prominent effort to have a cyber-resilient country and society.
As stated earlier, the US has been the first country that used the term Critical Infrastructure.
The US also takes place in the forefront of the studies on critical infrastructure protection.
The following paragraphs summarizes the efforts of the US.
2.3.1 National Infrastructure Protection Plan
National Infrastructure Protection Plan is the central document of the current critical
infrastructure protection program of the US (DHS 2013). The subtitle of the plan is
“Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience”. As the subtitle implies, the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan highlights the partnership of public and private
entities. The aim of the plan is to establish the collaboration and cooperation routines in
order to achieve secure and resilient infrastructures. National Infrastructure Protection Plan
is released pursuant to the Presidential Policy Directive-21 (The White House 2013b).
The national plan is a detailed call to action and a document that explains the details of a risk
management framework. Risk management is the core process for critical infrastructure
security and resilience; and it is fully integrated with the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan since achieving resilience is directly related to the successful risk management process
(DHS 2013). The proposed risk management framework has five steps. These steps are as
follows.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Set goals and objectives
Identify infrastructures
Assess and analyze risks
Implement risk management activities
Measure effectiveness

According to the framework, physical, cyber, and human elements of critical infrastructures
should be considered through all steps of the framework. Entire risk management framework
is accompanied by information sharing mechanisms. Information sharing is used as a
feedback mechanism to convey the results of measurement of effectiveness. All of the steps
of risk management framework is explained in this section. The link between these steps and
the items of call to action are shown with call-out boxes. National Infrastructure Protection
Plan does not urge critical infrastructure operators to use this framework. Rather, risk
management framework is an “organizing construct” for different types of infrastructures.
The call to action section of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan is a detailed action
plan which is formed to enhance national critical infrastructure security and resilience. This
section refers to all of the critical infrastructure partners and stakeholders, whether public
and private entities. The basic themes of the call to action section are the sector or crosssector collaboration, cooperation, partnership and information sharing among different types
of partners and stakeholders. The details of the collaboration, cooperation, partnership and
information sharing activities and routines are given in this section. The call to action has
twelve actions to advance national efforts. All of these actions are linked to the national
goals by using call-out boxes, which were given in second section of National Infrastructure
Protection Plan.
National Infrastructure Protection Plan is comprised of the list of the partners and
stakeholders, from federal government agencies to private sector entities, of the critical
infrastructure protection community. The document also lists the roles, responsibilities and
capabilities of these stakeholders. These appendices are extremely useful for the experts who
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try to understand the organizational structure of the US in terms of critical infrastructure
protection.
2.3.2

Presidential Policy Directive – 21

The name of Presidential Policy Directive-21 is Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience, which can be regarded as the initiator of the critical infrastructure protection
efforts of the US in recent years. Presidential Policy Directive -21 emphasize the physical
and cyber threats equally. The directive says that “it is the policy of the United States to
strengthen the security and resilience of its critical infrastructure against both physical and
cyber threats.”
Presidential Policy Directive - 21 is the stimulus of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan. It specifies the organizational structure, roles and responsibilities for critical
infrastructure protection. Presidential Policy Directive - 21 divided the critical infrastructures
into sixteen sectors and identified Sector-Specific Agencies for them.
Here, it is important to share some remarkable points of the Presidential Policy Directive 21. The “interconnectedness and interdependency” of critical infrastructures are emphasized
in the directive. The directive draws attention to interconnectedness and interdependency to
underline the importance of coordination, collaboration and partnership. The directive also
mentions “effective partnerships with critical infrastructure owners and operators”. It is said
that “this partnership is imperative to strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation's
critical infrastructure”. Presidential Policy Directive – 21 accentuates the importance of
international cooperation and the promotion of research and development activities as well.
Three strategic imperatives for critical infrastructure security and resilience are:
1) “Refining and clarifying functional relationships across the Federal Government”
2) “Enable effective information exchange”
3) “Implement an integration and analysis function” (The White House 2013b).
From these excerpts, it can be understood that the protection efforts have to take
interdependencies, relationships and partnership into account. These are the prerequisites to a
successful CIPP. These prerequisites are not technical countermeasures, rather they can be
regarded as the non-technical soft skills of a state. Soft skills denote that they are related to
the security culture and years -even decades- may be required for such skills to be
internalized.
2.3.3

Executive Order – 13636

Executive Order – 13636 is released simultaneously with Presidential Policy Directive – 21
(The White House 2013a). Presidential Policy Directive – 21 covers both physical and cyber
security of the critical infrastructures whereas EO – 13636 is dedicated only to cyber
security. The title of EO is “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity”. It is
noteworthy to state that EO – 13636 is released after the delay of US Cybersecurity Act in
Senate in the summer of 2012.
EO – 13636 assigns duty to the Federal Government to coordinate with critical infrastructure
operators to improve information sharing and to collaboratively develop and implement riskbased approaches to cybersecurity (DHS 2013).
Some of tasks that are assigned by EO to Federal Agencies are stated below:
1) Increasing the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information shared
with the US private sector entities (Responsible bodies: Attorney General, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence)
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2) Expanding the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program (voluntary information
sharing program) to all critical infrastructure sectors in order to assist the owners and
operators of critical infrastructures in protecting their systems (Responsible bodies:
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense)
3) Developing a Cybersecurity Framework (Responsible body: National Institute of
Standards and Technology Director) This framework is prepared by the participation
of representative of public and private organizations and released (NIST 2014).
4) Reviewing the preliminary release of Cybersecurity Framework (Responsible
bodies: Sector-Specific Agencies, Department of Homeland Security, Office of
Management and Budget)
5) Preparing a report for the President, on the feasibility, security benefits, and relative
merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition planning and contract
administration. (Responsible body: Secretary of Defense)
6) Using a risk-based approach to identify critical infrastructure, reviewing and
updating the list of identified critical infrastructure on an annual basis (Responsible
bodies: the Secretary of Homeland Security)
2.3.4

Nationwide Cyber Security Review

Nationwide Cyber Security Review was performed by the US Department of Homeland
Security in 2011, after Congress directed the DHS to assess the cybersecurity of all levels of
the government. Among the 162 State and local government officials, forty-four State
representatives participated in the NCSR survey. There are fifty-seven survey questions,
which are distributed among 12 control areas. The control areas are composed by the help of
the standards like ISO 27001, ISO 27002, NIST SP800-30 and CoBIT. The control areas are
consistent with the famous US security management legislations like FISMA, HIPAA and
GLBA. The control areas are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Malicious Code
Physical Access Control
Logical Access Control
Security Testing
Incident Management
Business Continuity
Personnel and Contracts
Information Disposition
Security Program
Security within Technology Lifecycle
Risk Management
Monitoring and Audit Trails

There is a control maturity model, which consists of six levels:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ad-hoc (Tier-1)
Documented policy (Tier-2)
Documented standards/procedures (Tier-2)
Risk measured (Tier-3)
Risk treated (Tier-3)
Risk validated (Tier-3)

There is a three-level tier structure according to these levels. Therefore, based on their
answers, survey respondents fall into one of the tier levels. It should also be noted that the
answers to the survey questions are selected from these six levels.
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The respondents of the survey were grouped into three distinct types, which are State, State
Agency (agencies responsible for IT services, revenue services, health services and
transportation services) and Local Government (municipalities, counties). The survey results
were published in March of 2012. The detailed results show the answers separated according
to the respondent types.
Although NCSR is not designed to evaluate a nation’s cyber security preparedness or to
determine a maturity level of cyber security, it may show the overall situation of a state,
based on the answers.
2.4

Development of Policies for Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures

An OECD publication named Development of Policies for Protection of Critical Information
Infrastructures compares the development of policies for the protection of critical
infrastructures in seven developed countries (OECD 2007a).
The comparative study of OECD shares some of the good practices of cyber security. It is
stated that these good practices are critical to the successful implementation of information
security in public and private organizations. Some of these good practices are listed as
follows:
1) Clear policy and objectives for cyber security have to be set at the state level.
2) The adopted approach for cyber security have to be consistent with the culture of all
the participants, whether public or private.
3) The state administration have to support and commit to the cyber security studies.
4) Risk assessment and management processes have to be internalized in order to
identify the requirements of cyber security.
5) Information sharing has to be substantiated effectively among all of the participants.
6) All relevant policies and standards have to be distributed to all of the participants.
7) Required training and education facilities have to be performed.
8) Measurements have to be conducted to improve persistently and continually.
Based on the good practices, some components are examined by OECD to compare the
critical infrastructure protection studies of seven developed countries. It is claimed that
governments take these components into account while implementing critical infrastructure
programs. These components are:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

A national strategy
Legal foundations
Incident response capability
Industry-government partnerships
A culture of security
Information sharing mechanisms
Risk management approach

Some of the good practices and components that are listed in OECD report can be regarded
as the parameters of cyber maturity.
2.5

Regulatory Approaches for Critical Infrastructure Protection

The academic articles that study the different approaches for enforcing regulations on critical
sectors are summarized in this section.
There are two perspectives on the regulation of the critical infrastructures in terms of cyber
security. This situation can sometimes be viewed as a dilemma for the governments
(Orlowski 2001). On one side, some security experts and government officials think that
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regulations are imperative to protect the critical infrastructures. On the other side, private
sector executives claim that regulations are the obstacles in front of the innovations in cyber
security. Executives assert that we should cooperate instead of regulate. The disputes
increase in line with the infrastructure ownership of the private sector.
The dilemma was experienced in the proposal of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 in the US.
The original version of the act imposed mandatory security standards on critical
infrastructure owners. It also involved information sharing with the military. Private sector
criticized the proposal for these obligations. As the result of the critiques, the proposal was
altered to reflect changes as the voluntary participation of private sector and stronger
government incentives (Hiller & Russell 2013). In spite of these changes in favor of the
private sector, Cybersecurity Act of 2012 failed to pass US Senate, although it was endorsed
by White House (Kelly 2012). After the dispute of Cybersecurity Act of 2012, Executive
Order 13636 was released by White House in In February 2013 (The White House 2013a).
The title of the EO was “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity”. The main theme
of the EO was to increase the public-private partnership. It assigned duties to federal
agencies in sharing cyber threat information with private sector, in coordinating with critical
infrastructure owners and in collaboratively developing and implementing risk-based
approaches to cybersecurity (DHS 2013).
According to the current EU rules, among all critical sectors, only telecommunications sector
has to adopt security measures and report significant security incidents (European
Commission 2013b). EU is on the way to impose government provisions on several critical
infrastructure sectors of the member countries. On February 2013, European Commission
prepared a proposal for a directive “concerning measures to ensure a high common level of
network and information security across the Union” (European Commission 2013a). The
directive has not been approved yet. If it is approved by the European Council and
Parliament, Member States will have to implement the Directive within 18 months
(European Commission 2013b). As the strongest motive of its latest proposal, European
Commission reminds the previous cyber security gaps that resulted from the voluntary nature
of the past efforts. If the proposal is approved, critical infrastructure operators (from the
sectors ranging from energy to healthcare) and public administrators will be required to
assess the risks they face and to adopt appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure
network and information security. These entities will also be required to report incidents
with a significant impact on core services provided to competent authorities (European
Commission 2013a). As a result, the directive will apply to the critical infrastructures owned
by the private sector as well (Hiller & Russell 2013).
Hiller and Russell state that countries struggle to find the best strategy and regulation for the
critical infrastructures owned by the private sector (Hiller & Russell 2013). The authors
compare the approaches of the US and EU in terms of the cyber security rules on the private
sector. According to the authors, the US follows a voluntary approach for the private sector,
whereas the EU adopts a relatively mandatory approach. This conclusion confirms the latest
developments in the US and EU.
The approach of Australia resembles the approach of the US. According to the Wilson,
Australian government has a deliberate non-regulatory approach for CIP. The liability of the
protection of the infrastructure is left to the owners of the infrastructures (Wilson 2014). The
legal situation is the same for the Australian National Broadband Network, the largest
infrastructure project in the Australian history. There is no security strategy associated with
the national broadband network. Instead of the government rules for the protection of the
infrastructures, Public-Private Partnerships, as a cost-effective partnering with Non15

Government Organizations, would produce positive outcomes for cyber resilience (Cook
2010).
DunnCavelty and Suter emphasize the importance self-regulating and self-organizing
networks for the CIP policy. They argue that the role of the government should be far from
close supervision and immediate control; the government should rather coordinate and
motivate these networks for the CIP tasks. In their article, they contrast the neoliberal
governance theory and the network governance approach and argue that neoliberal
governance theory is not suitable for the security-focused CIP policy because it aims to
increase the efficiency.
Assaf does not see the regulation issue of the critical infrastructures as a dilemma. Rather, he
considers it a choice of governments. According to him, there are two basic models for CIP:
the national security model and the business continuity model (Assaf 2008). Assaf shares an
illuminating regulatory continuum to demonstrate the seven different options; from highest
government intervention to the lowest. He compares the US and Israel in terms of their
governmental interventions in cyber security regulations of critical infrastructures. The US
adopts the business continuity model with the exceptions in energy and chemistry sectors
whereas Israel adopts the national security model.
According to the Luiijf and Klaver, no single governance model for CIP is applicable to all
countries. The regulation of CIP in a country depends on its legal system, the trust level
between government and private sectors, and its historical and cultural background (Luiijf &
Klaver 2004). Hence, Luiijf and Klaver corroborate the idea of Assaf. Luiijf and Klaver also
mention the importance of the cooperation and collaboration efforts in both national and
international domains. They also emphasize the internationally harmonized CIP efforts for
multinational operators.
Orlowski also points out the regulatory approaches for the multinational infrastructures.
According to Orlowski, there are two types of regulations for the CIP: protective security
and criminal laws. Protective regulations should be the last resort for the free market
economies. Countries with such economies should cooperate instead of regulate because
they may impose different regulations on critical infrastructures according to their
constitutional powers. These differences result in inconsistencies at cross-border
management, especially for multinational corporations. On the other hand, fighting against
cybercrime is the area where a commonly accepted regulation is needed (Orlowski 2001).
Convention on Cybercrime, also known as Budapest Convention, is an international treaty to
fight against cybercrime by urging the harmonization of the domestic laws (European
Council 2001). It is signed by 33 countries: 32 members of European Council and the US.
Table 2-2 summarizes the provision approaches of three countries and the EU according to
the articles reviewed. The US and Australia adopt the market provision, which means
minimum supervision of the government. However, energy and chemistry sectors are more
strictly supervised by the US federal agencies. Israel adopts the government provision; that
is, strict supervision of the market by the government. EU recently attempted to shift the
paradigm from market to government provision. However, as a result, the approaches on the
CIP regulation is a hot topic in the developed world. The strict government intervention and
regulations on the CIP efforts is not considered as a suitable option by the academia and
governments of developed countries. A number of academic studies that propose security
management models for CIP originates in such countries. This topic can be summarized by
the following questions: Which is suitable? Regulation or Innovation? These articles focus
on the importance of the cooperation, innovation, and non-regulation over regulations.
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Table 2-2: Provisional Approaches of Three Countries and EU

Government
Provision
US*
EU
Israel
Australia

Market
Provision






* Except for energy and chemistry sectors

2.6

Regulations of Turkey for Critical Infrastructures

In this section, the regulations of Turkey related with the cyber security and critical
infrastructure sectors are resumed.
The statute 2011/2237 on Military Forbidden Zones and Security Zones mentions the
requirements of the physical security of energy, manufacturing, water management,
transportation, telecommunications, intelligence, and military facilities, without using the
term critical infrastructure (Turkish Cabinet 2011). The aforementioned statute does not
include any articles about the cyber security.
Cyber Security Council of Turkey was established in October 2012, with the members from
eleven governmental organizations. After the second meeting of the council in June 2013,
the telecommunications, energy, water management, public services, transportation, and
finance sectors were designated as national critical infrastructures of Turkey. However, the
decision remained in the minutes of the meeting, without changing the existing regulations
or creating a new one in Turkey (Kaska & Trinberg 2015).
Turkey has regulatory authorities for the energy, telecommunications and finance sectors.
The related agencies are autonomously managed. The government in force can appoint only
some members of the boards of these agencies.
Until the amendments in December 2014, there were no cyber security or information
security-related articles in the statutes of the energy sector. Energy Market Regulatory
Authority amended the license regulations of the electricity, natural gas, and petroleum
markets in December 2014. According to the amendments, electricity production,
transmission, and distribution facilities, natural gas transmission and distribution facilities,
and petroleum refineries were required to establish ISO 27001 compliant information
security management systems for information processing departments (EMRA 2014a;
EMRA 2014b; EMRA 2014c).
Publishing a legal annunciation, Information and Communications Technologies Authority
urged the operators to comply with the ISO 27001 in telecommunications sector in October
2010. The authority released a new and more stringent regulation for ISO 27001 compliance
in July 2014 (ICTA 2014).
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency published several legislations for the finance
sector. In January 2008, BSRA published a legal annunciation on the information security
management of the banks. The annunciation contains the provisions about information
security risk management, management liabilities, internal audit, outsourcing rules,
separation of the duties and several other controls (BRSA 2007). Another regulation sets the
rules for the information systems audits of the banks by the independent external auditors
(BRSA 2010).
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In February 2014, Electronic Communications Law was amended to reflect the cabinet
decisions dating back to October 2012 (Turkish Cabinet 2014). By these amendments;
a) Cyber Security Council was defined in ECL. The president of the Cyber Security
Council was appointed as the Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and
Communications. One of the responsibilities of the Cyber Security Council was to
approve the list of the critical infrastructures.
b) The cyber security roles of the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and
Communications (Ministry) were defined. One of the responsibilities of the ministry
was to determine the critical infrastructures, their owners and locations.
As the critique of the Turkish organizational structure and the legislation; Turkey lacks an
overarching critical infrastructure protection program that handles cyber and physical
security together. By considering the establishment of a security zone around the facilities,
the decree 2011/2237 considers only the physical security. The recent amendments to ECL
assign some responsibilities to the Ministry and Cyber Security Council only on cyber
security. The term “critical infrastructure” was used explicitly in the amendments. However,
the amendments hold neither a definition nor a list of the critical infrastructures. Therefore,
they are far from setting up a holistic critical infrastructure protection program. There is
neither legislative nor organizational connection between the decree 2011/2237 and the
amendments to ECL.
The recent amendments to ECL assigned some roles to the Ministry, but not the required
authority. As an example, the Ministry did not have the power to audit the public
organizations and the critical sectors, in context of cyber security. According to the civil law
system, a role that is assigned to a governmental authority by a law has to be elaborated with
lower level statutes. By this way, the details of the applications of the law are specified in
detail. The recent amendments to ECL have not been detailed by using lower level statutes
so far.
2.7

Maturity Models for Cyber Security

Measurement is an important instrument for the continuous improvement of security.
Something that is not measured cannot be managed and thus improved. The maturity
measurement of the cyber security efforts of a country is a rarely-studied topic in the
academic literature, and similarly the maturity measurement of the critical infrastructure
protection efforts of a country has not been studied in the academic literature. It is because
the confidentiality constraints limit the availability of the data and limited data in this area
affect the number and content of the academic studies. The number of governmental studies
about this topic is limited, too. The measurement of the national level cyber security effort is
quite challenging, compared to the measurement of information security within an
organization. The first of the three prominent reasons for the fact is that, cyber security is a
new and challenging topic for countries. Secondly, the scope of the national level cyber
security is quite wide due to the horizontal usage of cyber system by all the sectors. Thirdly,
as cyber security has several dimensions, including policy-level, technical, international,
legislative, and organizational, it is quite difficult to evaluate the different dimensions in the
same pot. Most of the studies in the literature do not propose a dedicated, country-oriented
model; rather they score and rank countries.
Six studies on national cyber security maturity assessment are summarized and compared in
this section. Cyber security is the main focus in four studies, and in two of them is
considered as the parameter of the cyber power of the countries. Two studies are performed
by academics; whereas four studies are performed by international / regional organizations
or governments.
18

2.7.1

The Community Cyber Security Maturity Model

The Community Cyber Security Maturity Model is a government-funded academic study
that includes a holistic cyber security program with five maturity levels (White 2012). The
model includes guidance on how to step forward onto the higher maturity levels. The
CCSMM checks the existence of various best cyber security practices to determine the
maturity level; however, the article did not share a pre-defined and detailed list of the
countermeasures that corresponds to each maturity level. Besides, the upper levels of the
model are not fully developed, because “no community is currently at that level” (White
2012). The CCSMM can be adapted according to the requirements of different types of
targets. The targets of the CCSMM can be organizations, communities, states and even
individuals. The list of the countermeasures may differ according not only to the level of
maturity but also the type of the target. The model is applied to eleven communities within
five states of the US, but the details of the studies are not shared. As far as understood from
the presented article, there is currently no state-level application of the model.
The CCSMM is a three dimensional maturity model. First dimension of the CCSMM is five
maturity levels, extending from initial to vanguard. The second dimension is the type of the
body for which maturity model can be applied. The model can be applied to an organization,
a community or a state. The third dimension of the model is the countermeasures that build
the model. Determined for this dimension, four countermeasure domains are cyber security
awareness, information sharing, processes and procedures to handle cyber events, and test
and evaluation of the cyber security countermeasures.
As of 2011, the model have been implemented in five states within the US. It is stated that
the CCSMM model will evolve and improve as it is applied by the states. As of the
publication date of the article, the upper two levels of the model have not been constituted;
and the application will occur “as a natural outcome as states and communities advance in
the model” (White 2011).
2.7.2

National Cyber Security Management System

National Cybersecurity Management System provides guidance with which a state or region
can measure its current security status (Kettani & Debbagh 2009). NCSecMM is a holistic
security program like the CCSMM. It includes an application framework, roles and
responsibilities matrix, an implementation guidance, and a maturity model. It is basically an
adaptation of ISO 27000 series standards and CoBIT framework countermeasures to the
national context. The maturity level of each process is measured separately according to a
five-level maturity model adapted from CoBIT framework. The model is not applied in a
national context yet. NCSecMM framework includes thirty-four cyber security processes in
five groups. The headings of the some of the processes in five groups are as follows:
1. Strategies and Policies
a. National Cyber Security Strategy
b. Lead Institutions
c. National Cyber Security Policies
2. Implementation and Organization
a. National Cyber Security Council
b. National Cyber Security Authority
c. National CERT
d. National Experts and Policymakers
e. International Expertise
3. Awareness and Communication
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a. Leaders in Government
b. National Awareness
c. Research and Development
d. Cyber Security Culture for Business
4. Compliance and Coordination
a. Private Sector Cooperation
b. Incident Handling
c. International Compliance and Cooperation
5. Evaluation and Monitoring
a. National Cyber Security Observatory
b. National Cyber Security Assessment
c. National Cyber Security Governance
2.7.3

Cyber Readiness Index

Cyber Readiness Index was proposed by the former acting senior director for cyberspace at
the National Security Council of the US. By using the publicly available data resides at the
governmental websites of the countries, the cyber security efforts of thirty-five countries
were assessed according to the best practices specified by the author. The maturity levels of
each country are not represented quantitatively or qualitatively. The study is concluded as
“no country is cyber ready” (Hathaway 2013). The author of the study explains the goal of
the study as “to spark international discussion and inspire global interest in addressing the
economic erosion from cyber insecurity that is holding back more robust economic growth”.
With the aim of determining whether a country is cyber ready or not, five state level domains
are proposed. The titles of each domain and the criteria for each title are given below:
a) National cyber security strategy
i.
The existence of strategy
ii.
The existence of budget allocated to strategy
iii.
The participation and engagement of private sector in national cyber security
strategy
b) The existence of operational Computer Security Incident Response Team
i.
The existence of tested emergency and recovery plans that take the
infrastructure dependencies into account
ii.
The exchange of national contact details of different networks such as
governmental / regulatory bodies and critical infrastructure operators
iii.
The existence of information sharing and alert system
c) The commitment (by country) to protect against cyber crime
i.
The existence of the studies to determine the monetary loss of cybercrime
ii.
Threat assessment
iii.
Establishment of criminal offenses
iv.
Reviewing existing laws
v.
Capacity building mechanisms.
d) The existence of information sharing mechanisms
i.
The existence of cross sector incident-information sharing during and after
incidents
ii.
The existence of rapid reaction mechanism
iii.
The use of unclassified intelligence data
iv.
The existence of situational awareness mechanism
v.
The existence of the cross sector incident management and coordination
mechanism that take the interdependencies into account
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e) The existence of investments and funding of research activities
i.
The existence of budget allocated for cyber security research
ii.
The existence of the national funding for universities
iii.
The ratio of the operational products that emanates from research activities
iv.
The existence of the universities that offer degree in cyber security or
information security
v.
The existence of the government incentives for innovation
vi.
The commitment to the internationally accepted interoperability and security
standards
vii.
The commitment to protect intellectual property
2.7.4

Global Cybersecurity Index

Global Cybersecurity Index is proposed by International Telecommunication Union to figure
the cyber security maturity levels of 104 countries (ITU 2014). The maturity level of a
country is figured by evaluating the existence of seventeen criteria within five domains,
which were determined at Global Cybersecurity Agenda of ITU (ITU 2007).
The domains and the respective criteria are as follows:
a) Legal Measures
i.
Criminal legislation
ii.
General cyber security regulation / compliance
b) Technical Measures
i.
National Computer Security Incident Response Teams
ii.
Government-approved standardization studies
iii.
Personal certification studies
c) Organizational Measures
i.
Clear polices
ii.
Cyber security governance
iii.
Responsible agency for the implementation of cyber security
iv.
National benchmarking in the light of nationally adopted standards
d) Capacity Building
i.
Standardization development studies
ii.
Professional manpower development
iii.
Individual certification
iv.
Agency certification
e) Cooperation
i.
Intra-state cooperation activities
ii.
Intra-agency cooperation activities
iii.
International cooperation activities
iv.
Public-private partnership practices
The goals of the study are stated as the following:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Promote government strategies at a national level
Drive implementation efforts across industries and sectors
Integrate security into the core of technological progress
Foster a global culture of cybersecurity

ITU published a conceptual framework that shows both the explanations of the criteria and
the readiness calculation methodology. The parameters were converted into survey questions
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to measure the maturity level. For each parameter, three possible answers were created. A
country gets zero point for no action, one point for a partial action, and two points for a
comprehensive one.
There were primary and secondary data sources. The primary data source was the relevant
national stakeholders. The secondary data source was the publicly available sources.
There were more than one type of data collection. First of all, the data were collected by
using the online questionnaire in the webpage of the project. The second way was contacting
with the relevant national stakeholders, as stated by ITU. Internal databases of ITU and
publicly-available resources were used as the third data source.
The maturity level of a country is represented by the normalized values between zero and
one. There were twenty-nine different maturity levels, which means that a number of
countries were represented by the same maturity level. As stated by the ITU, “the index has a
low level of granularity since it aims at capturing the cybersecurity preparedness of a country
and not its detailed vulnerabilities”. At final report of the study, the countries were ranked
from the highest to the lowest maturity level.
A total number of 104 countries were scored and ranked in the study. However, the data of
90 countries were based on the internal databases of ITU, and publicly-available resources,
which means only fourteen countries provided data specifically for the study.
2.7.5

Cyber Maturity in the Asia–Pacific Region

Prepared by Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the report “Cyber Maturity in the Asia–
Pacific Region” includes the cyber maturity analysis of fourteen Asia-Pacific region
countries, along with the UK and US (Tobias Feakin & Woodall 2014). The study does not
concentrate solely on cyber security. Cyber security is considered as a dimension of the
general cyber maturity of the countries. The evaluation criteria along with the weights are
determined by the help of the experts from the government, private sector, and academia.
Countries are assessed and scored according to the publicly available data about the
countries. The maturity assessment results are converted into percentages and the countries
are sorted from the highest to the lowest percentage values. ASPI analyzed the cyber
maturity of 14 Asia-Pacific countries. It also included the UK and US as the benchmark.
Cyber maturity assessment is performed according to four key topics and associated
subtopics as follows:
1. Governance
a. The existence of organizational structures for cyber issues, like policy,
security, critical infrastructure protection, crime, consumer protection
b. The existence of legislation
c. The engagement in international discussion on cyberspace
d. The existence of cyber assistance service like CSIRT
2. Military Application
a. The role of the military in cyberspace, cyber policy and cyber security
3. Digital Economy and Business
a. The existence of dialogue between government and industry
b. The extent of digital economy in economic activity
4. Social Engagement.
a. The existence of public awareness, media coverage
b. The percentage of population with internet connectivity.
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As seen from the listed criteria, some of them are related to cyber security while some of
them are not. These criteria are determined in a workshop with the participation of
government officials, private sector representatives and academic experts. After the
identification of the criteria, they are scored by experts, between one and ten. The final
weight value for a specific criterion is calculated by experts by taking the arithmetic average
of weights assigned to it. After weighting the criteria, five answer choices are determined for
each criterion. The answer choices are weighted between one and ten. After the indication of
the weight values for questions (criteria) and the associated answer choices, countries are
assessed and scored. The results are converted into percentages and the countries are sorted
from the highest score to the lowest.
The cyber-maturity assessments and evaluations are made based on the information in the
public domain and open-source material. It is a regional cyber maturity metric within this
study, and planned to conduct annually.
2.7.6

Cyber Power Index

Cyber Power Index is created by Booz Allen Hamilton to score and sort the cyber powers of
nineteen G20 countries, except EU (BAH 2011). Cyber security is not the main focus of the
study, it is rather a dimension of the cyber power of the countries. The weight values of the
criteria and the answer choices are determined by the expert members of a peer panel. The
main sources of data for country evaluations were Economist Intelligence Unit, UNESCO,
ITU, and World Bank.
Cyber power is evaluated according to the four criteria:
1. Legal and regulatory framework
a. Government commitment to cyber development
b. Cyber protection policies
c. Cyber censorship
d. Political efficacy
e. Intellectual property protection
2. Economic and social context
a. Educational levels
b. Technical skills
c. Openness of trade
d. Degree of innovation in the business environment
3. Technology infrastructure
a. Access to ICT
b. Quality of ICT
c. Affordability of ICT
d. Spending on IT
e. Number of secure servers
4. Industry application
a. Smart grids
b. E-health
c. E-commerce
d. Intelligent transportation
e. E-government
The weight values of for these subcategories and thus the categories are settled by the expert
members of a peer panel in May 2011. The weights are created for answer choices for each
subcategory as well. Cyber security is the topic of the cyber protection policy subcategory
within the legal and regulatory framework category. The existence and the details of cyber
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enforcement authority, cybersecurity laws, cybercrime response, international cybersecurity
committees and cybersecurity plan are evaluated. Cyber power index of nineteen countries
are measured and the countries are sorted from the highest to the lowest maturity.
2.7.7

Comparison and Critiques of the Maturity Models

Table 2-3 summarizes six models according to their various properties. The CCSMM and
NCSecMM devise country-level cyber security maturity assessment models. Other four
studies perform country scoring and sorting. Among them, Cyber Readiness Index and
Global Cybersecurity Index concentrate solely on cyber security. The scopes of other two
studies (Cyber Maturity in the Asia–Pacific Region and Cyber Power Index) are wider than
cyber security, which means that cyber security is just a parameter of the broader topic:
cyber power.
It is notable that, none of the studies is specifically dedicated to the maturity assessment of
the critical infrastructure protection efforts of a country
Table 2-3: Summary of the Maturity Studies

Name of the Developed by
study

Brief description

Main
theme

Evaluation
criteria
are
determine
d by using

Country
evaluations
are
performed
according to

The
Community
Cyber
Security
Maturity
Model

Gregory B.
White, The
University
Texas at San
Antonio
(Academia)

A holistic security
program for
organizations,
communities, and
states and maturity
model for determining
cyber security postures
of them.

Cyber
security

Not
specified

Data provided
by government
officials

National
Cybersecurity
Management
System

Kettani &
Debbagh
(Academia)

A holistic security
program for countries,
including framework,
maturity model, roles
assignment and
implementation guide.

Cyber
security

ISO 27002,

Country-level
evaluation is
not performed

Cyber
Readiness
Index

Hathaway
Global
Strategies,
LLC (Private
organization)

Country scoring (35
countries)

Cyber
security

Not
specified
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ITU
documents

Publicly
available data

Name of the Developed by
study

Brief description

Main
theme

Evaluation
criteria
are
determine
d by using

Country
evaluations
are
performed
according to

Global
Cybersecurity
Index

Country scoring and
sorting (104 countries)

Cyber
security

Global
Cybersecur
ity Agenda
(ITU 2007)

Internal
databases of
ITU and
publiclyavailable
resources (90
countries)

ITU
(International
agency)

Data acquired
from national
stakeholders
for the study
(14 countries)
Cyber
Maturity
in
the
Asia–
Pacific Region

Australian
Country scoring and
Strategic
sorting (18 countries)
Policy Institute
(NGO)

Cyber Power Booz Allen
Index
Hamilton
(Private
Organization)

Country scoring and
sorting (19 countries)

Cyber
power

Expert
opinion

Publicly
available data

Cyber
power

Not
specified

Publicly
available data,
international
organizations,
Economist
Intelligence
Unit

First of all, the maturity criteria of the models are not the same. Therefore, the maturity level
of a country may differ among models. As an example, the maturity level of Turkey in
Global Cybersecurity Index study is 64.7%, ranking seventh among twenty-nine different
scores, while it is 30.4% in Cyber Power Index, ranking fifteenth among nineteen countries.
Because national cyber security and critical infrastructure protection are important agenda
items for the countries, some maturity criteria exist in the countries even with low level
maturities. As an example, the national CSIRT organization was specified as a maturity /
readiness criterion in five of the models. However, most countries today –even
underdeveloped ones- have national CSIRTs. Therefore, it may not be a true criterion for the
cyber maturity of a country. A country can effortlessly claim the establishment of national
CSIRT by registering itself to some of the international CSIRT databases. However, whether
a government provides budget, personnel, and trainings is more essential than the
registration to the international databases. The later processes show that the country
attributes importance to cyber security. Therefore, specifying the details of the trivial
maturity criteria may be a sound practice during the development of a maturity model. The
selection of the trivial maturity criteria may even result in unexpectedly high scores for
especially underdeveloped countries.
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The second criticism for the current models is about the method of specifying the maturity
criteria and the application of the maturity model. The basic constructs of a maturity model
are its maturity criteria. If the criteria are determined by analyzing the actual security posture
of a country, the current situation and progress can be observed more realistically by using
the maturity model. The models that evaluate the maturity of the national level cyber security
efforts are limited not only in number but also in content. The maturity evaluations in the
current literature are performed by applying the following two steps consecutively:
1) A set of criteria is determined by using usually the best practices or publicly
available sources. (Please refer to the fifth column of Table 2-3)
2) The countries are evaluated according to the publicly available data or sometimes by
using the questionnaires. (Please refer to the sixth column of Table 2-3)
In order to increase the accuracy level of a maturity model, the criteria of the maturity model
should be grounded on the actual data and vulnerabilities of the country. Following to the
preparation of the maturity model, the measurements should be performed by the relevant
government officials. These customizations will definitely increase the accuracy of the
maturity model. Hence, the model will be more beneficial for the countries in both the
evaluation of the current cyber security postures and in the identification the requirements of
the prospective studies.
In this PhD research, the researcher performed these customizations by using the data of the
state-sponsored project and by contacting with government officials. Secondly, rather than
the measurement of the state-level cyber security, the researcher proposed a maturity model
which is specific to the critical infrastructure protection efforts of a country, because critical
infrastructure protection is the common and one of the most vital agenda items in the
national cyber security strategies of the countries (Klimburg 2012).
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CHAPTER 3

3

RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter contains the sections of several issues regarding the research design. These are
research motivation, research question, methodical details of GTM, motive of selecting
GTM as research method, details of research data, interval validity issues, details of Delphi
survey, research population, sampling methods, role of the researcher, trustworthiness of the
research and finally research ethics.
3.1

Introduction

The PhD study has three main outputs. Firstly, the root causes of the susceptibility of the
critical infrastructures to cyber threats are extracted. Secondly, the set of principles for the
cyber security of the critical infrastructure of Turkey are extracted by using the root causes.
Thirdly, a national level cyber security maturity model is devised by using the set of
principles.
Therefore, the PhD study was basically a three-phased research. At the first phase, a
qualitative data analysis was performed by using the GTM to extract the root causes from the
data. At the second phase, Delphi survey was performed by using the outputs of the first
phase to find the set of principles. At the third phase, based on a simple linear additive
evaluation model, a maturity model was developed by using the views of the experts at
Delphi survey. The overview of the research process along with the inputs and outputs is
shown Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1: Research Process (General View)

The details of the research is shown in Figure 3-2. The three phases of the research are
explicitly shown with dashed lines in this figure. GTM is composed of four consecutive
recursions, a saturated theory was extracted after these recursions. The Delphi Survey
consists of five consecutive rounds. After the Delphi survey, a maturity model was devised
by using the linear additive model. Finally, an unofficial application of the model was
performed as well.
3.2

Research Motivation and Research Questions

The researcher participated in the state-sponsored project named “Information Security
Management in Critical Infrastructures” between January 2012 and December 2013. The
vulnerabilities that stem from the usage of the cyber systems were analyzed in the project.
The results of the project showed that critical infrastructures had significant vulnerabilities
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related with the cyber systems, in spite of recent national efforts such as the establishment of
Cyber Security Council and the national CSIRT organization.
The research motivation of the GTM is to discover the possible root causes of the
susceptibility of the critical infrastructures to cyber threats. The research question is “What
are the possible root causes of the susceptibility of the critical infrastructures of Turkey to
cyber threats?”
The second research question is “What are the set of principles to mitigate these root
causes?” This question is answered through the conduction of Delphi survey.

Figure 3-2: Research Process (Detailed View)

3.3

Grounded Theory Method

A number of qualitative data were gathered for the PhD research. The data were analyzed
using Grounded Theory Method, a qualitative data analysis method. The qualitative data
were rigorously coded, codes were categorized and categories were compared in order to
extract the theory inside the data, the root causes of the susceptibility of the critical
infrastructures to cyber threats.
GTM is an interpretive, qualitative and inductive data analysis method, which is proposed
and used by two sociologists, Glaser and Strauss in 1967. It is the discovery of the theory
through the analysis of data (Strauss & Corbin 2008). GTM provides a detailed, rigorous,
and systematic method of data analysis (Jones & Alony 2011). In GTM, the researcher does
not begin with a hypothesis that has to be proved or disproved, but he begins “with an area of
study and allows the theory to emerge from the data” (Strauss & Corbin 2008). In GTM, the
research question is a statement that identifies the phenomenon to be studied. The results of
the assessments within the project of “Information Security Management in Critical
28

Infrastructures” showed that cyber systems were used significantly in the sectors of the
energy, telecommunications, finance, government services, transportation, and water
management. The project also showed that critical infrastructures are susceptible to cyber
threats because of their inherent vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are paving the way for
the successful cyber attacks. In this research, the phenomenon of the susceptibility of the
critical infrastructures to cyber threats were analyzed. The root causes of the susceptibility
were extracted as the theory.
3.3.1

Suitability of the Grounded Theory Method

There were several reasons for the selection of GTM as the data analysis method. First of all,
GTM is particularly suitable when “the topic of interest has been relatively ignored in the
literature or has been given only superficial attention” (Goulding 2002). The topic of the
possible root causes of cyber security vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures of Turkey
has been studied in neither the national nor the international literature. Secondly, GTM is
suitable for studying social issues (Jones & Alony 2011; Glaser & Strauss 1967). Cyber
security is a horizontal area that intersects a number of social disciplines, like public
administrations, regulations and international security policies. Because the researcher aims
to find the “root causes” of the cyber security vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures of
Turkey, he has to analyze the topics in social nature rather than technical issues. Thirdly,
GTM is suitable for the analysis and interpretation of complex and multifaceted phenomena
(Orlikowski 2002; Charmaz 2000). During the data analysis, the researcher took the
organizational, sectorial and country level cyber security countermeasures into account. The
researcher had to consider not only technical countermeasures, but also the non-technical
ones. He dealt with the complex correlations among the vulnerabilities. GTM provided a
structured roadmap in analyzing the complex phenomena. Fourthly, GTM is a proven
method for its appropriateness to develop new theories from broad and diverse sets of
complex data (Glaser & Strauss 1967). During the data analysis, the researcher had to deal
with hundreds of documents of different types, from questionnaires to legislation texts, from
media reports to independent evaluation ones. Well-defined coding steps helped much in
dealing with the vast amount of diverse data. Lastly, the first phase of the research, to some
extent, falls under the discipline of management information systems. GTM fits well into the
information systems research, because information systems cover not only information
technology, but also procedures and peoples (Fernández & Lehmann 2011). There are a
number of information systems researches that are performed by using GTM (Rodon &
Pastor 2007; Matavire et al. 2010; Hansen & Kautz 2005).
There are two basic schools of GTM, namely Glaserian school and Straussian school (Jones
& Alony 2011). In Glaserian School, the researcher has an empty mind at the beginning. He
asks neutral questions and lets the theory emerge. As a result, the researcher is in a passive
role. In Straussian School, the researcher has a general idea of the phenomenon to be studied.
He forces the theory by using structured questions. As a result, the researcher is in an active
role. In this research, Straussian school was adopted. The researcher has a considerable
amount of knowledge on the subject area. He does not have an empty mind. He directs the
research until the extraction of the theory.
3.3.2

Research Data

The data belonging to six critical sectors were analyzed in this PhD study. The six critical
sectors were energy, telecommunications, finance, transportation, water management, and
government services, which were resolved in the second meeting of the Cyber Security
Council of Turkey in June 2013.
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The project data were composed of interview texts and various kinds of official documents.
Data collection and interviews were performed until theoretical saturation. Nine semistructured interviews were performed with the critical infrastructure owners. Interviews
provided the focused, in-depth and rich data on the phenomenon under analysis. The
interviews included open-ended questions about the general security posture, threats,
potential vulnerabilities, applied countermeasures, and weaknesses of the interviewed
organization and the critical sectors. The questions were reshaped according to the emerging
categories and themes, and they were regarded as the initiators and catalyzers of the long
lasting and evolving interviews. The interviewees were mid-managers and employees of the
information processing departments. Table 3-1 shows the distribution of the interviewed
organizations according to the sector and organization types.
Table 3-1: Distribution of the Interviewed Organizations

Critical Sector

Energy
Telecommunications
Finance
Transportation
Water Management
Government Services
Total

Interviewed
organization
(Public)
1
1
1
1
1
1
6

Interviewed
organization
(Private)
1
1
1
0
0
0
3

As to increase the robustness and reliability of the study, interviewed critical infrastructure
operators were determined for each sector according to the dominance of the governmental
or private organizations in that sector. Table 3-2 summarizes the situation of the ownership
for each sector. Table 3-2 is created by using the public information sources like websites of
the regulatory authorities and critical infrastructure operators. There is no official statistical
data on the ownership of the critical infrastructure operators.
Water management and transportation sectors are substantially operated by the governmental
organizations in Turkey. The semi-structured interviews are performed with governmental
organizations for these sectors. The energy, telecommunications, and finance sectors are
operated by both private and governmental organizations. Therefore, for these sectors, both
types of the organizations are interviewed.
Table 3-2: Summary of the Ownerships of the Critical Infrastructure Operators

Critical Sector
Energy

Ownership
Electricity production: %38 government (EUAS 2015)
Electricity transmission: government (TEIAS 2015)
Electricity distribution: private (TEDAS 2015)
Natural gas transmission: government (BOTAS 2015)
Natural gas distribution: In privatization. (Ankara: private, Istanbul:
government)
Petroleum production: %73 government (TP 2015)
Petroleum transmission: government (BOTAS 2015)
Petroleum refinery: private (TUPRAS 2015)
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Critical Sector
Telecommunications

Finance
Transportation
Water management
Government services

Ownership
Two GSM operators: Private
One GSM operator: %88,99 of shares are owned by Turk Telekom
Turk Telekom: %55 of the shares are privatized (Turk Telekom
2015)
Satellite and cable television: government
Stock exchange, treasury, central bank: government
Banks: %6 government (Wiki 2015b)
The prominent airway, railway and seaway operators are owned by
government.
Government
Government

Three hundred and nine documents associated with ninety one different governmental or
private organizations were gathered. Most of these organizations were critical infrastructure
owners from energy, telecommunications, finance, transportation, water management and
government services sectors. There were also documents belonging to the regulatory
authorities and the ministries.
The distribution of the organizations according to the sector type and ownership is shown in
Table 3-3.
Table 3-3: Distribution of the Organizations according to the Sector and Owner

Critical Sector of the
Organization
Energy
Telecommunications
Finance
Transportation
Water Management
Government Services
Total

Private

Governmental Total

6
5
8
5
3
0
27

12
7
10
7
3
25
64

18
12
18
12
6
25
91

The collected documents were classified in five groups. These are:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Minutes of meeting
Independent evaluation report
Regulation text
Organizational report
New and media report

Minutes of meeting are the notes taken during the state-sponsored project. The researcher
took a written consent from the project manager. Performed by the independent third parties,
independent evaluation reports are information security audit and analysis results of the
critical infrastructure owners. Regulation texts are the laws and statues that regulate the
activities of critical infrastructures operators. Regulation texts provide insight into the
security views and practices of the organizations. Organizational reports are the documents
prepared by the organizations such as annual activity reports, annual plans, and strategic
plans. Organizational reports were downloaded from the websites of the organizations. These
reports contain valuable information on the cyber security perceptions of the organizations.
News and media reports are media excerpts related with the critical infrastructures. The
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researcher collected the news related with the critical infrastructures of Turkey between 2011
and 2014. News and media reports include valuable information on threats, the opinions of
the experts and the government officials.
As shown in Table 3-4, minutes of meetings and independent evaluation reports are
restricted documents, which are not available publicly; whereas regulation texts,
organizational reports, and news and media reports are publicly available documents. Table
3-4 shows the source of the documents as well.
Table 3-4: Confidentiality of the Gathered Documents

Document Type
Minutes of Meeting
News and Media

Confidentiality
Restricted
Publicly available
Publicly available

Source
State sponsored project
Newspapers and Internet media
Official websites of the organization
Official Gazette
State sponsored project
Official websites of the organizations
State sponsored project
State sponsored project

Regulation Text
Organizational
Report
Independent
Evaluation Report

Publicly available
Restricted

The distribution of the collected documents according to the critical sector type is shown in
Table 3-5.

3.3.3

3
9
9
7
11
39

5
3
5
2
16
31

2
4
3
3
14
26

TOTAL

Finance

20
15
12
18
21
86

Government Services

Telecommunications

Minutes of Meeting
News and Media Report
Regulation Text
Organizational Report
Independent Evaluation Report
TOTAL

Water Management

Document Type

Energy

Critical Sector

Transportation

Table 3-5: Distribution of the Documents

3
2
2
4
6
17

13
41
8
14
34
110

46
74
39
48
102
309

Internal Validity by Using Data Triangulation

The triangulation obtained by using different sources of data for the internal validity of the
research was performed in this PhD study (Kaplan & Duchon 1988). The triangulation of the
data improved the reliability and validity of the study. The data triangulation can be regarded
as a means of completeness of the research as well (Adami & Kiger 2005). By triangulating
data, the research relied on the multiple sources of evidence and the construct validity is
ensured (Thai et al. 2012). Therefore, unbiased data were used in data analysis. The
triangulation of data from different sources helped the researcher to avoid potential
analytical errors and omissions (Kaplan & Duchon 1988). Therefore, the researcher tried to
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reduce the weaknesses of each individual data source (Thai et al. 2012). Table 3-6 shows the
sources of the collected data. Internal means that the data are produced by the analyzed
organizations. External means that the data are produced by the independent third party
organizations. News and media along with independent evaluation reports are external to the
organization. Organizational reports are internal documents.
Table 3-6: Sources of the Documents

Document Type
Minutes of Meeting
News and Media
Regulation Text
Organizational Report
Independent Evaluation Report

Prepared by
Internal / External
External
Internal / External
Internal
External

Regulation texts can be either internal or external. If it is prepared by the critical
infrastructure operator itself, it is internal. If it is prepared by a higher order authority such as
regulatory authority, it is external. Directives, instructions, circulars are internal regulations,
whereas laws are external to the most of the critical infrastructure operators.
Minutes of meetings can be either internal or external as well. Minutes of meetings were
created by the researcher including the opinions of the third parties. However they also
contain the opinions of the organizations.
3.3.4

Application Details of the Grounded Theory Method

In Straussian GTM, there are three consecutive steps which are open coding, axial coding
and selective coding. The qualitative data were coded, and codes were categorized in open
coding step. Categories are the basic headings under which extracted codes are clustered.
Categories were compared to find the themes in axial coding step. Redundant, obvious, and
irrelevant themes were eliminated to refine the theory in the selective coding step. Selective
coding is the integration of different categories in order to build a theory (Thai et al. 2012).
A single run of three steps was not enough to obtain a saturated theory. GTM is the recursive
process of data collection, data coding, comparative analysis, and theoretical sampling until
theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Goulding 2002; Locke 1996; Strauss & Corbin
2008). The details of the application of the GTM for the PhD research is shown in Figure
3-3. Data analysis performed in four recursions. Only open coding step was conducted in the
first recursion. In the following three recursions, all three consecutive coding steps were
conducted.
It is important to emphasize the theoretical sampling processes between the recursions.
Because GTM is a process of discovery rather than hypothesis testing, theoretical sampling
was performed instead of statistical sampling (Denscombe 2010; Strauss & Corbin 2008). In
theoretical sampling, the unsaturated theory of initial recursions guides the data collection
processes of the next recursion. The type of data, critical sector, interview questions, and
organization for the next recursion were determined according to the results of the current
recursion during the data analysis. The researcher decided the new resources of data,
reshaped the interview questions according to the theoretical sampling. This process was
performed until theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is the point where new data
does not change the discovered theory (Shannak 2009).
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Figure 3-3: Details of the Grounded Theory Method

As shown in Figure 3-3, first open coding started with an initial set of data. The results of the
first open coding process guided the second recursion in terms of both sector type,
organization type and the document collections. The first set of codes, categories, and
themes were created during the second recursion. A theory was discovered after the second
recursion. Second recursion guided the third recursion by performing the theoretical
sampling again. A saturated theory was obtained after the third recursion. The purpose of the
fourth recursion was to validate the saturated theory by performing the last coding based on
new interviews and documents. The validated themes were the root causes of the
susceptibility of the critical infrastructures to cyber threats. After the last recursion, the root
causes were verified by the participation of two experts. During the axial coding steps of all
recursions, comparisons and contrasts among and within categories were performed to
extract the meaningful themes. During the selective coding steps, the researcher performed
micro analysis, meaning that the researcher prepared memos in order to find the repetitions
and eliminate the redundant, irrelevant, and trivial themes.
The researcher exhibited the results of previous recursions to the participants of the semistructured interviewees at the next recursion to acquire the reactions like acceptance,
rejection, and comments (Thai et al. 2012). The results were substantially accepted by the
interviewees with minor comments.
3.4

Delphi Survey

The second important output of the thesis was the development of the set of cyber security
principles for critical infrastructures. The researcher had the opportunity of contacting with
the experts to develop a set of principles for the cyber security of the critical infrastructures.
The set of principles was determined by conducting a Delphi survey. Besides the set of
principles, the weight values of the principles were determined by the Delphi survey. The
arithmetic averages of the individual weight values were used in the maturity measurement.
The Delphi survey as a research method was quite compatible with the task of determining
the set of cyber security principles and weight values. The objective of the Delphi survey is
to obtain the consensus of the opinions of a group of experts (Dalkey & Helmer 1962). The
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Delphi technique is a widely used and accepted method for gathering the opinions of the
experts (Hsu & Sandford 2007).

Figure 3-4: Detailed Flowchart of the Delphi Survey

The flowchart of the Delphi survey is given in Figure 3-4. The researcher provided experts
the extracted root causes of the susceptibility to cyber threats. A five-round Delphi survey
was conducted with controlled opinion feedback of the researcher between the rounds. The
e-mails were sent to experts separately. So that the experts remained anonymous to express
their opinions freely without any biases or refrainment (Chan et al. 2001). As the result of
the Delphi survey, a convergence of the opinions of six experts was gathered. It seems
notable that the set of principles were determined by six experts, not by the researcher. The
role of the researcher in Delphi Survey was to consolidate the answers and send back to
experts along with the controlled opinion feedbacks. The researcher provided the necessary
instructions and warning between the rounds as feedback.
3.5

Creation of a Maturity Model and Pilot Application of the Model

For organizations, there are a number cyber security maturity assessment studies, which are
developed by academia or government (Adler 2013; Lessing 2008; Miron & Muita 2014;
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Eshlaghy & Pourebrahimi 2011; Karokola et al. 2011; Butkovic & Caralli 2013). However,
there is a need for models that measure the state-level maturity.
After determining the set of principles and their weight values, a maturity model was
proposed by using the linear additive evaluation model.
An unofficial pilot application of the maturity model was performed for Turkey by the
participation of ten government or former government officials. The maturity model and
application details were given in the next chapter.
3.6

Research Population

During the research, there were several points where sampling has to be performed. Table
3-7 shows the all points of the research at which the sampling was performed.
Table 3-7: Summary of the Sampling Process

Research Process

Target Population

Sampling Method
Convenience
The semi-structured interviews All of the critical infrastructure
sampling &
(The first phase of the research) operators
Theoretical
sampling
Theoretical
The collection of the
All of the critical infrastructure
sampling &
documents (The first phase of
operators
Convenience
the research)
Sampling
The verification of the theory
Convenience
All of the experts that studies critical
with expert opinion (The first
Sampling
infrastructure security
phase of the research)
Delphi survey (The second
All of the experts that study critical Convenience
phase of the research)
infrastructure security
Sampling
The application of the maturity
Convenience
model for Turkey (the third
All of the related government official Sampling
phase of the research)
The target population of the first phase of the research was all of the critical infrastructure
operators in all the critical sectors. There are more than 300 critical infrastructure operators
in six different sectors in Turkey. It was infeasible to study the entire population due to the
time and cost constraints. In order to ensure reliable observation and analysis, a wholly
representative sample from the population was selected, by performing both theoretical and
convenience sampling methods. As a consequence, the documents that belong to 91 different
organizations were gathered. 71 of the organizations were critical infrastructure operators.
The distribution of the organizations according to the areas of activity are shown in Table
3-8.
Table 3-8: Distribution of the Organizations According to the Areas of Activity

Organization type
Critical infrastructure operators
Ministries and regulatory authorities
Research institutes and non-profit organizations
Total

Total Number
71
15
5
91

The organizations for the semi-structured interviews were determined by using theoretical
sampling. According to the results of the data analysis in a recursion, the organizations were
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determined for the next recursion. The current situation and interim results of the data
analysis guided the researcher to the selection of the organizations. The process of
theoretical sampling may also be called as purposeful sampling, because the samples were
selected purposefully by the researcher (Coyne et al. 1997).
The documents were collected by using both theoretical sampling and convenience
sampling. The results of the previous recursion guided the researcher to gathering the
documents for the current recursion.
The researcher collected conveniently accessible and proximate documents rather than
barely reachable and obtainable ones. This is where the convenience sampling begins.
Because the cyber security of the critical infrastructure is a confidential topic, not all of the
organizations in target population were willing to document sharing. Therefore, the
documents provided by the voluntary organizations were accepted. However, the researcher
took the following factors into consideration for the convenience sampling.
a. The type of the document
b. The belonging organization type (governmental or private)
c. The belonging sector type
Therefore, the researcher gathered the documents to obtain a uniform distribution in terms of
the above-mentioned factors.
The researcher studied with two experts for the verification of the theory. Six experts
participated in the Delphi Survey. Ten government officials participated in the application of
the maturity survey of Turkey. The experts were selected by convenience sampling. Because
the researcher has fifteen years of experience in cyber security field and cyber security
community is already a closed and small community, he is acquainted with the most of the
experts and government officials in Turkey. Therefore, the researcher easily identified and
reached the experts and officials for these three studies.
The selection of the experts for the verification was performed according to the criteria in
Table 3-9.
Table 3-9: Sampling Details for the Verification of the Theory

Criteria
The number of the
years of experience
in cyber security
Job description

Value
At least five
years of
experience
The participation
of the national
level cyber
security efforts

Reason
At least five years of experience in cyber security is
necessary to obtain the required insight for the
assessment and verification of the extracted theory.
Because the scope of the PhD study is national level
cyber security, experts who participated in the
national level cyber security are required to verify
the root causes.

The selection of the experts for the Delphi survey was performed in accord with the criteria
in Table 3-10.
Table 3-10: Sampling Details for the Delphi Survey

Criteria
The number of the
years of experience
in cyber security

Value
At least five
years of
experience

Reason
At least five years of experience in cyber security is
necessary to determine the set of principles.
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Criteria
Job description

Job divergence

Value
The knowledge
of the domain of
the critical
infrastructures
At least one
participant from
government
At least one
participant from
private sector
At least one
participant from
academia

Reason
The knowledge of the concept of critical
infrastructures, and critical infrastructure protection
is required to determine the set of principles.
The job divergence of the participants enables the
acquisition of the different point of views.

The selection of the government officials for the application of the maturity model was
performed in line with the criteria in Table 3-11.
Table 3-11: Sampling Details for the Application of the Maturity Survey

Criteria

Value

The number of years of
experience in cyber security

At least one year of
experience

Job description

The knowledge of the
domain of national cyber
security

3.7

Reason
At least one year of
experience in cyber security is
necessary to assess the current
situation of Turkey.
The existence of knowledge of
national cyber security is
required to assess the current
situation of Turkey.

Role of the Researcher

The researcher has fifteen years of cyber security experience, which provides some
advantages for this PhD study. First of all, it helped much in accessing the experts and
officials in different parts of the PhD research. It also assisted in reaching documents.
Secondly, it increased the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher. The researcher has the
knowledge of the current literature on the critical infrastructure protection, and the latest
efforts of the countries. That knowledge increased the theoretical sensitivity of the
researcher. By this way, the researcher was sensitive about the criticality of the data in
developing the theory at the first phase of the research: data analysis with GTM. The
researcher had the insight in the selection of the organizations, interviewees, and collection
of the documents. That insight accompanied the researcher throughout the four recursions of
the first phase of the research. By theoretical sensitivity, the researcher had the ability to
interpret the data, to understand the complex situations, and to omit the irrelevant pieces
from the analysis. The researcher was already familiar with the research setting, which
covers the organizations like critical infrastructure operators, ministries and regulatory
authorities. Therefore, the researcher started his PhD research with some pre-knowledge
about the phenomenon and the organizations in mind. This situation helped the researcher to
perform the required delimitations. In this research, theoretical samplings between the
recursions of the first phase were the points where delimitations were performed. During the
Delphi survey, opinion feedbacks, which were also another means of delimitations, were
given to the experts between the rounds.
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On the other hand, the experience of the researcher may also be a disadvantage for the PhD
study (Creswell 2012; Malterud 2001). The discovered theory at the end of the first phase of
the research may be influenced by the researcher’s experience. The experience and
knowledge of the researcher, in other words, his theoretical sensitivity may be a bias factor
for the first phase of the research. The constant comparisons during axial coding steps were
important gadgets to eliminate any bias. Challenging the interim conclusions with the new
data helped to eliminate the bias (Strauss & Corbin 2008). The verification phase at the end
of the first phase of the PhD study was another important gadget to check the existence of
any bias. Two experts checked the extracted theory in detail and made some corrections. The
Delphi Survey was performed by six experts, with minor contributions of the researcher.
Therefore, the disadvantages that might originate from the experience of the researcher were
debilitated by incorporating the experts into the PhD research.
3.8

Trustworthiness of the Research

Several validity and reliability measures were applied to secure the trustworthiness and the
robustness of the research and findings.
A data analysis, which is performed by GTM, can be evaluated according to four aspects
(Strauss & Corbin 2008). These aspects are:
a)
b)
c)
d)

The reliability, validity, and credibility of the data,
The credibility of the theory,
The reliability, validity, and credibility of the data analysis process,
Back-traceability from the theory to the data.

At the first phase of the research, the triangulation of the data by using different sources of
the data was performed. Therefore, the possible weaknesses of a single data source were
eliminated. Secondly, the researcher exhibited the interim results to the participants of the
semi-structured interviews to receive the reactions like acceptance, rejection, and comments
(Thai et al. 2012). The researcher shared each transcript with the participants to check for the
accuracy as well. These were the means of the construct validity of the research.
The researcher collected data and made interviews until theoretical saturation. This type of
actions increased the reliability and repeatability of the study.
Research steps are auditable by the documentation of coding steps. These audit trails ensure
the credibility of the theory (Sandelowski & Barroso 2002).
The first step of the data analysis was the selection of the sample population. The researcher
showed the details of the selecting sample in the PhD thesis. The researcher also wrote
memos which show the impressions of the researcher. Constant comparison and theoretical
sampling processes continuously evolved the theory. All of these steps can be observed in
the thesis document.
At the end of the first phase of the research, the extracted theory was verified by two experts.
The experts checked the theory and accepted it with minor changes that did not change the
meaning of the theory. At the second phase of the research, the Delphi survey was performed
by the participation of six cyber security experts, who have twelve years of experience on
average. Some of them have PhD degrees. These peer examination processes also increased
the internal reliability of the PhD research.
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3.9

Research Ethics

Interviewees of the semi-structures interviews were aware of their rights, such as rejecting
the participation and giving up at any time. Interviewees also knew their rights to control the
data that were produced as the result of interviews. The control of data included the deletion
of the data as well. They also knew their rights to review the results of the interviews, to
ensure that their statements had been accurately represented.
The data were anonymized during data analysis by using coding steps. Therefore, none of
the interviewees could be identified through their responses.
The PhD topic intersects with the national security. The research data and the codes contain
a mass amount of vulnerabilities associated with critical infrastructures. Because of the
confidentiality constraints, no organization name was exposed in the thesis. Any
vulnerability information that might be used to trace back to the specific organizations was
anonymized during the preparation process of the thesis. Therefore, any explicit or implicit
relationships between the vulnerabilities and the organizations were removed.
The most of the data (all of the confidential documents) were gathered by using the
authorization obtained by the state sponsored project. The written and signed consent of the
project manager was obtained at the beginning of the research.
The research data were kept safe during the research. Nobody had access to it apart from the
researcher. At the end of the PhD research, the data were permanently deleted.
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CHAPTER 4

4

FINDINGS

Forth chapter contains step-by-step application details and findings of the three-phased
research.
4.1

First Phase of the Research: Grounded Theory Method

As stated at the third chapter, qualitative data analysis with GTM was a recursive process
with four recursions. The research process of the GTM was shown in Figure 3-3 in the
previous chapter. The qualitative data analysis was repeated four times until the theoretical
saturation. After each recursion, the theoretical sampling was performed for the next
recursion based on the interim results of the previous one.
At the first recursion, only open coding step was performed. At next three recursions, open
coding, axial coding and selective coding steps were performed. At the second recursion,
extracted codes started to cluster around categories. Relationships emerged after constant
comparisons among categories, and these relationships yielded themes, which were
fundamental constructs of the theory. At two subsequent recursions, the categories and
themes are saturated and validated with minor changes.
Table 4-1 contains the summary of the recursions in the first phase of the research.
Table 4-1: Details of the Four Recursions of the Data Analysis

Analyzed
documents

First
Recursion
Publicly
available
documents
(regulation
texts, news &
media reports,
organizational
reports)

The number 109
of analyzed
documents
The sector of the
interviewed
organization*

Second
Recursion
Internal
documents
(independent
evaluation
reports, minutes
of meetings)
Publicly
available
documents
(regulation texts,
organizational
reports)
76

Third
Recursion
Internal documents
(independent
evaluation reports,
minutes
of
meetings)
Publicly available
documents
(regulation
texts,
organizational
reports)

Energy (G)
Water
management (G)
Finance (P)

Government
Energy (P)
services (G)
Finance (G)
Transportation (G)
Telecommunications
(G, P)
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86

Fourth
Recursion
Internal
documents
(independent
evaluation
reports, minutes
of meetings)
Publicly
available
documents
(regulation texts,
organizational
reports)
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First
Recursion
-

Second
Recursion
Initial set of
Interview
open-ended
questions
interview
questions
Open coding
Coding steps Open coding
Axial coding
Selective coding
theory Discovery of a
Evolution of No
discovered
theory
the Theory
(unsaturated)

Third
Recursion
Reshaped
and
detailed interview
questions

Fourth
Recursion
Same questions
as the previous
recursion

Open coding
Open coding
Axial coding
Axial coding
Selective coding
Selective coding
Saturation of the Validation of the
theory
theory

* G: Governmental organization, P: Private organization
4.1.1

First Recursion: Scanning

At the first recursion, data analysis was performed by using publicly available documents,
which were regulation texts, news - media reports, and organizational reports. The goal of
the first recursion was to understand the environment in which critical infrastructures
operate, and to minimize the possible biases of researchers for the next recursion (Thai et al.
2012). In the first recursion, only open coding was performed. All of the collected data from
all sectors were read and prominent pieces of the data were labelled so that the codes would
be extracted. The content of the data was limited. So, extracted codes were not enough to
create categories and to perform axial coding. However, the first recursion provided
important information on the general security postures of the critical sectors. When the
documents were analyzed during the first recursion, energy and water management sectors
drew the attention of the researcher as the critical infrastructure operators of these sectors
had minimum amount of cyber security or information security paragraphs in their
organizational reports and regulations. In addition, there were some remarkable pieces of
news associated with the problems of these sectors as well.
Table 4-2 shows the distribution of the coded documents according to the type of the
documents. The researcher coded 109 documents at the first recursion.
Although the documents were high in number, the number of codes extracted from these
document was relatively low. It was because most of these documents were not
cybersecurity-oriented. For example, in some of the documents, less than five codes were
extracted.
Table 4-2: Distribution of the Analyzed Documents at the First Recursion

Document type

Number
documents
74
21
14
109

News and media report
Regulation text
Organizational report
Total

of

After the open coding process at the first recursion, it was decided that the energy and water
management sectors were to be the focus because of the low number of security related
codes in regulations and organizational reports and high number of security incident related
codes in the news and media reports. The semi-structured interviews were arranged with the
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operators within these sectors. An operator from finance sectors was also arranged to make
comparisons with a sector that seems more secure than these sectors according to the codes.
4.1.2

Second Recursion: Discovery

All three coding steps of the data analysis were performed in the second recursion.
Therefore, the researcher discovered a theory at the end of the second recursion. However,
the discovered theory was probably unsaturated because there were still critical sectors for
which no interviews were performed.
4.1.2.1

Data: Documents and Interviews

In the second recursion, the number of coded documents is seventy-six. The distribution of
the documents according to the sectors and document types are shown in Table 4-3 and
Table 4-4 respectively.
A set of publicly available documents and restricted documents were analyzed and coded.
The restricted documents were independent evaluation reports and minutes of meetings.
They contained a number of valuable information on the vulnerabilities, cyber threats, the
practices of organization, and the reflections of current legislative frameworks. These
documents were richer than the regulation texts, news and the organizational reports, which
were publicly available.
Table 4-3: Distribution of the Documents According to the Sector Type

Critical sector

Energy
Water management
Finance
Total

The number of documents
associated with the critical
sector
43
15
18
76

Table 4-4: Distribution of the Documents According to the Document Type

Document type
Regulation text
Organizational report
Minutes of meeting
Independent evaluation report
Total

Number of documents
7
16
21
32
76

There were two types of independent evaluation reports, which were penetration test and
information security management evaluation reports. Penetration test reports were technical,
whereas other reports were not. Penetration test reports contained technical and
technological aspects while the content of information security management evaluation
reports along with minutes of meetings were nontechnical. They contained vulnerabilities
and threats that were associated with organizational processes. Information systems have
three perspectives, which are technology, management and organization (Laudon & Laudon
2015). The researcher covered all three aspects of information system by analyzing these
reports during the coding processes.
At the second recursion, the organizations for semi-structured interviews were determined.
The selection was performed by using theoretical sampling, which was based on the results
of the first recursion. Because energy and water management sectors seemed problematic in
terms of cyber security, the researcher decided to make semi-structured interviews with two
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governmental critical infrastructure operators from these sectors at the second recursion.
Apart from the two sectors, a private organization from finance sector was selected for the
interview. When the codes of the first recursion are reviewed, the finance sector is
considered much more resilient against cyber threats than energy and water management
sectors. The purpose of including a financial organization in the interviews was to make
comparisons and contrasts during the axial coding phase, namely to check whether the
discovered problems exist in the finance sector.
Table 4-5 summarizes the properties of the semi-structured interviews. The energy and water
management operators were governmental organizations; whereas the finance organization
was private sector. The water management sector is totally operated by the governmental
organizations. In energy sector, there are prominent private sector operators. However, at the
first round of data analysis, it was seen that their cyber security posture is much less
problematic compared to the governmental operators. Therefore, governmental operators
were chosen for the energy sector.
Table 4-5: Properties of the Interviewees of the Second Recursion

Interviewee
Interviewee - 1
Interviewee - 2
Interviewee - 3
4.1.2.2

Sector
Energy
Water management
Finance

Type
Governmental organization
Governmental organization
Private organization

Open Coding

The second recursion started with the open coding of the documents listed in Table 4-4. As
open coding progressed, the extracted codes started to cluster around categories in this
recursion
The list of emerged categories at the end of open coding of second recursion is shown in
Table 4-6.
Table 4-6: List of the Categories before the Interviews in the Second Recursion

No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Categories
Vulnerabilities
Countermeasures
Outsourcing
Audit
Security culture
Personnel
Security standards
Collaboration
Regulation
Regulatory authority
Leadership
Interdependence
National software
National governance

During the open coding of these documents, two categories, Vulnerabilities and
Countermeasures, emerged quickly along with the other codes and categories. These two
categories, sub-categories and associated codes for each sub-categories are shown in Table
4-7.
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Table 4-7: Codes of the Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Categories

Category
Vulnerabilities

Subcategory
Nontechnical vulnerabilities

Technical vulnerabilities

Countermeasures

Nontechnical
countermeasures

Technical countermeasures

Selected Codes
Password sharing
Shared accounts
Accounts with no password
Limited technical training
Limited awareness training
Single point of failure
Damaged backup facilities
Equipment shortage
Remote access of vendors
Uncertainty
Unconsolidated huge systems
Very old systems
Management problems in sectorial level
Disorderliness
No Backup
DDoS
Limited log capability
Limited capacity for logs
Limited USB storage usage
Security roadmap
Prioritization of countermeasures
Awareness trainings
Access control
Firewalls
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems
Antivirus
Patch management
Secure configuration
Cryptographic solutions
Physical security
Facility backup
Data backup
Identity management
Data loss prevention
Passwords
Hardening
Monitoring systems
Biometric systems
Log management
Technical trainings
Database security

As it is seen from Table 4-7, both categories have two subcategories: technical and
nontechnical. For the Vulnerabilities category, there was an excess of non-technical
vulnerabilities over technical vulnerabilities. For Countermeasures category, there was an
excess of technical countermeasures over nontechnical ones. Although a number of
countermeasures were extracted from the various kind of documents, they might not be
considered as the signs of security. If there are limited or problematic organizational security
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practices, these countermeasures might not be used effectively. They even might be the
sources of the new vulnerabilities because of the improper usage. The problems at tactical
level might be the result of limited or absent rules at the policy level (von Solms & (Basie)
von Solms 2006). Therefore, by taking these two categories into consideration, the
researcher shifted his attention towards the higher level problems instead of technical level
problems for the semi-structured interviews.
Before starting the semi-structured interviews with the organizations, the prepared survey
questions at the beginning of the research were reviewed and changed according to the
results of the comparisons of the Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures categories, and the
focus of the questions were changed to reflect the organizational, policy and even national
level aspects more.
The questions of the semi-structures surveys are listed below. All of the questions were
open-ended. They did not have multiple-choice answers. The respondents were allowed to
answer the questions freely without much disturbance. The requested information was
qualitative rather than quantitative.
Question list:
1. What are prominent cyber security problems? What is your idea on the reasons of
these problems?
2. Do you think that the technical countermeasures are effective? If not, why?
3. What do you think about cyber threats? Do you think that you may face but not
realize? Why?
4. What do you think about the security standards? Are they useful or just a burden for
the organizations?
5. Do you outsource your IT and security services? Why? How?
6. Do you perform IT audit? Is it regular? What do you think about audit process? Is it
useful?
7. Do you have a relationship with a regulatory authority? Could you please explain the
details?
8. Are you dependent on other critical sectors and associated organizations? Is there
any other critical infrastructure that depends on you?
9. Let’s talk about security culture. Do you have a security culture as the organization?
What kind of security behaviors do your personnel, managers and IT staff have?
10. Do you cooperate with other organizations, people, government agencies, and
training institutions?
11. Do you need any regulations for cyber security? Do you believe in the effectiveness
of regulations?
12. What is the source of the software you use? (Foreign country, Turkish) Does it
matter for you? Does a software developed by a Turkish company make any
difference?
13. What about the quality and number of IT and security personnel?
14. Do you need any leadership in cyber security?
15. What do you think about the role of the governments and national security officials
in the security of the critical infrastructures? Should they be involved or isolated?
Because of the characteristics of the semi-structured survey, these questions were regarded
as the initiators and catalyzers of the long lasting and evolving interviews.
Each interview lasted around two hours. The interviews were conducted face to face. The
interviewees were mid-managers who work in information processing departments. They
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had responsibilities for cyber security and were acting as bridges between the technical
personnel and the higher level managers.
Sound recording was not permitted during interviews. Nevertheless, the researcher was
allowed to take notes. The transcripts were the most valuable source of information for the
research.
After finishing all of the semi-structured interviews, open coding was conducted more
thoroughly. It is noteworthy to state that, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures categories
emerged at first during the open coding; however, they were mostly merged into other
categories as coding process continued after interviews. The codes belonging to these
categories were distributed among the other categories such as leadership problems,
outsourcing problems, collaboration problems and regulation problems. The situation was
the same for the countermeasures category. Therefore, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures
categories, which came into sight at the open coding, were used to update the questions of
semi-structured interviews and they finally merged with other categories.
Some of the codes are shared to show and explain the research process and the findings. A
list for the extracted codes is not given in the thesis because of the space and confidentiality
constraints.
The final list of categories at the end of the open coding is listed in Table 4-8.
Table 4-8: List of the Categories after the Open Coding in the Second Recursion

No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Categories
Outsourcing
Audit
Security culture
Personnel
Security standards
Collaboration
Regulation
Regulatory authority
Leadership
Interdependence
National software
National governance

The sample transcripts of three interviewees are written for each category below. All
transcripts are accompanied with the extracted sample codes. It is noteworthy to state that the
selected transcripts are peculiarly selected from interview texts as they contain valuable
input for comparisons. These transcripts are enough to show how the comparisons are made
in axial coding.
For the Outsourcing category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “We of course outsource the critical IT services. We pay
the firm for that and receive/expect for the services. The work must be
permanent, that’s the point. That’s why we don’t want to intervene with the
outsourced services. As long as all is fine, you shouldn’t question the practices.
There is no need to ruin the ongoing mechanism.”
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Turkish (Original): “Kritik BT hizmetlerini tabi ki dışardan alıyoruz. Biz
firmaya parasını veririz. Sonra da hizmet bekleriz. Bizim için önemli olan
işlerin sürmesidir. Bu nedenle firmaya da fazla karışmak istemeyiz. İşler düzgün
olduktan sonra sen ne yaptın diye fazla sorulmaz. Çalışan düzeni bozmaya
gerek yok.”
Extracted codes: Outsourcing of IT services, outsourcing behavior, the
importance of business continuity
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “We outsource IT services from the firms we already
know and trust. It is quite hard when you have to work with an unfamiliar firm.
I wish we also had rules and principles for the outsourcing of the IT services.”
Turkish (Original): “Dışarıdan BT hizmet alırız. Güvendiğimiz, bildiğimiz
firmalardan almaya çalışırız. Bilmediğimiz firma ile uğraşmak zor. Keşke bize
dışarıdan hizmet alımı konusunda kurallar belirli olsa.”
Extracted codes: Outsourcing of IT services, no outsourcing rules
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “We do outsourcing. But, we also have procedures of
strict audits. In other words, we already have outsourcing rules and established
penal sanctions for the firms.”
Turkish (Original): “Dışardan hizmet alımı yapıyoruz. Bu konu bizde çok
sıkıdır. Zaten bu konu ile ilgili kurallar da belirlenmiştir. Firmaların ne yapıp
ne yapamayacağı ve cezai yaptırımlar bellidir.”
Extracted codes: Outsourcing of IT services, outsourcing rules, sanctions to
third parties
Note: For the governmental organizations, there are some problems with outsourcing
practices. They do not have the rules obliged on them (Regulation, Regulatory authority).
Also they trust the third party firms without grounds (Security culture). It is important to try
to find the reasons for these differences between governmental and private organizations.
The possible reasons are sought in the axial coding.
Categories to be compared with: Security culture, Regulation
For the Audit category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “There is a partial IT audit, which, I think, is not
sufficient. First of all, standards must be set, or to put it another way, the
problem of which standards to apply should be resolved. We have a lot work to
do, but we cannot start anyhow.”
Turkish (Original): “BT denetimi kısmen var. Ama yeterli olduğunu
düşünmüyorum. Bu konuda öncelikle standartların oluşması lazım veya hangi
standartların kullanılacağının belirlenmesi lazım. Yapacak işimiz çok; ama
başlayamıyoruz.”
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Extracted codes: Insufficient IT audit, IT audit standards, IT audit is not a
priority
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “There is no IT audit. But we do maintain our work
properly as we work with competent firms.”
.
Turkish (Original): “BT denetim süreci yok. Ama işlerimizi düzgün yapıyoruz.
Çalıştığımız firmalar yetkin firmalar.”
Extracted codes: No IT audit, no awareness on IT audit
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “Obliged by the regulations, an audit is a process of
established standards. Regular and official IT audits are conducted. A
considerable part of those audits are performed and reported by competent
audit firms.”
Turkish (Original): “Denetim yönetmelikler çerçevesinde zorunlu tutulan ve
standartlarının oluşturulduğu bir süreçtir. Düzenli ve resmi BT denetimleri
yapılır. Bu denetimlerin önemli bir kısmı yetkili denetçi firmalar tarafından
yapılır ve raporlanır.”
Extracted codes: IT audit regulation, IT audit standards, regular and formal IT
audit, external
Note: Like the outsourcing category, there is a considerable difference between
governmental and private organizations in terms of both the practices and the perception of
the audit. There is limited security awareness in governmental organizations. Regulation and
regulatory authorities may cause considerable differences in audit process. In the axial
coding phase, required comparisons will be performed to examine this phenomenon.
Categories to be compared with: Security culture, Regulation
For the Security culture category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “We have to develop a security culture, and in that sense,
we have a long way to go.”
Turkish (Original): “Güvenlik kültürünü oluşturmamız lazım. Bu konuda
alınacak çok mesafemiz var.”
Extracted codes: The lack of security culture
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “The users may share their passwords. Some users don’t
even have their own ones. Password sharing is common even in the IT
department.”
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Turkish (Original): “Kullanıcılar şifrelerini paylaşır. Hatta bazı kullanıcılarda
şifre bile yok. Bilgi işlemde bile şifre paylaşımı var.”
Extracted codes: Password sharing, no passwords
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “Security is considered a significant process it is a part of
the business we manage. We cannot overlook that fact. The business is
dependent on the financial data and monetary issues anyhow.”
Turkish (Original): “Güvenlik önemli bir süreç olarak görülüyor. Yapılan işin
bir parçası da güvenlik. Güvenliği göz ardı edemeyiz. İş sonuçta finansal
bilgilere ve paraya dayanıyor.”
Extracted codes: Security is the part of business, business value of security
The security awareness level is quite low in the governmental operators. Business-oriented
security culture is observed for the financial institutions. The concept of security culture is
directly related with the profile of the personnel. Also, the contribution of the regulation and
regulatory authorities to the security culture is checked.
Categories to be compared with: Regulation, Personnel
For the Personnel category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “We have a sufficient number of personnel. But, it is hard
to say that they are efficient and productive. The personnel who are good at any
type of work are very few while the unqualified employees are far higher in
number.”
Turkish (Original): “Personel sayımız yeterli olsa da verimli bir personel
altyapımız yok. Her işe koşturan az sayıda personel var, bir de kalitesiz çok
sayıda personel var.”
Extracted codes: Unqualified personnel, efficient usage of personnel
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “We cannot employ qualified people, and even if we do,
they are sure not to accept to be recruited for that amount of salary. We cannot
pay higher salaries for the qualified personnel as we operate on certain rules
and regulations as a governmental organization.”
Turkish (Original): “Kaliteli personel bulamıyoruz, bulsak da vereceğimiz
maaşa gelmezler. Kaliteli personele yüksek maaş veremiyoruz. Sonuçta kamu
kurumu olarak belli kanunlara göre iş yapıyoruz.”
Extracted codes: Low salaries, governmental organization, unqualified
personnel
Interviewee-3:
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English (Translated): “We have a sufficient infrastructure of personnel and but
at some points, we need more employees. Qualified personnel is always on
demand. Finding qualified employees is a country-wide problem as they are
very few.”
Turkish (Original): “Personel altyapımız yeterli ama bazı noktalarda da
personele ihtiyacımız oluyor. Kaliteli personel her zaman ihtiyaç. Ülkemizde
genel olarak kaliteli personel sıkıntısı var. Yetişmiş eleman çok az.”
Extracted codes: Qualified personnel is required, the need for qualified
personnel
All of the organizations need qualified personnel. However, governmental organizations
have problems with the recruitment of the qualified personnel because of the regulations.
Also the possible problem of the lack of qualified personnel
Categories to be compared with: Regulation, National governance
For the Security standards category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “There is no institutional risk management, either. We
don’t operate in compliance with a security standard as we are not lawfully
bound by one. We once considered adopting ISO 27001, but later we thought it
would be hard to convince the top management for the application of the
standard and to implement it and so, it had to remain as a plan. We, the IT
department, seem responsible for the security. Yes, we are in fact, but we don’t
have any authorities over it.”
Turkish (Original): “Kurumsal bir risk yönetimi de yapılmıyor. Herhangi bir
güvenlik standardına göre çalışmıyoruz. Kanuni olarak uymak zorunda
olduğumuz bir standart da yok zaten. Bir ara ISO 27001 alalım mı diye
düşündük; sonrasında başlatmak yönetimi ikna etmek zor geldi. Düşünce
planında kaldı. Güvenliğin sorumlusu biz (bilgi işlem) olarak görülüyor.
Sorumluyuz ama yetkimiz yok.”
Extracted codes: No risk management, Standards are not obliged by law,
adoption of international standard, convincing top management for the adoption
of standards, the lack of due care of management
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “The security standards exist and we are aware of how
critical they are, but have no practices. We cannot initiate the process for ISO
27001. We are not sure whether we can persuade the management, either. The
standard must be obliged by a higher authority. Only by this way we can
convince the managers, to whom we cannot explain the importance of IT
investments. The management must be responsible and decide for securitybased issues but such a practice is nonexistent within our organization.”
Turkish (Original): “Güvenlik standartları var. Öneminin farkındayız ama
uygulamamız yok. ISO 27001 konusunda ilk adımı atamıyoruz. Yönetimi ikna
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edebileceğimiz noktasında emin değiliz. Bir üst kurumun bunu şart koşması
gerekir. Yöneticileri ancak bu şekilde ikna edebiliriz. Biz yöneticilere IT
yatırımını anlatamıyoruz. Güvenlik konusunda yönetimin sorumlusu olması ve
karar alması gerekir ama maalesef bize böyle bir pratik yok.”
Extracted codes: convincing top management for the adoption of standards, the
lack of awareness of top level management, obligation of standards by
regulatory authority, the lack of due care of management
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “There are both COBIT based audit standards and some
security standards designated by the regulations and reports. You have to
establish you own institutional standard by combining the utilizable parts of
COBIT, ITIL and 27001.”
Turkish (Original): “COBIT bazlı oluşturulmuş denetim standartları var. Ayrıca
yönetmelik ve tebliğlerde belirlenmiş bazı güvenlik standartları var. COBIT’i,
ITIL’ı, 27001’i alıp işinize yarayacak bölümlerini bir araya getirip kurumsal
standardınızı oluşturmanız gerekir.”
Extracted codes: customized standard, obligation of standards by law
Security standards are customized, adopted and obliged in the finance sector. The situation is
completely negative for other sectors. Security standards category intersects with the ones of
regulatory authority, regulations and security culture.
Categories to be compared with: Regulation, Security culture
For the Collaboration category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “We generally act on our own and do not have external
connections. We occasionally attend the IT and security occasions. We try to
solve the security problems by ourselves, we search in the forums for the
solutions, for instance. We do not cooperate with the private sector, either,
apart from the times when they undertake a post as part of the projects.”
Turkish (Original): “Genelde kendi halimizdeyiz. Dışarıyla pek bağlantımız
yoktur. Arada bir BT ve güvenlik etkinlikleri olduğu zaman katılırız. Bir
güvenlik problemi olduğu zaman kendi başımıza çözmeye çalışırız. İnternet’ten
falan forumlara bakarız. Özel sektör ile işbirliğimiz de yok; projeler
kapsamındaki iş yaptırma ilişkisi dışında.”
Extracted codes: Isolated organization, no cooperation, no partnership with
private sector
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “We are not in touch with the other organizations. We
learn everything by ourselves. Thus, common platforms for information sharing
would be highly beneficial. And we do not cooperate with the private sector in
areas like R&D etc.”
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Turkish (Original): “Diğer kurumlarla temasımız yok. Kendimiz öğreniyoruz.
Ortak bilgi paylaşım platformları falan çok iyi olur. Özel sektör ile ar-ge vs.
kapsamında bir birlikteliğimiz yok.”
Extracted codes: No cooperation, no information sharing, no partnership with
private sector
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “There is no settled culture of cooperation and
collaboration in the sector. When a problem with the security arises, we try to
resolve it by ourselves. Maybe there are some other organizations who have
experienced the same problems before, so if there were a pool of information,
we would benefit from that to solve out the deficiencies. In the sector, there is a
top-down structure of directives. So, the obligations by the regulatory authority
are conducted. We work with the private sector in projects, but we have no
cooperation.”
Turkish (Original): “Sektörde pek işbirliği, ortak bir şeyler yapma kültürü yok.
Bir güvenlik olayı meydana gelince kendi başımıza çözmeye çalışırız; belki
daha önce başına gelip çözen kurumlar vardır, bir bilgi havuzu olsa
faydalanırız. Sektörde tepeden aşağıya doğru bir direktif yapısı var. Düzenleyici
kurumun getirmiş olduğu zorunluluklar yerine getirilir. Özel sektör ile beraber
sık sık proje yapıyoruz. Ama proje, bir işbirliğimiz yok.”
Extracted codes: No cooperation culture in sector, regulatory authority does not
promote cooperation, no partnership with private sector
The lack of collaboration and cooperation is a common problem for all three sectors. The
reasons for this situation are attempted to be extracted. After the recursions, it was seen that
this was a root problem itself.
Categories to be compared with: Regulation, Security culture
For the Regulation category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “Regulations are important, but in the sector we do not
have any legal regulations for the cyber security issues. There must be, in fact.
The basic and minimum standards must also be obliged by the law.”
Turkish (Original): “Kanuni düzenlemeler önemli, ancak bizim sektörde siber
güvenlik konusunda yasal düzenleme yok. Olması lazım. Kanunlarla belli başlı
temel asgari standartların da belirlenmesi lazım.”
Extracted codes: the lack of regulations, the obligation of minimum standards
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “The parts pertaining to information security and cyber
security are left blank in the legislation. It is impossible to talk about cyber
security in a legal context when even information security issues are not
included in the legislation.”
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Turkish (Original): “Mevzuatta bilgi güvenliği veya siber güvenlik boş
bırakılmış. Zaten siber güvenlik çok yeni bir kavram bilgi güvenliği bile yer
almıyorken siber güvenlikten kanunlar seviyesinde hiç bahsedemeyiz.”
Extracted codes: the lack of regulations
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “There are highly detailed sectorial regulations for the
security issues. Everything including the report format is detailed in the
sectorial legislations. Legal legislations prove significant in the proper
maintenance of the sector.”
Turkish (Original): “Güvenlik konusunda sektörel kanuni düzenlemeler var,
oldukça detaylı. Rapor formatına kadar sektörel mevzuatta belli. Yasal mevzuat
sektörün düzgün işlemesi için önemli.”
Extracted codes: the detailed set of regulations, sectorial regulations
There is a considerable gap between the legislative infrastructure of finance sector and the
other sectors. The possible adverse effects of this situation and also its effects on the security
practices within the sectors will be analyzed.
Categories to be compared with: Regulatory authority, Security standards
For the Regulatory authority category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “An auditing and regulatory institution renders critical in
that it lays down the rules and supervises their implementation. In the sector,
we have an auditing institution, which supervises over the market, but not the
cyber security. The institution doesn’t have a proper and clear regulation for
that.”
Turkish (Original): “Denetleyici ve düzenleyici kurum kuralların tepeden
konulup takip edilmesi noktasında önemli. Bizim sektörde denetleyici kurum
var. Ama piyasa unsurlarını denetler, siber güvenlik konusunda etkin değil. Net
bir regülasyonu yok.”
Extracted codes: the lack of cyber security supervision
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “The water sector does not resemble to the other ones like
energy, finance or telecommunications. Of course, water management is very
important, the service is distributed among all the citizens, but the sector
doesn’t have a firm market approach. Thus, in the sector, there has been no
regulatory authority that is similar to those of the other mentioned sectors. In
the absence of a regulatory authority, every organ acts independently, which is
not favorable.”
Turkish (Original): “Su sektörü gibi bir sektör ülkemizde yok. Enerji, finans,
Telekom gibi değil. Tamam, su yönetimi önemli; tüm vatandaşlara hizmet
veriliyor ama bir piyasa yaklaşımı yok. Bu nedenle düzenleyici kurum da diğer
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saydığım sektörler manasında yok. Düzenleyici kurum olmayınca herkes
bağımsız, bu aslında pek de iyi bir durum değil.”
Extracted codes: no regulatory authority
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “The regulatory authority has adopted a crucial position
for security. It both determines the rules and audits their conduction process. It
sets the rules with its experts in a balanced and experienced manner. And
sectorial standards are formed in this way.”
Turkish (Original): “Düzenleyici kurum güvenlik konusunda çok önemli bir
pozisyonda. Hem kuralları koyar, hem uygulanıp uygulanmadığını denetler.
Ayrıca kuralları da oldukça dengeli koyar. Bu konuda uzmanları vardır.
Sektörel standartlar belirlenmiş olur.”
Extracted codes: the sectorial rules, the audit according to the rules, the sectorial
standards
The current situation with the regulatory authority is completely parallel to the situation of
regulations. It is expected that there are strong relationships between the existence of
regulatory authority and audit standardization.
Categories to be compared with: Leadership, National governance
For the Leadership category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “Of course we need leadership in security. In face of a
security problem, we are all alone. We don’t have anyone to consult. It is the
regulatory authority which is to undertake the leadership position.”
Turkish (Original): “Güvenlik konusunda liderliğe elbette ihtiyacımız var. Bir
güvenlik problemi olunca tek başınayız. Soracağımız kimse yok. Liderliği
yapacak kurum düzenleyici kurumdur.”
Extracted codes: the leadership of regulatory authority
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “Leadership matters a lot. For the security issues, there
must be a body of authority which shows the way to proceed in. It is the
responsibility of the government to seriously deal with the security issue and
establish the institutional structures. And the leadership must belong to the
top.”
Turkish (Original): “Liderlik önemli bir konu. Birilerinin güvenlikte nasıl
ilerleneceğini göstermesi gerekir. Devletin bu güvenlik işine ciddi şekilde eğilip
kurumsal yapıları oluşturması gerekir. Liderlik ise en tepeden başlamalı.”
Extracted codes: the leadership of state-level actors on cyber security
Interviewee-3:
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English (Translated): “I think, the regulatory authority in the sector has
assumed the leadership as well. But, more space must be allocated within the
sector for more cooperative opportunities and the regulatory authority may
then act as the pioneer, as something beyond legislation setting and auditing.”
Turkish (Original): “Sektördeki düzenleyici kurum gerekli liderliği bence
yapıyor. Ama sektörde biraz daha işbirliği fırsatları yaratmalı, etkinliklerde
belki öncülük yapabilir. Kural belirle ve denetlemenin ötesinde bir şey.”
Extracted codes: the leadership of regulatory authority, enabler of cooperation
There is a relationship between leadership and regulatory authorities. For the sectors that
have regulatory authorities; interviewees set this relationship. The interviewee from the
water management sector talks about the higher level leadership as “state-level leadership”.
Categories to be compared with: Regulatory authority
For the Interdependence category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “Many sectors are dependent on the energy sector.
Energy is the source of everything. Until now, there has been no serious energy
cut based problems that have also affected other infrastructures. Even if there
may happen wide-scale cuts, it wouldn’t matter much as long they do not last
long as all large institutions have their own energy production infrastructures.
This is another subject for further analyses, of course in the leadership of the
high level state institutions.”
Turkish (Original): “Pek çok sektör enerji sektörüne bağımlıdır. Enerji can
suyudur. Şu ana kadar kesintilerden dolayı diğer altyapıları da etkileyen ciddi
bir sıkıntı yaşanmadı. Gerçi geniş çaplı kesintilerde bile çok uzun süreli
olmadığı müddetçe sıkıntı yaşanmayabilir. Çünkü örneğin büyük kurumların
kendi enerji üretim altyapıları var. Bu konuda üzerinde analizler yapılması
gereken bir konu. Tabi üst düzey devlet yapılarının önderliğinde.”
Extracted codes: Redundancy of the energy supply, the state leadership to make
analysis
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “No institution is dependent on us. We do not depend on
another one either. It doesn’t affect us anyway even when the electricity is cut
off as we have generators as part of our infrastructure.”
Turkish (Original): “Bize bağlı yer yoktur. Biz de bağlı değiliz. Elektrik gitse de
etkilenmeyiz. Altyapımızda jeneratörler var.”
Extracted codes: Interdependency is not a concern
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “When we cannot provide services, only the service takers
will be adversely affected, not the other infrastructures. Our systems are
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directly connected to the energy infrastructure, but we also have our own spare
energy infrastructure.”
Turkish (Original): “Bizim hizmet veremez duruma gelirsek bizden hizmet
alanlar etkilenir. Altyapı manasında diğer altyapılar etkilenmez. Bizim
sistemlerimiz doğrudan enerji altyapısına bağlıdır ama yedekli enerji
altyapılarımız var.”
Extracted codes: Interdependency is not a concern
Interdependency is not a concern in general. However, the interdependency issue is checked
at next recursions.
Categories to be compared with: National governance
For the National software category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “National software is a critical topic. The use of foreign
software is widely common in the energy systems. The energy sector is fully
under the dominance of foreign companies. But we cannot handle the problem
of foreign software on our own. The state must also be involved in the issue and
must encourage the use of a national software in multiple aspects and must
offer some warranties for that.”
Turkish (Original): “Milli yazılım önemli bir konu. Enerji sistemlerinde çok
ciddi yabancı yazılım kullanılıyor. Sektör tamamen yabancıların hakimiyetinde.
Yabancı yazılım hakimiyeti sadece bizim kırabileceğimiz bir konu değil.
Devletin el atması, milli yazılımı her yönüyle teşvik etmesi ve bazı garantiler
vermesi gerekir.”
Extracted codes: the dominance of foreign companies, a difficult topic, a
national governance issue
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “We would like to work with national software firms. But
how much we can work only with our sources, in isolation from the outer world,
is another matter. We use the certain products, like many other countries. The
systems shouldn’t be facing problems when a national software is obliged.”
Turkish (Original): “Yerli yazılım firmaları ile çalışmak isteriz. Ama küresel
dünyada ne derece izole olunacak o da ayrı mesele. Pek çok ülke belli başlı
ürünleri kullanıyor, biz de kullanıyoruz. Milli yazılım olacak diye sistemlerde de
sıkıntı olmaması gerekir.”
Extracted codes: dependence to foreign software, a difficult topic, not a priority
Interviewee-3:
English (Translated): “National software is a difficult topic. We benefit from the
operating systems and the databases used by all other countries. We pay for
annual maintenance support for those operating systems and databases. They
have penal mechanisms for the problems that are not solved on time as the
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finance sector does not tolerate any negligence. Frankly, we have not national
software topic in our agenda. But if it is implemented as a governmental policy,
there might be a transition process that covers many years and various stages.
But anyhow, that would be very tough ...”
Turkish (Original): “Milli yazılım çok zor bir konu. Tüm dünyanın kullandığı
veri tabanlarını, işletim sistemlerini kullanıyoruz. Bunlara yıllık destekler satın
alıyoruz. Zamanında çözüm olmayınca ceza mekanizmaları var. Finans sektörü
gevşeklik kabul etmez. Milli yazılım olmaması gibi bir problemimiz ve
gündemimiz yok açıkçası. Ama bu konuda bir devlet politikası olursa aşama
aşama ve uzun yılları içine alacak şekilde bir geçiş düşünülebilir. Ama çok zor
bir konu yine de …”
Extracted codes: dependence to foreign software, not a priority, a difficult topic
Developing software by a national firm is important for national security. However, this is
very difficult to actualize.
Categories to be compared with: National governance
For the National governance category:
Interviewee-1:
English (Translated): “I think that there is no awareness of the protection of the
national cyber security infrastructures or critical infrastructures of the state
from cyber threats. But I wish there were, as this lack is the beginning point of
all other deficiencies. There has been some improvements in the area, but I
think they weren’t sufficient. Anyhow, I hope more improvements will come
up.”
Turkish (Original): “Devletimizin ulusal siber güvenlik veya kritik altyapıların
siber tehditlerden korunması adına yeterli bir farkındalığının olduğunu
düşünmüyorum. Keşke olsa. Bu eksiklik bence pek çok eksikliğin de kaynağı.
Son yıllarda bazı gelişmeler oldu ama hem yeterli olmadığını düşüyorum hem
de umarım devamı gelir diyorum.”
Extracted codes: Unawareness at state level, the lack of governance is the
source of the other problem
Interviewee-2:
English (Translated): “I think the leadership topic is quite parallel to this one.
The state must undertake the leadership task. And only then we will be able to
achieve the objectives which we now cannot reach.”
Turkish (Original): “Daha önce konuştuğumuz liderlik başlığı ile bu başlığı
paralel görüyorum. Devletin liderlik yapması gerekir. Şu an tek başına
başaramadığımız pek çok şeyi ancak o zaman başarabiliriz.”
Extracted codes: the leadership of government is important, the key to the
success
Interviewee-3:
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English (Translated): “There is certainly a leadership and governance on a
sectorial basis. There are some country-wide developments, either. But when we
compare the security level of the finance sector with those of other sectors, only
Telekom has a similar position. As far as I know, the rest of the sectors do not
have a structure like ours. Among the sectors you have mentioned, there are
even ones with no regulatory authorities. In this respect, it becomes obligatory
to take steps for the formation of a national governance.”
Turkish (Original): “Sektörel olarak düşündüğümüz zaman kesinlikle bir
liderlik, bir yönetişim var. Ülke bazında da bazı pozitif gelişmeler var. Ama
finans sektöründeki güvenlik seviyesi ile diğer sektörleri karşılaştırdığımız
zaman, sadece Telekom sektörünün benzer durumda olduğunu görüyorum.
Diğer geri kalan tüm sektörlerde benim bildiğim kadarıyla bizdeki gibi bir yapı
yok. Hatta ismini saydığınız diğer sektörler içerisinde denetleyici kurumu
olmayan sektörler de var. Bu durumda ulusal yönetişim adına ciddi adımlar
atılması gerektiği aşikar.”
Extracted codes: Problems at national governance, problematic sectors
All of the interviewee agree on the need of national governance framework to make
improvement in cyber security of critical infrastructures.
Categories to be compared with: Regulatory authority, Regulation, Personnel
Please note the list of categories under the heading “Categories to be compared with”, under
each group of transcript. These categories were created after performing sufficient coding on
the transcripts of the interviews. After the coding of the transcripts, some inherent
dependencies and especially “cause and effect relations” among categories are realized.
Table 4-9 show the categories to be compared at the axial coding step.

Outsourcing
Audit
Security culture
Personnel
Security
standards
Collaboration
Regulation
Regulatory
authority
Leadership
Interdependence

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

National
governance

National software

Interdependence

Leadership

Regulatory
authority

Regulation

Security
standards

Personnel

Security culture

Audit

Outsourcing

Compared
Categories

Collaboration

Table 4-9: Compared Categories

X

X
X
X

X
X

X
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National
governance

National software

Interdependence

Leadership

Regulatory
authority

Regulation

X

National
software
National
governance
4.1.2.3

Collaboration

Security
standards

Personnel

Security culture

Audit

Outsourcing

Compared
Categories

Axial Coding

During the axial coding phase, comparisons and contrasts were carried out among and within
the categories. Comparisons among different sectors and comparisons between different
organizations types (governmental vs. private) were performed as well. Relationships among
categories emerged and these relationships yielded themes, which means some remarkable
cyber security problems were clustered around these categories. These themes were the basic
constructs before reaching a theory.
Table 4-10 shows the first comparison over eleven categories between governmental critical
infrastructure owners and private infrastructure owners. According to the table below, the
security practices in private sectors are much more mature in terms of outsourcing, audit,
security culture, personnel and standards. The private sector has a regulatory authority and
associated regulations. The regulatory authority supervises cyber security.
Table 4-10: Comparison of the Governmental and Private Critical Infrastructure Operators

Outsourcing
Audit
Security culture
Personnel

Security standards

Collaboration
Regulation
Regulatory authority

Leadership

Governmental
Private
Improper
outsourcing Proper outsourcing practices
practices
No audit / limited audit
Periodical / formal / external
audit
Do not have a clear security Created a security culture
culture
Cannot recruit qualified staff Has qualified staff; however,
the lack qualified staff is a
general problem
No standards
Established standards
No risk management
Due care of the top level
management
No apparent cooperation No apparent cooperation
routines
routines
No regulation
Established
sectorial
regulation
No regulatory authority / Regulatory authority with
regulatory authority with no cyber supervision
cyber supervision
Vital. Should be performed Vital. Should be performed
by regulatory authority / top by regulatory authority
level state officials
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Interdependence
National software
National governance

Governmental
Private
Not a concern
Not a concern
Challenging issue, not a Challenging issue, not a
priority
priority
Must be done
Must be done

Table 4-11 shows the compared categories and the results of each comparison in this
recursion. The table also shows the extracted themes, based on the comparisons at the last
column.
Table 4-11: Comparisons and the Resulting Themes

Compared Categories Comparison Results
Regulation
versus The lack of a regulatory
Regulatory authority
authority results in the
deregulation of the sector.
Regulation
versus The operators in a sector with
Audit, Security culture, no or minimum cyber security
Personnel,
Security regulations have problems
Standards,
with security. These problems
are:
a) The lack of audit
practices or minimum
audit practices
b) Limited security culture
c) Limited awareness level
of employees (including
managers)
d) Operating and
outsourcing without
security standards
e) The lack of management
responsibility on cyber
security
f) No risk management

Themes
The lack of sectorial regulations
The
lack
of
regulatory
authorities for some sectors
Limited security culture in
organizations
Limited security awareness
level of employees
Operating without security
standards
No regular and formal IT audit
Problematic
contract
management practices and
granting full access rights to
third party companies
Limited information security
governance
No or partial internalization of
information
security
management
within
the
organizations

Security culture versus Collaboration is an enabler of No collaboration culture
Collaboration,
the cyber security; however, Limited public and private
Regulation
the practices like collaboration cooperation
Collaboration
versus and cooperation are limited.
Regulation
There is no relation between
collaboration and regulation.
Collaboration is a matter of
culture.
Partnership
and
collaboration with private
sector do not exist.
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Compared Categories
Security culture versus
Outsourcing,
Audit,
Personnel,
Security
standards
Regulation
versus
Audit,
Outsourcing,
Security Standards
National governance –
Personnel, Leadership,
National
software,
Interdependence,
Regulation, Regulatory
authority

Comparison Results
Themes
Because security is somehow related with the culture, the
existence of audit rules,
outsourcing rules and security
standards may not increase the
level of security.
The
lack
of
national
governance has some negative
effects on cyber security. Such
as:
a) Qualified personnel is
limited because of the
limited national capacity
building efforts
b) The lack of leadership in
cyber security
c) The lack of studies such
as amendments to the
laws, creation of policies
on national software
development, or national
infrastructure
interdependence studies
d) The lack of diffusion of
the cyber security into
the critical sectors in
terms of regulatory
authority and regulations

The lack of national governance
Limited
capacity
building
efforts
The lack of leadership in cyber
security
The adverse effects of some
laws on the cyber security of
critical infrastructures
The lack of diffusion of the
cyber security into the critical
sectors

The themes at last column of Table 4-11 are written in the list below. This list is analyzed in
selective coding, next step of the data analysis.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

The lack of sectorial regulations
The lack of regulatory authorities, for some sectors
Limited security culture in organizations
Limited security awareness level of employees
Operating without security standards
No regular and formal IT audit
Problematic contract management practices and granting full access rights to third
party companies
Limited information security governance
No or partial internalization of information security management within the
organizations
No collaboration culture
Limited public and private cooperation
The lack of national governance
62

13.
14.
15.
16.
4.1.2.4

Limited capacity building efforts
The lack of leadership in cyber security
The adverse effects of some laws on the cyber security of critical infrastructures
The lack of diffusion of the cyber security into the critical sectors
Selective Coding

During the selective coding phase, memos are written by the researcher in order to find
repetitions, redundancies and to eliminate irrelevant and trivial themes. Memos are the
researcher’s record of analyses, thoughts, interpretations, questions, and directions for
further data collection (Strauss & Corbin 2008). Memos also provided some important inputs
for theoretical sampling.
Table 4-12 shows the list of themes after selective coding, along with the themes before the
selective coding for the comparison purposes.
Table 4-12: Themes after the Axial and Selective Coding in the Second Recursion

Before Selective Coding (After Axial
Coding)
The lack of sectorial regulations
The lack of regulatory authorities, for some
sectors
The lack of diffusion of the cyber security to
the critical sectors
Limited security culture in organizations
No collaboration culture
Limited security awareness level of
employees
Operating without security standards
No regular and formal IT audit

After Selective Coding (Discovered
Theory)
The lack of sectorial authorities for cyber
security

Problematic contract management practices
and granting full access rights to third party
companies
No or partial internalization of information
security
management
within
the
organizations
Limited information security governance

Problematic contract management practices
and granting full access rights to third party
companies
Risk management process is not conducted
by the critical infrastructure owners.

The lack of legislation that may create
security culture and collaboration
Limited security awareness level of
employees
Discarded after writing memos.
No regular and formal IT audit

Limited information security governance
practices
Limited public and private cooperation
The lack of national governance

Limited public and private cooperation
The lack of national governance
The lack of leadership in cyber security
Limited capacity building efforts
Limited capacity building efforts
The adverse effects of some laws on the The adverse effects of some laws on the
cyber security of critical infrastructures
cyber security of the critical infrastructures
The list of themes after selective coding is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The lack of sectorial authorities for cyber security
The lack of legislation that may create security culture and collaboration
Limited security awareness level of employees
No regular and formal IT audit
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5. Problematic contract management practices and granting full access rights to
third party companies
6. Risk management process is not conducted by the critical infrastructure owners
7. Limited information security governance practices
8. Limited public and private cooperation
9. The lack of national governance
10. Limited capacity building efforts
11. The adverse effects of some laws on the cyber security of the critical
infrastructures.
4.1.2.5

Theoretical Sampling for the Third Recursion

It was seen at the second recursion that the critical infrastructure operators in the finance
sector conducted more mature and concrete security practices, compared to the other
operators in water management and energy sectors. The water management sector does not
have a regulatory authority. The energy sector has a regulatory authority with no/minimum
supervision on cyber security.
At first glance, the non-existence of regulatory authority can be considered a root cause for
cyber security problems. In the similar manner, the non-existence of regulations can be
regarded a root cause as well. The first two root causes were written to show these two
phenomenon.
Nevertheless, the most important input to the third recursion was to check the role of the
regulations and regulatory authorities for cyber security. A theoretical question as the
following arises at that point: “Is the supervision of cyber security by law/regulations
feasible or not?” As a result, five focused and detailed questions based on the core problems
discovered in the second recursion were added for the next recursion.
Because of the results of the second recursion, governmental critical infrastructures were
preferred for the interviews of the third recursion because it was seen in the second round
that the cyber security problems of the critical infrastructures of Turkey mainly emanate
from governmental organizations. Four interviews were performed in the third recursion.
Three of the interviews were performed with governmental organizations.
4.1.3

Third Recursion: Saturation

Like in the second recursion, all the three coding steps of the data analysis were performed at
the third recursion. The sectors, the critical organizations and the new interview questions
were determined by making theoretical sampling at the end of the second recursion. The
researcher reshaped the theory that was discovered at the second recursion. The researcher
also observed saturation in the theory at this recursion.
4.1.3.1

Data: Documents and Interviews

In the third recursion, there were eighty-six coded documents. The distribution of the
documents according to the sector and the document types are shown in Table 4-13 and
Table 4-14 respectively.
As in the second recursion, a set of publicly available documents and restricted documents
were analyzed and coded. The restricted documents were independent evaluation reports and
minutes of meetings. These documents were richer than the regulation text, news and
organizational reports, which are publicly available data. As in the second recursion, there
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were two types of independent evaluation reports, which were penetration test reports and
information security management evaluation reports.
Table 4-13: Distribution of the Documents According to the Sector Type

Critical sector

Government services
Transportation
Telecommunications
Total

The
number
of
documents
associated
with the critical sector
51
17
18
86

Table 4-14: Distribution of the Documents According to the Document Type

Document type
Regulation text
Organizational report
Minutes of meeting
Independent evaluation report
Total

Number of
documents
8
14
14
50
86

For the third recursion, the organizations from the government services, transportation and
telecommunications sectors were selected as the result of the theoretical sampling. Three out
of four organizations were governmental organizations. Table 4-15 summarizes the
properties of the semi-structured interviews. Transportation and one of the
telecommunications operators were governmental organizations; whereas the other
telecommunications organization was from the private sector. The most part of the
transportation sector is operated by the governmental organizations. In other words, there is a
dominance of the governmental organization in the transportation sector. In the
telecommunications sector, there are prominent private sector operators.
Table 4-15: Properties of the Interviewees of the Third Recursion

Interviewee
Interviewee – 4
Interviewee – 5
Interviewee – 6
Interviewee – 7

Sector
Government
services
Transportation
Telecommunications
Telecommunications

Type
Governmental organization
Governmental organization
Governmental organization
Private organization

The work done in the third recursion was to perform data analysis in a different set of data
and to compare the results with the ones of the previous recursion as to reach a theoretical
saturation.
4.1.3.2

Open Coding

The third recursion started with the coding of eighty-six documents. After reading and
coding these documents, it was seen that, cyber security practices within the
telecommunications sector were more mature, in contrast with the government services and
the transportation sectors
Interviews were performed following the coding of the documents. Each interview lasted
around two hours. Like the interviews of the previous recursion, they were face to face. The
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interviewees were mid-managers working within information processing departments. Sound
recording was not permitted during interviews. The researcher was free to take notes.
The new interview questions for the third recursion to elaborate the role of the regulations
and regulatory authorities for cyber security on this issue were:
1. Do you think that the regulations on cyber security will be sufficient to improve the
cyber security of the critical infrastructures?
2. What is your opinion on the role of regulatory authority in improving cyber security?
3. Is there a preventive law against collaboration?
4. Could you please compare top-down supervision and bottom-up approach? Which
one is more valuable?
5. How can a security culture be created for organizations?
After finishing all of the semi-structured interviews, open coding continued on the transcripts
of the interviews. Some of the transcripts related with the new questions are placed below.
The transcript about other questions is not placed in the thesis because of the space
constraints.
Interviewee-4: Do you think that the regulations on cyber security will be sufficient to
improve the cyber security of the critical infrastructures
English (Translated): “Laws may affect the security based issues and in my
opinion, security cannot be attained through the laws. The sense of security
must be the result of an inner consideration. It is not possible to proceed farther
by the help of external forces. This issue is related to the proper conduction of
work and business ethics, it is a matter of settled practice. Laws can only set the
necessary regulations, but they cannot create what is nonexistent.”
Turkish (Original): “Kanunların ve yasaların güvenliğe belli bir etkisi olabilir
ama ben güvenliğin kanun ile sağlanacağını düşünmüyorum. Güvenlik denen
şey biraz da içten gelecek. Dışarıdan zorlamayla nereye kadar? Düzgün iş
yapmakla, iş ahlakıyla ilgisi olan bir konu. Bir alışkanlık meselesi. Kanunlar
sadece gerekli düzenlemeyi yapar ama olmayan şeyi oluşturamaz.”
Extracted codes: No direct relation between regulations and security, security
culture
Interviewee-4: What is your opinion on the role of regulatory authority in improving cyber
security?
English (Translated): “The existence of a regulatory authority is not by itself
enough. There are some sectors which own a regulatory authority but no
security applications. I don’t want to mention the names now.”
Turkish (Original): “Sadece düzenleyici kurumun varlığı tek başına güvenlik
için elbette yeterli değil. Öyle sektörler var ki, düzenleyici kurumu var. Ama
güvenlik uygulaması yok. Şimdi örnek vermeyeyim.”
Extracted codes: No direct relation between regulatory agency and security
Interviewee-5: Is there a preventive law against collaboration?
English (Translated): “Laws neither inhibit nor promote cooperation or
participation, which should only be internally and inherently encouraged.”
66

Turkish (Original): “İşbirliği, katılımcılık gibi şeyleri engelleyen kanun olmaz.
Bunlar teşvik edilen şeylerdir. Ancak bunlar engellenmediği gibi kanunla da
teşvik edilmez.”
Extracted codes: No relation between collaboration and security
Interviewee-6: Could you please compare top-down supervision and bottom-up approach?
Which one is more valuable?
English (Translated): “I guess bottom up approach would create long
lasting/permanent results. Even if the top down imposition may create positive
result in the short term, what is crucial is the efforts by the down.”
Turkish (Original): “Bence güvenlikte aşağıdan yukarıya yaklaşım daha kalıcı
sonuçlar doğurur. Yukarıdan aşağıya bir şeyleri empoze etmenin kısa vadede
pozitif sonuçlar olsa da asıl olan aşağıdakilerin çalışmalarıdır.”
Extracted codes: The value of bottom up approaches for security
Interviewee-7: How can a security culture be created for organizations?
English (Translated): “The establishment of a security culture within
organizations is an important subject. Overall national security would rise
considerably when all or at least the critical organizations would form a
security culture. An external force might increase security but the rest will be
the responsibility of the organization itself. In our sector, telecommunications,
some information security rules are dictated by the regulatory authority. But I
know that many organizations, and ours as well, want to take the easiest and
shortest way out. We pass through the auditing process with a seeming culture
of security, but whether we are actually secure or not is a matter of question.”
Turkish (Original): “Kurumlarda güvenlik kültürünün oluşması önemli bir
konu. Bunu tüm kurumlar başarsa veya en azından kritik kurumlar başarsa
ulusal güvenlik ciddi oranda artar. Dışarıdan ne yapılacağı söylenmesi
güvenliği artırır ama güvenlik kültürünün oluşması için biraz da kurumun
kendisinin bir şeyler yapması gerekir. Bizim sektörde (elektronik haberleşme)
bazı bilgi güvenliği kuralları düzenleyici kurum tarafından dikte ediliyor. Ama
ben biliyorum ki bazı kurumlar hatta bizim kurum da dahil işin kolayına
kaçabiliyor. Göstermelik bazı şeyler ile denetimlerden geçiyoruz ama güvenlik
oluyor muyuz soru işareti.”
Extracted codes: Organizational culture, inefficiency of the regulatory agency
4.1.3.3

Axial Coding

At the axial coding phase, eleven themes that were determined after the selective coding of
the second recursion was compared with new data. Table 4-16 shows the results of the
comparison. Three themes are discarded according to the results of the comparisons. Two
themes emerged, and they were supported by the data of the second recursion as well.
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Table 4-16: Themes before and after the Axial Coding in the Third Recursion

No

1
2

3
4
5

6

8
9

10
11
12

13

14

The Discovered Theory of the The Discovered Theory after the
Second Recursion
Axial Coding in the Third
Recursion
The lack of sectorial authorities for Discarded
cyber security
The lack of legislation that may Discarded
create
security
culture
and
collaboration
Limited security awareness level of Discarded
employees
No regular and formal IT audit
IT audit is not performed regularly
and formally.
Problematic contract management The improper relationship practices
practices and granting full access with product/service providers
rights to third party companies
Risk management process
conducted
by
the
infrastructure owners
Limited
information
governance practices
Limited
public
and
cooperation

is not Risk management process is not
critical conducted by the critical
infrastructure owners.
security Limited
information
security
governance practices
private Private sector is not perceived by the
government
as
an
important
stakeholder in the national cyber
security efforts.
The lack of national governance
The lack of national governance
Limited capacity building efforts
The number of cyber security experts
is limited.
The adverse effects of some laws on Some laws have adverse effects on
the cyber security of the critical the cyber security of the critical
infrastructures
infrastructures.
The culture of collaboration is very
limited. (Emerged at the third
recursion)
Security is not considered as a design
construct by the critical infrastructure
owners. (Emerged at the third
recursion)

The first two themes were discarded because of the results of the interviews in this recursion.
There were some indications on the relationship of regulation and security in the second
recursion. The same was true for the relationship between regulatory authority and security.
However, the data of the previous recursion was not enough to come to a conclusion in these
relationships. In this recursion, some specific interview questions were asked. The sample
transcripts in the table above demonstrate some ideas of the interviewees. In axial coding,
comparisons were performed for these categories. These two themes were dropped according
to new data introduced as it was concluded that the lack of either regulation or regulatory
authority was not the root causes of cyber security problems.
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For the third theme in the table, the limited security awareness level of employees was an
obvious problem. However, this was not a root cause for the national cyber security of the
critical infrastructures. There were no supporting data in this recursion for this previouslyemerged theme.
The themes at the thirteenth and fourteenth rows emerged at this recursion. Although there
were some supporting data in the second round, these two themes did not emerge. At the
third recursion, newly introduced codes supported these two themes.
4.1.3.4

Selective Coding

After open coding and axial coding, selective coding step started. The list of the root causes
(themes) before starting the selective coding is given in Table 4-17.
Table 4-17: Themes after the Axial Coding in the Third Recursion

Root Causes
IT audit is not performed regularly and formally.
The improper relationship practices with product/service providers.
Risk management process is not conducted by the critical infrastructure owners.
Limited information security governance practices.
Private sector is not perceived by the government as an important stakeholder in
the national cyber security efforts.
The lack of national governance
The number of cyber security experts is limited.
Some laws have adverse effects on the cyber security of the critical infrastructures.
The culture of collaboration is very limited.
Security is not considered as a design construct by the critical infrastructure
owners.
Again memos were written in selective coding. The memos for the third recursion were
useful especially in re-wording the root causes more precisely and clearly.
At third recursion, the saturation of the extracted theory was observed because there were not
considerable changes in the extracted themes. The newly emerged themes were already
supported by the data of the second recursion. It was seen that the general posture of cyber
security, the types of vulnerabilities, and the threats that were associated with the sectors
were similar. The important difference among sectors was the higher security maturity of the
private sector. This phenomenon was observed in the last two recursions. The root causes of
the cyber security problems of the critical infrastructures were seen to be generally
associated with the governmental critical infrastructure operators.
The list of the themes (Saturated theory) after the selective coding is shown in Table 4-18.
Table 4-18: Saturated Theory after the Selective Coding in the Third Recursion

Root Causes (Saturated Theory)
Cyber security of critical infrastructures is not perceived as a problem at the state
level.
The culture of collaboration is very limited.
Private sector is not perceived by the government as an important stakeholder in the
national cyber security efforts.
Civil servants laws have adverse effects on the cyber security of the critical
infrastructures.
The number of cyber security experts is limited.
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Root Causes (Saturated Theory)
The improper relationship practices with product/service providers.
IT audit mechanism does not exist within critical infrastructure owners.
The managers of the critical infrastructure owners do not perceive the information
security as an area of responsibility.
Risk management process is not conducted by the critical infrastructure owners.
Security is not considered as a design construct by the critical infrastructure owners.
The most of the themes (root causes) in the saturated theory were rewritten after selective
coding, without changing the meaning. Some of the changes were performed to reflect more
generalized concepts, and some to detail the problem for better explanation.
4.1.3.5

Theoretical Sampling for the Fourth Recursion

The interviews at the fourth recursion were performed with the set of questions of the third
recursion. No new interview question was introduced after the third recursion. Two
interviews were arranged for the fourth recursion. The sectors of the interviews were energy
and finance, which were already interviewed in the second recursion. The researcher took the
validation requirement into consideration for the fourth recursion. Because the theory was
saturated in the third recursion, the task to be fulfilled in the fourth recursion was to validate
the saturated theory. The effective way of validating the theory was to turn back to the
sectors of second recursion and to analyze and compare the previous data again, based on the
completely new data.
4.1.4

Fourth Recursion: Validation

The saturation of the theory was observed at the third recursion. The purpose of the fourth
recursion was to confirm the saturation and so validate the theory after performing new
coding tasks in a completely different data set. As in previous two recursions, all three
coding steps of the data analysis were performed at the fourth recursion. At the end of the
fourth recursion, the researcher observed the validation of the theory.
4.1.4.1

Data: Documents and Interviews

In the fourth recursion, the number of coded documents is thirty-eight. The distribution of
the documents according to the sector and document types are shown in Table 4-19 and
Table 4-20 respectively.
On contrary to the second and third recursions, the documents from all sectors were coded to
make validation.
Table 4-19: Distribution of the Documents According to the Sector Type

Critical sector

Energy
Finance
Telecommunications
Transportation
Government Services
Total

The number of documents
associated with the critical
sector
13
8
4
4
9
38
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Table 4-20: Distribution of the Documents According to the Document Type

Document type
Regulation text
Organizational report
Minutes of meeting
Independent evaluation report
Total

Number of documents
3
4
11
20
38

For the fourth recursion, as the result of the theoretical sampling, the organizations from the
energy and finance sectors are selected for interviews. The organization from the energy
sector was private. The organization from the finance sector was governmental. Table 4-21
recapitulates the properties of the semi-structured interviews.
Table 4-21: Properties of the Interviewees of the Fourth Recursion

Interviewee
Interviewee – 8
Interviewee – 9

Sector
Energy
Finance

Type
Private organization
Governmental organization

In the fourth recursion, the data analysis in a different set of data was performed. The
purpose of this recursion was to check whether the findings were similar to those of the
previous recursion and compare the results as to obtain a theoretical saturation.
The researcher started the fourth recursion by coding thirty-eight documents. The researcher
performed semi-structured interviews and continued coding the transcripts of the interviews.
The results of the data analysis at the fourth recursion exposed that fourth recursion
confirmed the results of the third recursion. Hence, the data analysis process was finalized
with the validation of the theory.
Table 4-22 shows the list of themes (theory) after the third and fourth recursions
comparatively. There were some minor changes in wordings to reflect the ideas more clearly.
The completely new data did not change the themes, but rather rendered them stronger. What
was done at the axial and selective coding steps at the fourth recursion was to confirm the
saturated theme.
Table 4-22: Saturated and Validated Theories

Theory (Saturated)
Cyber security of critical infrastructures
is not perceived as a problem at the state
level.
The culture of collaboration is very
limited.
Private sector is not perceived by the
government as an important stakeholder
in the national cyber security efforts.

Theory (Validated)
Cyber security of critical infrastructures is
not perceived as a problem at the state
level.
The culture of collaboration and
cooperation is very limited.
The private sector is not perceived by the
government and critical infrastructure
operators as an important stakeholder in
national cyber security efforts.
Civil servants laws have adverse effects The laws of public procurement and civil
on the cyber security of the critical servants have adverse effects on the cyber
infrastructures.
security of the governmental critical
infrastructure owners.
The number of cyber security experts is The number of cyber security experts is
limited.
limited.
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Theory (Saturated)
The improper relationship practices with
product/service providers.
IT audit mechanism does not exist within
critical infrastructure owners.
The managers of the critical infrastructure
owners do not perceive the information
security as an area of responsibility.

Theory (Validated)
The improper relationship practices with
product/service providers.
IT audit mechanism does not exist within
critical infrastructure owners.
The managers of the critical infrastructure
owners do not perceive the information
security as an area of responsibility.

Risk management process is not
conducted by the critical infrastructure
owners.
Security is not considered as a design
construct by the critical infrastructure
owners.

Risk management process is not conducted
by the critical infrastructure owners.

4.1.5

Security is not considered as a design
construct by the critical infrastructure
owners.

Verification of the Theory by Using Expert Opinion

After the saturation and validation of the theory, it was verified with two cyber security
experts. Both experts have master’s degrees and over ten years of professional experience in
cyber security. The first expert was one of the researchers who undertook responsibility in
the action items of national cyber security strategy and action plan, which were related with
critical infrastructures protection. He contributed to the cyber security studies at national
level such in such areas as the preparation of national cyber security strategy, the guidance
document of sectorial and organizational computer security incident response teams, and
national critical infrastructure protection plan. He was managing a new project about
geography and population, based profiling and risk analysis of national critical
infrastructures. He also took part in the adaptation of the internationally recognized standards
to the national context. He was currently working at a governmental research organization.
The second expert had ten years of experience in cyber security. He also took part in national
level cyber security studies. He was one of the professionals who took part in the
establishment of National Computer Incident Security Response Team. He contributed to the
preparation of the national cyber security strategy and action plan. He prepared national level
policy documents on incident response mechanisms and organizations to tackle state
sponsored cyber threats. The verification based on the expert opinion lasted for three weeks.
Three face to face meetings were performed. Here it should be noted that two experts never
met during the verification process to prevent any bias. The researcher was the mediator
between two experts. The mediator role lasted until experts met at the same point. Apart
from the face to face meetings, a number of e-mail correspondence and phone conversations
were done with the experts over three weeks’ period. Verification with experts was an
iterative process, during which, root causes did not change in meaning. However, they were
evolved by some amendments for better meanings. Both experts underlined the security
problems in the governmental organizations. Their views were parallel to the findings of the
research. The term “governmental critical infrastructure owners/operators” was added to the
five root causes to demonstrate that the root causes were observed specifically in the
governmental organizations. As a result two experts and the researcher agreed on the final
list shown at the second column of the Table 4-23.
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Table 4-23: Validated and Verified Theories

Theory (Validated)
Cyber security of critical infrastructures
is not perceived as a problem at the state
level.
The culture of collaboration
cooperation is very limited.

and

The private sector is not perceived by the
government and critical infrastructure
operators as an important stakeholder in
national cyber security efforts.
The laws of public procurement and civil
servants have adverse effects on the cyber
security of the governmental critical
infrastructure owners.
The number of cyber security experts is
limited.
The improper relationship practices with
product/service providers.

IT audit mechanism does not exist within
critical infrastructure owners.
The managers of the critical infrastructure
owners do not perceive the information
security as an area of responsibility.
Risk management process is not
conducted by the critical infrastructure
owners.
Security is not considered as a design
construct by the critical infrastructure
owners.

Theory (Verified)
The cyber security of critical infrastructures
is not perceived by national security
authorities as a vital part of national
security.
The culture of information sharing,
collaboration and cooperation within the
critical sectors and among the sectors is
very limited.
The private sector is not perceived by the
government and critical infrastructure
operators as an important stakeholder in
national cyber security efforts.
The laws of public procurements and civil
servants have adverse effects on the cyber
security
of
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners.
The number of qualified cyber security
experts is limited.
The relationship management practices
with the product/service providers are
insufficient in governmental critical
infrastructure operators.
The IT audit mechanism is very limited or
does not exist in governmental critical
infrastructure owners.
The managers of governmental critical
infrastructure owners do not perceive the
information security as an area of
responsibility.
The
methodical
and
formal
risk
management process is not conducted by
governmental critical infrastructure owners.
Security is considered by governmental
critical infrastructure owners as an add-on
and not as a design construct.

Table 4-24 shows the evolution of the theory from the first discovery to the verification by
expert opinion.
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Table 4-24: Evolution of the Theory from Discovery to Verification

Recursion-2
(Discovered Theory)
The lack of national
governance

Recursion-3
(Saturated Theory)
Cyber security of
critical
infrastructures is not
perceived
as
a
problem at the state
level.

Recursion-4
(Validated Theory)
Cyber security of
critical
infrastructures is not
perceived
as
a
problem at the state
level.

The
lack
of The
culture
of The
culture
of
legislation that may collaboration is very collaboration
and
create
security limited.
cooperation is very
culture
and
limited.
collaboration

Limited public and Private sector is not
private cooperation
perceived by the
government as an
important
stakeholder in the
national
cyber
security efforts.

The adverse effects
of some laws on the
cyber security of the
critical
infrastructures

Civil servants laws
have adverse effects
on the cyber security
of
the
critical
infrastructures.

Limited
capacity The number of cyber
building efforts
security experts is
limited.

The private sector is
not perceived by the
government
and
critical infrastructure
operators
as
an
important
stakeholder
in
national
cyber
security efforts.
The laws of public
procurement
and
civil servants have
adverse effects on
the cyber security of
the
governmental
critical infrastructure
owners.
The number of cyber
security experts is
limited.

Verified Theory by
Expert Opinion
The cyber security of
critical infrastructures
is not perceived by
national
security
authorities as a vital
part
of
national
security.
The
culture
of
information sharing,
collaboration
and
cooperation
within
the critical sectors
and
among
the
sectors
is
very
limited.
The private sector is
not perceived by the
government
and
critical infrastructure
operators
as
an
important stakeholder
in national cyber
security efforts.
The laws of public
procurements
and
civil servants have
adverse effects on the
cyber security of
governmental critical
infrastructure owners.

The
number
of
qualified
cyber
security experts is
limited.
Problematic
The
improper The
improper The
relationship
contract
relationship practices relationship practices management
management
with product/service with product/service practices with the
practices
and providers.
providers.
product/service
granting full access
providers
are
rights to third party
insufficient
in
companies
governmental critical
infrastructure
operators.

74

Recursion-2
(Discovered Theory)
No regular and
formal IT audit

Recursion-3
(Saturated Theory)
IT audit mechanism
does not exist within
critical infrastructure
owners.

Recursion-4
(Validated Theory)
IT audit mechanism
does not exist within
critical infrastructure
owners.

Limited information The managers of the
security governance critical infrastructure
practices
owners
do
not
perceive
the
information security
as an area of
responsibility.
Risk management Risk
management
process
is
not process
is
not
conducted by the conducted by the
critical
critical infrastructure
infrastructure
owners.
owners.
Security
is
not
considered
as
a
design construct by
the
critical
infrastructure
owners.
The lack of sectorial authorities for cyber
security
Limited
security awareness level of
employees

The managers of the
critical infrastructure
owners
do
not
perceive
the
information security
as an area of
responsibility.
Risk
management
process
is
not
conducted by the
critical infrastructure
owners.

4.1.6

Security
is
not
considered
as
a
design construct by
the
critical
infrastructure
owners.
-

Verified Theory by
Expert Opinion
The
IT
audit
mechanism is very
limited or does not
exist in governmental
critical infrastructure
owners.
The managers of
governmental critical
infrastructure owners
do not perceive the
information security
as
an
area
of
responsibility.
The methodical and
formal
risk
management process
is not conducted by
governmental critical
infrastructure owners.
Security is considered
by
governmental
critical infrastructure
owners as an add-on
and not as a design
construct.
-

-

-

Findings of the First Phase of the Research

The prominent finding of the first phase of the research was ten root causes of the
susceptibility of the critical infrastructures to cyber threats. The root causes are as follows:
1) The cyber security of critical infrastructures is not perceived by national security
authorities as a vital part of national security.
2) The culture of information sharing, collaboration and cooperation within the critical
sectors and among the sectors is very limited.
3) The private sector is not perceived by the government and critical infrastructure
operators as an important stakeholder in national cyber security efforts.
4) The laws of public procurements and civil servants have adverse effects on the cyber
security of governmental critical infrastructure owners.
5) The number of qualified cyber security experts is limited.
6) The relationship management practices with the product/service providers are
insufficient in governmental critical infrastructure operators.
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7) The IT audit mechanism is very limited or does not exist in governmental critical
infrastructure owners.
8) The managers of governmental critical infrastructure owners do not perceive the
information security as an area of responsibility.
9) The methodical and formal risk management process is not conducted by
governmental critical infrastructure owners.
10) Security is considered by governmental critical infrastructure owners as an add-on
and not as a design construct.
The first root cause is associated with the state-level perception of cyber security. Cyber
security is not considered as a vital part of the national security by the national security
authorities. This root cause might be the underlying reason for the other extracted root
causes. In this aspect, this root reason can be regarded as a core theme among the other
extracted themes.
Cyber security is a horizontal area because of the ubiquitous use of the cyber systems.
Therefore, cyber security is the common problem of all organizations in all critical sectors.
This fact requires effective collaboration and cooperation activities to cope with the cyber
threats as the threats to a sector will probably be the same to other sectors as well. In the
same way, threat information exchange is crucial to counteract cyber threats before they
actually occur. In Turkey, owing to the privacy and confidentiality constraints, organizations
usually keep away from information sharing. Thus, the culture of cooperation, collaboration
and information sharing is quite tenuous. There are no incentives by regulatory authorities to
encourage the information sharing within the sectors. The practices of information sharing,
collaboration and cooperation have to be flourished for resilient infrastructures.
The government authorities and the most of the critical infrastructure operators are not aware
of the private sector’s potential. The private sector is not regarded as an important
stakeholder to reach the cyber security goals, it is rather kept outside of the cyber security
agenda. In Turkey, the private organizations did not participate in the preparation process of
national cyber security strategy and action plan. There is no private sector representative in
Cyber Security Council of Turkey, which, as a fact, affects the national cyber security
adversely. For example, public-private partnership cannot be achieved. The public-private
partnership is an accelerative force for cyber resilient societies. It is an important instrument
for the security of the critical infrastructures (Kelly & Hunker 2012; Rak 2002).
Most of the interviewees in governmental organizations asserted the problems which
originate from Turkish Public Servant’s Law and Turkish Public Procurement Law. Both
laws are comprehensive regulations that shape the core employment and procurement
processes of the governmental organizations. The strict articles of the Public Servant’s Law
prevent the employment of the qualified personnel in the governmental organizations. The
strict conditions of the Public Servant’s Law bring some problems with the procurements for
the governmental organizations as well.
There is a limited number of qualified cyber security experts in Turkey. This is a widespread
problem, in fact, the problem of the whole country. It affects all sectors in a way. There are
limited efforts regarding human capital to increase the cyber capacity of the country. For
example, there is a low number of universities that offer cyber security programs. The
training facilities in Turkey are also insufficient in terms of both their number and quality.
The last five root causes are directly associated with the governmental critical infrastructure
operators. The lack of IT audit, preliminary security design, information security risk
management, and due care of management are related with the inappropriate information
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security management culture and practices within the governmental organizations. After the
interviews with the critical infrastructure owners, it was seen that business oriented formal
and regular risk management was not conducted. The decisions on risk levels and
countermeasure procurements were taken in an ad-hoc manner. The insufficiency of the
relationship management practices with product/service providers is common among
governmental operators. This problem creates considerable cyber security challenges.
The comparisons between applied countermeasures and vulnerabilities within all sectors
showed that:
1) There is no correlation between the existence and sophistication of the technical
countermeasures and inherent vulnerabilities.
2) Organizations lack in the security processes, which are related to the security
culture.
According to the Computer Security Institute, a professional membership organization in
US, 60% - 80% of all the network misuse is perpetrated by the people inside the
organizations (Peltier et al. 2005). The state-of-the art technical countermeasures will not be
effective unless the personnel support the countermeasures by understanding the logic
behind their implementation. A cultural change is required to achieve the integration of
information security into the organizational culture (Woodhouse 2007).
Technology is a means of improving of security; however, the human factor is the real
determinant that ensures security. People’s behavior is an essential parameter for the design,
implementation, and maintenance of the security controls (Colwill 2009).
The comparisons among the six sectors and between the governmental and private
organizations showed that:
1) Independent of the sectors, private organizations are more mature, compared to the
governmental organizations. The most of the extracted root causes are mainly
associated with the governmental organizations.
2) Therefore, if a sector is dominated by the private organizations, the general security
posture of the sector is more mature; and vice versa.
a. The security maturity of a sector does not mainly originate from the sectorial
security practices. While a governmental operator in the finance sector had
relatively poor security practices, a private operator in the energy sector had
state-of-the art security practices.
b. Telecommunications and finance sectors are more mature compared to the
others because of the private sector dominance in these sectors.
c. Energy, water management, government, and transportation sectors are less
mature due to the government dominance and recently-completed
privatizations.
3) Although private organizations are more mature; the root causes are observed in
private organizations as well.
Seven out of ten root causes are associated with especially governmental operators. These
root causes contain the term “government” explicitly in their definitions. As it can be seen
from Table 3-2 in section 3.3.2, the considerable amount of the critical infrastructures are
operated by governmental organizations. Therefore, the root causes considerably and
negatively affect the critical infrastructures of Turkey. Table 4-25 shows the prevalence of
the root causes in governmental and private organizations.
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Root Causes
The cyber security of critical infrastructures is not perceived by national
security authorities as a vital part of national security.
The culture of information sharing, collaboration and cooperation within the
critical sectors and among the sectors is very limited.
The private sector is not perceived by the government and critical infrastructure
operators as an important stakeholder in national cyber security efforts.
The laws of public procurements and civil servants have adverse effects on the
cyber security of governmental critical infrastructure owners.
The number of qualified cyber security experts is limited.
The relationship management practices with the product/service providers are
insufficient in governmental critical infrastructure operators.
The IT audit mechanism is very limited or does not exist in governmental
critical infrastructure owners.
The managers of governmental critical infrastructure owners do not perceive
the information security as an area of responsibility.
The methodical and formal risk management process is not conducted by
governmental critical infrastructure owners.
Security is considered by governmental critical infrastructure owners as an addon and not as a design construct.
: Fully observed; ~: Partially observed; - : Not observed
4.2

Private

The Ownership of the CI Operators

Governmental

Table 4-25: Appearance of the Root Causes in the Governmental and Private Operators

N/A N/A
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Second Phase of the Research: Delphi Survey

The purpose of the second phase of the research was to determine the set of principles for the
cyber security of the critical infrastructures of Turkey. The set of principles were determined
by a Delphi survey. The input to the Delphi survey was the extracted theory which was the
output of the first phase of the research. At the beginning of the second phase, the root
causes were introduced to the experts, and they were requested to determine the principles
that could be remedies for the root causes of the susceptibility.
The second output of the Delphi survey was the weight values of the principles. The weight
values were used to measure the maturity percentage in the proposed national level cyber
security maturity model.
The Delphi survey lasted for three weeks. Nine experts were invited to participate in the
Delphi survey. However, two of the experts refused to participate in because of their
previously-arranged schedules. And one expert was very late to participate in the survey, and
thus, his opinions could not be included in the subsequent rounds of the survey. Therefore,
the Delphi survey was conducted with six experts to determine the principles associated with
the root causes.
The properties of the participants of the Delphi survey are shown in Table 4-26. Two experts
with ten and fifteen years of experience in cyber security were from the private sector. Two
experts with five and fourteen years of experience were from a governmental research
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institute in cyber security. Two experts with fifteen years of experience both were from
academia.
Table 4-26: Profile of the Participants of the Delphi Survey

Expert
Expert-1
Expert-2
Expert-3
Expert-4
Expert-5
Expert-6

Years of Experience
14
15
5
15
15
10

Affiliation
Government
Academia
Government
Academia
Private sector
Private sector

To ensure the anonymity, the Delphi survey was conducted by sending e-mails to the six
experts separately (Okoli & Pawlowski 2004). The survey had five consecutive rounds.
Controlled opinion feedback was supplied by the researcher to the respondents between the
rounds (Hsu & Sandford 2007). The details of the rounds of the Delphi survey are given in
Appendix A: Details of the Delphi Survey.
4.2.1

First Round: Identifying Principles

At the first round, ten root causes were sent to the experts. Some of the root causes were
clarified. The experts were requested to determine principles, from one to three in number,
for each root cause by considering the following proposition: “The proposed principle is a
sign or countermeasure. If it exists, the effect of the root cause descends, the root cause
vanishes or the root cause does not exist”. The set of principles determined by each
individual is listed in Appendix A: Details of the Delphi Survey. After gathering responses
from the experts, the researcher took the repeated principles into consideration and
consolidated them. A total of seventy-nine unique principles were obtained. The researcher
consolidated the principles into a single document before the second round for the weighting.
4.2.2

Second Round: Weighting Principles

The answers of the experts were consolidated into a single document and sent back to the
experts at the second round in which the experts were requested to weight the principles.
According to the Table 4-27, a principle could be regarded as “recognized” by the expert if
s/he assigns it a weight value other than zero, or it could be discarded if it is assigned zero.
Therefore, three Likert scales were used for the “recognized” principles. Three Likert scales
are considered suitable to assess the importance of the principle. Because the national level
cyber maturity is assessed, there is not much data on the application details of a specific
principle at national level so as to use, for example, a five Likert scale. As an example, a
study of the US Department of Homeland Security that measures the cybersecurity
capabilities at the national level use a three Likert level to represent the level (DHS 2014).
At this round, the experts were encouraged to assign zero weights to the principles. It was
said that the maturity model would include only the most vital principles. This was an
important feedback given to the experts at this round.
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Table 4-27: Reference Table for the Weight Values of the Principles (Wm)

Wm Explanation
0

The principle is duplicate, nonsense, confusing, unrelated, imprecise (careless),
too detailed or too technical.

1

The lack of the principle can be compensated by other principles to some extent.
The country improves its critical infrastructure protection effort more slowly than
expected.

2

The maturity principle is important on its own. The lack of the principle cannot
be compensated by other principles. The lack of criterion indicates an obvious
problem for the critical infrastructure protection. The critical infrastructures will
not be resilient at some parts.

3

The lack of the maturity criterion indicates a major problem for the critical
infrastructure protection efforts of the country because of the dependencies of the
other criteria on this criterion. The country cannot improve the cyber resilience of
the critical infrastructures.

4.2.3

Third Round: Reviewing Weights

The scores of six experts were collected into a single document and sent back to the experts
at the third round in which the experts were allowed to review and change their scores by
looking at the scores of the other anonymized experts. For the controlled opinion feedback,
the arithmetic average of the weight values of all principles were sent back to the experts at
the beginning of the third round. A distribution chart that shows the frequency of each
average weight value was sent as well.
4.2.4

Fourth Round: Reviewing Weights

At the fourth round, the action in the third round was repeated. However, the principles were
sorted according to their arithmetic averages from the highest to the lowest before sending
the document to the experts. Each expert was requested especially to concentrate on the
principles which s/he graded zero point when the average score of the principles is more than
one. If a principle got zero point from at least one expert, it would be regarded as the
disagreement of the experts and discarded although its average was high because group
consensus is vital in Delphi survey (Chan et al. 2001). As controlled opinion feedback, if an
expert insisted on the zero value, a reason for insistence was requested.
After the fourth round, a significant consensus of experts on the weights of the principles
was reached. The weight values of the experts were converged into each other, compared to
the results of the second and the third rounds. After the second round, there were seventeen
principles with weight values below one, as seen in Figure 4-1. The number of principles
with highest values was relatively low.

80

Figure 4-1: Distribution of the Average Weights after the Second Round

After the third round, the distribution of the average weight values changed, as in Figure 4-2.
A more uniform distribution was obtained. Both the number of principles with higher
averages and the ones with average weight less than one increased.

Figure 4-2: Distribution of the Average Weights after the Third Round

The distribution of the weight values after the fourth round is shown in Figure 4-3. Again,
the number of principles with relatively higher and lower weight values increased after the
fourth round.
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Figure 4-3: Distribution of the Average Weights after the Fourth Round

It is important to obtain the most reliable consensus of the opinions of the experts in Delphi
surveys (Chan et al. 2001). Therefore, only the principles, which did not get zero point from
any of the experts by the end of the fourth round, were selected as the potential criteria of the
maturity model. Although there were fifty-eight principles with average weights between
one and three, only forty-one of them got non-zero weights from the six experts by the end
of fourth round of Delphi survey.
4.2.5

Fifth Round: Finalizing Principles

A final round of Delphi survey was performed to obtain a final list of the principles as some
of the principles were close in meaning. There were both some detailed and general
principles for the same topic. The experts were requested to decide on whether to eliminate
these principles. The consensus of the experts were required in the elimination of a principle.
It means that a principle would be eliminated only if all experts agreed on elimination. As a
result, only one principle was omitted at the fifth round. Therefore, forty principles were
selected as the criteria of the maturity model at the end of the fifth round. The final list of the
principles with weight values are shown in Table 4-28. At the fifth round of the Delphi
survey, the experts were requested to review the English translations of the principles as
well. It is notable that, at the fifth round, weighting of the principles was not performed.
4.3

Third Phase of the Research: Developing the Maturity Model

Maturity models might help the national security officers in taking accurate decisions on
national security and in directing the investments by looking at the current snapshot (DHS
2014; ITU 2009). A national level cyber security maturity model, which measures the state
level preparedness of the critical infrastructures protection efforts, was proposed to assess the
current cyber security posture.
4.3.1

National Cyber Security Maturity Model

The proposed maturity model was grounded on the set of principles determined in the Delphi
Survey. Because the set of principles are grounded on the root causes of the susceptibility to
cyber threats, the proposed maturity model was called Vulnerability Driven National Cyber
Security Maturity Model.
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Table 4-28 shows the list of the principles along with the associated root causes, and their
weight values set after the fifth round of the Delphi Survey. The weight value of each
principle was the arithmetic average of the individual scores of the six experts for that
principle. These weights values were used in the formula of the maturity model. The
principles were set as the maturity criteria for the proposed maturity model.
Table 4-28: List of the Principles Determined After the Delphi Survey

Root causes of
susceptibility to cyber
threats

Principles (Maturity Criteria)

1) A Critical Infrastructure Protection Program
(CIPP) that considers cyber threats
2) The management of the CIPP by a governmental
organization which has responsibilities for the
national security as well / the communication
between CIPP and national security bodies
3) The existence of a consultant who provides
technical, regulatory and diplomatic cyber
security consultancy for the head of the state
The cyber security of
4) Budget allocated to critical infrastructure
critical infrastructures is
protection efforts
not perceived by national
5) Regulatory agencies that set cyber security
security authorities as a
regulations and check their applications for each
vital part of national
critical sector
security.
6) A CSIRT organization dedicated to the protection
of critical infrastructures
7) A national cyber security strategy that considers
the cyber security of critical infrastructures as
part of national security
8) Nation-wide risk analysis and risk management
activities which cover all critical sectors / sectorwide wide risk analysis and risk management
activities
9) A public-private partnership program which is
developed and supported by the government
10) Regulations that specify the inner - inter sector
information sharing and cooperation principles
The
culture
of
11) Sector based CSIRTs that have information
information
sharing,
sharing responsibilities determined by the
collaboration
and
regulations
cooperation within the
12) The existence of an internationally recognized
critical
sectors
and
National CSIRT that performs international
among the sectors is very
cooperation with other CSIRTs
limited.
13) A technical infrastructure to fulfill the inner inter sector information sharing needs (online
information sharing portals, statistics dashboards,
data collections centers)
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Average
Weight
Value
(Wm)
2,5

2,5

1,67
2,5
1,83
2
2,17

2,5

2,33
2
1,5

2

1,67

Root causes of
susceptibility to cyber
threats

The private sector is not
perceived
by
the
government and critical
infrastructure operators
as
an
important
stakeholder in national
cyber security efforts.

The laws of public
procurements and civil
servants have adverse
effects on the cyber
security of governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.

Principles (Maturity Criteria)

14) A National CSIRT that handles the warnings of
cyber incidents related to critical infrastructures
by coordinating with the relevant sectorial
CSIRTs and critical infrastructure owners when
needed
15) Government policies and strategies that position
private sector as a key player in national cyber
security efforts
16) The participation of the private sector in the
preparation of the national or sectorial cyber
security strategies
17) Permanent seat for the private sector in the
national boards like the cyber security council
18) Government leadership for innovation, research
& development activities, and the identification
of the priority areas in cyber security by the
government
19) The extensive participation of the private sector
in the national cyber security exercises
20) Critical review and update of the existing
legislation that may affect critical infrastructures
(especially for the needs of the governmental
critical infrastructure operators)
21) Making amendments to the regulations to hire
outsourced personnel / qualified government
officials with higher salaries / contracted
personnel in governmental critical infrastructures
22) National capacity building plans and strategies

23) Preference of the internationally accepted
certificate owners in the recruitments by critical
infrastructure owners
24) Qualified and sufficient number of cyber security
The number of qualified
training institutions (private, academic or
cyber security experts is
governmental) that support/train the personnel of
limited.
critical infrastructure operators
25) Cyber security and IT curriculum for all levels of
the education, from elementary schools to
universities
26) Special positions for cyber security experts in
critical infrastructure operators
27) National / sectorial products and service
The
relationship
procurement standards or rules for critical
management
practices
infrastructure operators
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Average
Weight
Value
(Wm)

1,83

2,5

2
1,33

2,33

1,5

2,5

2,5
2,5
1,67

1,83

2,33
1,67
2,67

Root causes of
susceptibility to cyber
threats

Principles (Maturity Criteria)

with the product/service 28) The establishment of a system for the eligibility
providers are insufficient
certifications of the IT companies to provide IT
in governmental critical
services for critical infrastructure operators
infrastructure operators. 29) Security standards for the IT products to be used
by critical infrastructure operators
30) National or sectorial regulations that enforce the
internal / external audit for critical infrastructure
operators
31) Regular cyber security audits performed by the
The IT audit mechanism
regulatory authorities of the sectors for critical
is very limited or does
infrastructure operators
not exist in governmental
32) Experienced IT auditors who are employed
critical
infrastructure
within the internal audit units of critical
owners.
infrastructure operators
33) Sanctions imposed by the regulatory authorities
on critical infrastructure operators for the
nonconformities
34) Regulations that render top level management of
The
managers
of
critical infrastructure operators responsible for
governmental
critical
cyber security
infrastructure owners do
not
perceive
the
information security as
an area of responsibility.
35) Regulations that enforce critical infrastructure
The methodical and
owners to conduct the cyber security risk
formal risk management
management process
process is not conducted
36) Obligation of a comprehensive security standard,
by governmental critical
such as ISO 27001, for critical infrastructure
infrastructure owners.
owners
37) Minimum security countermeasures that are
obliged by regulations for critical infrastructure
owners
38) Regulations that set out the properties of
information systems and security
Security is considered by
countermeasures that come into operation in
governmental
critical
critical infrastructure operators
infrastructure owners as
an add-on and not as a 39) Sector-specific technical guidance documents for
design construct.
the secure design, set-up and operation of the
networks of critical infrastructure operators
40) Sectorial or national security standards that set
out the best security practices for each critical
sector

Average
Weight
Value
(Wm)
2,17
1,83
2,67

3

1,67

1,83

2,83

3

2,17

2,5

2,33

1,5

1,83

Vulnerability Driven National Cyber Security Maturity Model is a survey-based maturity
assessment method. The other numerical value that was used in the national level cyber
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security maturity evaluation was the value of each answer choice selected by the survey
participants. The existence of each principle would be checked by the survey participants
according to the three answer choices based on the three Likert scale, as shown in Table
4-29. A country gets zero point for very limited or no action, one point for the partial action,
and two points for the comprehensive action. Table 4-29 was the evaluation table used at a
similar study, Global Cybersecurity Index (ITU 2014). Global Cybersecurity Index is the
most similar study to the proposed maturity model among other studies in terms of its
content. Global Cybersecurity Index is the only study that scores countries according to their
cyber security efforts only. Therefore, the same evaluation table is selected to make more
reliable discussions and comparisons after the application of the model.
Table 4-29: Weight Values of the Answer Choices

Am

Explanation

0

No action or very limited action

1

Partial Action

2

Comprehensive Action

Before conducting the maturity survey, the forty maturity criteria (m) are converted into the
questions (Wm). For each question, three answer choices (Am) are written under the question
based on the Table 4-29. The survey sheet is given at Appendix B: Maturity Survey.
Formula 1 shows the maturity model associated with the legend. The maturity calculation is
performed based on a simple linear additive evaluation model. The numerator of the fraction
in Formula 1 represents the maturity percentage evaluated by a single participant. The final
maturity level is the arithmetic average of the opinions of all participants.

∑𝑝 (
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =

∑𝑚 𝑊𝑚 × 𝐴𝑚
× 100)
∑𝑚 𝑊𝑚 × 2
𝑝

(1)

where;
p: The total number of the survey participants
m: The total number of the maturity criteria (principles) (m=40)
Wm: The weight of the principle “m” (See Table 4-28)
Am: The weight of the selected answer choice for the principle “m” (See Table 4-29)
Maturity Level: The cyber security maturity percentage of critical infrastructure
protection efforts of the evaluated country
The maturity level is presented as percentage values which are more flexible and meaningful
for the government officials compared to the Likert scale in presenting maturity level. Cyber
Power Index and Cyber Maturity in Asia-Pacific Region studies also use percentage values
to represent the maturity level (BAH 2011; Tobias Feakin & Woodall 2014). Both studies
measure the maturity of cyber capabilities of various countries and they are intended to be
read by policy makers.
4.3.2

Application of the Maturity Model for Turkey

A maturity survey was performed with ten participants (p) who are working in the
governmental organizations or are former government officials. They participated in the
national cyber security efforts such as the preparation and review of the national strategy, the
participation of the nation cyber security exercises and the preparation of the national level
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cyber security statues. The results of the survey do not officially represent the maturity level
of Turkey because the survey was not officially conducted.
A maturity survey would produce the most accurate results when it was answered by the
related government officials. Most of the country level maturity surveys were answered by
the experts and according to the publicly available data about the countries. Publicly
available data may be misleading because the real preparedness level and the intent of the
government can only be known by the appropriate government officials.
Table 4-30 shows the results of the maturity survey. Table 4-30 also shows the individual
maturity percentages. The cyber security maturity percentage of the critical infrastructure
protection efforts of the Turkey is 22.27 percent.
Table 4-30: Results of the Pilot Application of the Maturity Survey for Turkey

Participant
(p)

p=1
p=2
p=3
p=4
p=5
p=6
p=7
p=8
p=9
p=10

Individual
Maturity
Percentage
∑𝑚 𝑊𝑚 × 𝐴𝑚
∑𝑚 𝑊𝑚 × 2
× 100
24,01%
28,30%
14,20%
20,03%
28,50%
21,59%
10,99%
22,28%
21,02%
17,61%

Maturity
Level
Maturity Percentage)

∑𝑝 (

(Average

∑𝑚 𝑊𝑚 × 𝐴𝑚
× 100)
∑𝑚 𝑊𝑚 × 2
𝑝

20,85%

It is worthy of note that the maturity percentage of Turkey was 64.7% in the GCI of ITU.
Turkey got the seventh highest point among the twenty-nine levels in ITU’s Global
Cybersecurity Index survey study. The considerable difference between the maturity levels
of two studies may emanate from the details of the analysis. Vulnerability Driven National
Cyber Security Maturity Model checks the details of the organizational structures, CSIRTs,
and the regulatory infrastructure etc. However GCI checks the existence of these structures
and it does not detail the survey. As an example, GCI checks whether National and Sectorial
CSIRTs are legally mandated and also National CSIRT’s ability to gather its own
intelligence. However, the following detailed criteria are checked for CSIRTs in the
proposed model:
a) A CSIRT organization dedicated to the protection of critical infrastructures
b) Sector based CSIRTs that have information sharing responsibilities determined by
the regulations
c) The existence of an internationally recognized National CSIRT that performs
international cooperation with other CSIRTs
d) A technical infrastructure to fulfill the inner - inter sector information sharing needs
(online information sharing portals, statistics dashboards, data collections centers)
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e) A National CSIRT that handles the warnings of cyber incidents related to critical
infrastructures by coordinating with the relevant sectorial CSIRTs and critical
infrastructure owners when needed
The scope of the proposed model is the cyber security posture of the critical infrastructures.
However, the scope of the GCI is the general cyber security efforts of the countries. This
may be the other reason for the difference of the results.
The other study that scores Turkey is Cyber Power Index performed by Booz Allen
Hamilton with a maturity percentage of 30.4%. Turkey was the fifteenth among nineteen
countries. This percentage value is close to the percentage of unofficial application of the
proposed model. The theme of the Cyber Power Index was broader than cyber security.
There are four different categories in Cyber Power Index. The criteria related with cyber
security –as well as the ones not related with cyber security- are under the legal and
regulatory framework category. The maturity level of Turkey is 49,2% in this category.
However, the ranking of Turkey for this category does not change despite relatively higher
maturity. Again, the details of the analysis may be a reason for the difference of the maturity
percentages. The principles of the Cyber Power Index are not detailed like the principles of
GCI. Secondly, the other criteria in the legal and regulatory framework such as intellectual
property protection may be another reason for the relatively higher maturity level.
Although the maturity model is based on the data specific to Turkey, it can produce accurate
results for the countries that have certain similarities with Turkey in terms of organizational
and legislative properties. Before conducting the survey, the weight values of the criteria can
be reviewed and changed by the experts in that country.
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CHAPTER 5

5

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion chapter has five sections, which are comparison of the extracted theory with
the literature, comparison of the set of principles with the criteria of the other maturity
models, suggested list of principles, regulatory approaches for the mitigation of the root
causes, and the implications for future research.
There were two research questions for the PhD research. These were:
1) What are the possible root causes of these vulnerabilities?
2) What are the set of principles to mitigate these root causes?
The first and the second research questions were discussed in the section 5.1 and in the
section 5.2 respectively.
5.1

Comparison of the Extracted Theory with the Literature

Academic studies, the reports of the Turkish government and the international/regional
organizations, Turkish regulations, and the official webpages of the government agencies of
Turkey were reviewed to find the appropriate materials that may confirm the extracted root
causes. The literature that analyzes the cyber security efforts of Turkey is quite limited. Most
of the found studies are conducted by Turkish citizens. This section contains the comparison
of the current literature with the findings.
Ten root causes, which were the reasons of the susceptibility of the critical infrastructures to
the cyber threats, were as follows:
1. The cyber security of critical infrastructures is not perceived by national security
authorities as a vital part of national security.
2. The culture of information sharing, collaboration and cooperation within the
critical sectors and among the sectors is very limited.
3. The private sector is not perceived by the government and critical infrastructure
operators as an important stakeholder in national cyber security efforts.
4. The laws of public procurements and civil servants have adverse effects on the
cyber security of governmental critical infrastructure owners.
5. The number of qualified cyber security experts is limited.
6. The relationship management practices with the product/service providers are
insufficient in governmental critical infrastructure operators.
7. The IT audit mechanism is very limited or does not exist in governmental critical
infrastructure owners.
8. The managers of governmental critical infrastructure owners do not perceive the
information security as an area of responsibility.
9. The methodical and formal risk management process is not conducted by
governmental critical infrastructure owners.
10. Security is considered by governmental critical infrastructure owners as an addon and not as a design construct.
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There are several findings in the literature that confirm the first root reason. As opposed to
the developed countries in which the organizations with national security responsibilities
have a central role in cyber defense, the cyber security coordinator body of Turkey does not
have any national security responsibility (Ikitemur 2014). The webpage of the national
CSIRT does not contain any security recommendation or bulletin specific to the critical
infrastructures (TR-CERT 2015). According to the eighth action item of National Cyber
Security Action Plan, an international cyber security exercise had to be organized by the end
of May 2014 (Ministry of Telecommunications 2013). However, no exercise was organized
either at that date or later. The national cyber security action plan spanned between the years
2013 and 2014. Currently, there is no action plan in effect. Cyber Security Council of Turkey
was established at the end of 2012 by the Cabinet decision (Senturk et al. 2013). The council
has not gathered for the last fifteen months. At the meeting of the Cyber Security Council in
June 2013, the critical infrastructure list of Turkey was updated. The decision remained in
the meeting record and has not yet been part of a regulation (Kaska & Trinberg 2015).
For the second root reason; there are currently no sectorial level CSIRTs or no CSIRT
specific to Industrial Control Systems like ICS-CERT of USA, although it was obliged at the
fourth action item of the obsolete national cyber security action plan of Turkey. CSIRTs
share various pieces of information with other CSIRTs, ISPs, Law Enforcement Agencies
and any other related parties (Cichonski et al. 2012) The successful CSIRT operations
depend on the collaborative and cooperative activities. The lack of security-specific
organizations like CSIRT is one of the primary causes of the lack of information sharing,
collaboration and cooperation. According to the e-government studies report of OECD, only
10-25% of the respondents from central and municipal government collaborate with other
public sector organizations (OECD 2007b). According to the same report, nearly 50% of
respondents emphasize that the complexity of regulations prevents the collaboration. The
legislative infrastructure has not changed since 2007. There is no public-private partnership
model, as stated in the article that analyzes the cyber security structure of Turkey (Senturk et
al. 2013). According to the same article, government and privately owned critical
infrastructure owners should cooperate.
For the third root reason; the contribution of the private sector to the national cyber security
efforts is minimum (Ikitemur 2014). As an example, the cyber security council of Turkey
does not have a member who represents the private sector, as the Cabinet Decision and
Electronic Communications Law amendments deal with the cyber security issues from a
public point of view (Turkish Cabinet 2012; Turkish Cabinet 2014). The national cyber
security strategy and action plan were prepared by a governmental research organization. As
written in the webpage of the governmental research agency that prepared the strategy,
exposure draft was shared only with the related governmental organizations (CSI 2013).
Only six of the forty participants of the national cyber security exercise, organized in 2011,
were private organizations (ICTA & TUBITAK 2011). Among thirty OECD countries,
Turkey ranks the twenty-sixth among thirty countries in 2013 in terms of gross domestic
spending on research and development (OECD 2013). This statistic may be regarded as an
indicator of the limited power of the private sector in Turkey.
For the fourth root reason; all of the interviewees from governmental critical infrastructure
owners emphasized the adverse effect of the civil servants law on the employee quality.
Three of the interviewees stated the adverse effect of the public procurement law on the
security of critical infrastructure owners. As stated by all governmental interviewees, there
are three prominent problems with the civil servants law. Firstly, it grants job guarantee
according to the article 125 (Republic of Turkey 1965). Secondly, it lacks the performance
evaluation based on technical performance. Thirdly, high salaries for successful personnel
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cannot be granted according to the article forty-three. As a result, qualified personnel look
for jobs with higher salaries and usually find a favorable job. Governmental critical
infrastructure owners cannot purchase the desired software/hardware because of the public
procurement law which urges tendering for almost all needs of the organizations.
For the fifth root reason; Ministry of Development of Turkey recently published a report,
which analyzes the problems of the information society. According to the report, available
human resources do not meet the requirements of the employers in the information
technology sector. According to 58% of the participants of a survey made by an employers’
association, the qualified workforce deficit is the most important problem of the sector
(Ministry of Development 2013). According to the presentation made by the authorized
government official in 2014, there is no cyber security doctoral program in Turkish
universities. There are master programs in only six universities among 196 universities
(Ministry of Telecommunications 2014).
For the sixth root reason; the State Supervisory Council, which works on behalf of Turkish
Presidency, examined the security postures of six governmental critical infrastructure owners
in 2013. According to the confidential audit report, the owners of the information systems of
the organizations are mostly private organizations “in practice”, because of the granted
permissions to control and monitor the critical systems (Turkish Presidency 2013). The same
report points out the problems with the authorization procedures of the service provider
personnel, security clearance procedures, access management processes, and nondisclosure
agreements. To summarize, critical infrastructure owners do not comply with the cyber
security principles when procuring services or products from third party firms. According to
another study that contains the results of eight information security management projects
within governmental organizations, the managers of the governmental organizations and the
chiefs of the information processing departments may fallaciously think that “information
security management can and should be achieved by the consulting firm” (Karabacak &
Ozkan 2010).
For the seventh root reason; the report of the State Supervisory Council emphasizes the lack
of internal audit procedures and processes. According to the report, some of the critical
infrastructure owners do not have internal audit units (Turkish Presidency 2013). The report
of the national cyber security exercise in Turkey points out the inherent audit problems of the
participant organizations (ICTA & TUBITAK 2011). Fourteen critical infrastructure owners
from the telecommunications, finance, and government services participated in the national
cyber security exercise.
For the eighth root reason; according to the results of information security management
projects within eight critical governmental organizations, the top level managers do not feel
themselves responsible for information security (Karabacak & Ozkan 2010). Five of the
analyzed organizations were critical infrastructure owners. Therefore, due care principles of
information security were violated (Solms & Solms 2004). According to the article the
enterprise wide information security was delegated to the head of the information processing
department by the top level managers (Karabacak & Ozkan 2010). Therefore, information
security governance principles are not obeyed by critical infrastructure owners, meaning that
information security is not seen as a part of corporate governance and business strategy (von
Solms & von Solms 2006; Von Solms & Von Solms 2005).
For the ninth root reason; the lack of the information security management systems was the
first finding of the national cyber security exercise (ICTA & TUBITAK 2011). According to
the exercise report, organizations do not perform a risk analysis process; which is the
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essential part and the starting point of the risk management process (Stoneburner et al.
2002).
For the tenth root reason; according to the national cyber security exercise report, some
participants of the exercise did not consider security as a main design principle in the system
design stage (ICTA & TUBITAK 2011). The similar problem was stated in the audit report
of the State Supervisory Council (Turkish Presidency 2013). The report recommends the
consideration of the security requirements at the design phase.
Table 5-1 shows the root causes, which are implicitly stated by the aforementioned studies.
Six of the root causes are implied by thirteen different studies; only two of them are from the
academia.
Table 5-1: Implicitly Stated Root Causes

Root Cause

Discussed By

The cyber security of critical
infrastructures is not perceived
by national security authorities
as a vital part of national
security.

Implicitly discussed in a PhD thesis (Ikitemur 2014)
Implied in the webpage of TR-CERT (TR-CERT
2015)
Implicitly stated by a NATO report (Kaska &
Trinberg 2015)

The culture of information
sharing, collaboration and
cooperation within the critical
sectors and among the sectors
is very limited
The private sector is not
perceived by the government
and
critical
infrastructure
operators as an important
stakeholder in national cyber
security efforts.

Implicitly stated in an OECD report (OECD 2007b)
Implicitly stated in the article (Senturk et al. 2013)

Implicitly discussed in a PhD thesis (Ikitemur 2014)
Implied in the Turkish regulations (Turkish Cabinet
2014; Turkish Cabinet 2012)
Implied in the webpage of governmental organization
(CSI 2013)
Implied in the report of cyber security exercise (ICTA
& TUBITAK 2011)
Implicitly stated by an OECD report (OECD 2013)
The
laws
of
public Implied in the Turkish Civil Servant’s Law (Republic
procurements and civil servants of Turkey 1965)
have adverse effects on the
cyber security of governmental
critical infrastructure owners.
The number of qualified cyber Implied by a ministry report (Ministry of
security experts is limited.
Development 2013)
Implied in a presentation of a government official
(Ministry of Telecommunications 2014)
The methodical and formal risk Implied in the report of cyber security exercise (ICTA
management process is not & TUBITAK 2011)
conducted by governmental
critical infrastructure owners.
Table 5-2 shows the root causes, which are explicitly stated by other studies. Four of the root
causes are explicitly stated by three different studies; only one of them is from the academia,
which is an article of the researcher and his advisor. As a result, this PhD thesis brings ten
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root causes together as the result of the analysis of the project data. This fact also points out
to the significance of the study.
Table 5-2: Explicitly Stated Root Causes

Root Causes
The relationship management
practices
with
the
product/service providers are
insufficient in governmental
critical infrastructure operators.

Discussed By
Explicitly stated in a report of Turkish Presidency
(Turkish Presidency 2013)
Implicitly discussed in an academic article (Ozkan
& Karabacak 2010)

The IT audit mechanism is very
Explicitly stated in a report of Turkish Presidency
limited or does not exist in
(Turkish Presidency 2013)
governmental
critical
Explicitly stated in the cyber security exercise
infrastructure owners.
report (ICTA & TUBITAK 2011)
The managers of governmental
critical infrastructure owners do
not perceive the information
security as an area of
responsibility.
Security is considered by
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners as an addon and not as a design construct.

5.2

Explicitly discussed in an academic article (Ozkan
& Karabacak 2010)

Explicitly stated in a report of Turkish Presidency
(Turkish Presidency 2013)
Explicitly stated in the cyber security exercise
report (ICTA & TUBITAK 2011)

Comparison of the Principles with the Criteria of the other Maturity Models

According to the National Cyber Security Framework Manual prepared by NATO’s
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, there are five mandates for national cyber
security strategies (Klimburg 2012). These mandates can be defined as national level cyber
security functions of a country. These are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Military Cyber Operations
Counter Cyber Crime
Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence
Cyber Security Crisis Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection
Internet Governance and Cyber Diplomacy

The scope of this PhD thesis is the fourth mandate in the report of NATO, as stated a
delimitation in the introduction chapter of the thesis. The extracted root causes are all about
the vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures. The set of principles are for the protection of
critical infrastructures. Finally, the purpose of the proposed maturity model is to assess the
maturity of the critical infrastructure protection efforts of a country. Any principle that may
be considered within any mandate other than critical infrastructure protection is out of scope
of the PhD thesis. Such principles (criteria) that belong to other mandates are excluded from
Table 5-3.
Maturity models are compared in terms of their maturity criteria. Before making
comparisons, similar criteria are generalized to produce a maturity theme for comparability
purposes. However, some criteria that elaborate on certain technical topics are not
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generalized to produce a theme; comparisons are performed over these criteria. Table 5-3
shows maturity themes and criteria which are related with critical infrastructure protection
and denoted by at least one maturity model. The numbers in the parentheses at the first
column of Table 5-3 are the sequence numbers of the relevant principles of the proposed
model. Please refer to Table 4-28 for the list of principles along with the sequence numbers.
Proposed maturity model provides thorough and multiple criteria for the CSIRT
organization, national level organization, capacity building, cyber security legislation, audit
and risk management concepts.
First ten criteria or class of criteria are commonly used in the maturity models along with the
proposed method. Next six criteria are less commonly used in other maturity models. The
following nine criteria are unique to the proposed model. Next five criteria are not included
in the proposed model although they are included in other models. Public awareness is a
commonly used criterion; however it is not used in the proposed model. The reason for that
may be the peculiarity of the proposed model to governmental critical infrastructure
protection efforts.
Table 5-3: Comparison of the Maturity Models in terms of the Maturity Criteria

Cyber Readiness Index

Global Cybersecurity Index

Cyber Maturity in the A-P Region

Cyber Power Index

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

International cooperation / international engagement (12)

X

X

X

X

X

X

Regulations related with the cyber security (30, 34, 35, 38)

X

X

X

X

X

Cyber security program / strategy / plan / policy (1, 7)

X

X

X

X

X

X

Information sharing and cooperation (10, 11, 13, 14)

X

X

X

X

X

Certification, training, promoting higher education, capacity
building (22, 23, 24, 25, 26)

X

X

X

X

X

Innovation, research and development programs (18)

X

X

X

X

Maturity Themes / Maturity Criteria
Cyber security organization / coordination (2, 5)

X

National CSIRT organization (12, 14)

X

Public - private partnership (9)
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The CCSMM

X

Proposed Model

NCSecMM

Maturity Models

X

X

X

Participation and engagement of private sector (15, 16, 17, 19)

X

X

Adoption of the information security governance routines by
critical infrastructure owners (34)

X

X

Adoption of (internationally approved) standards to critical
infrastructure owners (29, 36, 40)

X

Risk analysis and management for critical infrastructure
operators (35)

X

Critical review of and amendments to the existing laws (20,
21)

X

X

Budget dedicated to cyber security / National funding for
research (4)

X

X

Critical infrastructures focused CSIRT and Sector based
CSIRTs (6, 11)

X

Nation-wide / sector-wide risk analysis and management
processes (8)

X

National / sectorial product and service procurement standards
or rules (27, 38)

X

Sector-specific technical guidance documents for the secure
design, set-up and operation of the networks (39)

X

Certification scheme of IT companies for eligibility to provide
IT services for critical infrastructure operators (28)

X

Cyber security consultant (cyber czar) of the president / prime
minister of the country (3)

X
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X
X
X

X

X

X

Cyber Power Index

NCSecMM

X

Cyber Maturity in the A-P Region

The CCSMM

Audit, performance evaluation, exercises, benchmarking to
measure cybersecurity development (30, 31, 32)

Maturity Themes / Maturity Criteria

Global Cybersecurity Index

Proposed Model

Cyber Readiness Index

Maturity Models

Sanctions imposed by the regulatory authorities on critical
infrastructure operators for the nonconformities (33)

X

Technical infrastructure to fulfill the inner - inter sector
information sharing needs (13)

X

Public awareness
Situational awareness mechanisms

X

The existence of rapid reaction mechanism

X

Identification of the appropriate experts and policymakers
within government, private sector and university

X

Persuade national leaders

X

5.3

X

X

Suggested List of Principles

Some principles underline general matters, whereas some others deal with more detailed
matters. At this section of the thesis, a suggested list of principles are suggested. While
creating the suggested list:
a) Some principles are grouped together to have a more general meaning (29th, 36th, and
40th principles)
b) Some principles are grouped under another principle that has more general meaning
(16th, 17th, and 19th principles are grouped under 15th principle; 21st principle is
positioned under 20th principle; 31th principle is positioned under 30th principle)
The following thirty-three principles can be used in maturity measurements as well. The
weight values of the consolidated principles can be selected as either arithmetic average of
the principles or the highest weight value of the combined principles.


A Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIPP) that considers cyber threats (1)
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Cyber Power Index

X

Cyber Readiness Index

X

Cyber Maturity in the A-P Region

X

Global Cybersecurity Index

Minimum security countermeasures that are obliged by
regulations for critical infrastructure owners (37)

NCSecMM

Maturity Themes / Maturity Criteria

The CCSMM

Proposed Model

Maturity Models

























The management of the CIPP by a governmental organization which has
responsibilities for the national security as well / the communication between CIPP
and national security bodies (2)
The existence of a consultant who provides technical, regulatory and diplomatic
cyber security consultancy for the head of the state (3)
Budget allocated to critical infrastructure protection efforts (4)
Regulatory agencies that set cyber security regulations and check their applications
for each critical sector (5)
A CSIRT organization dedicated to the protection of critical infrastructures (6)
A national cyber security strategy that considers the cyber security of critical
infrastructures as part of national security (7)
Nation-wide risk analysis and risk management activities which cover all critical
sectors / sector-wide wide risk analysis and risk management activities (8)
A public-private partnership program which is developed and supported by the
government (9)
Regulations that specify the inner - inter sector information sharing and cooperation
principles (10)
Sector based CSIRTs that have information sharing responsibilities determined by
the regulations (11)
The existence of an internationally recognized National CSIRT that performs
international cooperation with other CSIRTs (12)
A technical infrastructure to fulfill the inner - inter sector information sharing needs
(online information sharing portals, statistics dashboards, data collections centers)
(13)
A National CSIRT that handles the warnings of cyber incidents related to critical
infrastructures by coordinating with the relevant sectorial CSIRTs and critical
infrastructure owners when needed (14)
Government policies and strategies that position private sector as a key player in
national cyber security efforts (15)
o The participation of the private sector in the preparation of the national or
sectorial cyber security strategies (16) / Permanent seat for the private sector
in the national boards like the cyber security council (17) / The extensive
participation of the private sector in the national cyber security exercises
(19)
Government leadership for innovation, research & development activities, and the
identification of the priority areas in cyber security by the government (18)
Critical review and update of the existing legislation that may affect critical
infrastructures (especially for the needs of the governmental critical infrastructure
operators) (20)
o Making amendments to the regulations to hire outsourced personnel /
qualified government officials with higher salaries / contracted personnel in
governmental critical infrastructures (21)
National capacity building plans and strategies (22)
Preference of the internationally accepted certificate owners in the recruitments by
critical infrastructure owners (23)
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5.4

Qualified and sufficient number of cyber security training institutions (private,
academic or governmental) that support/train the personnel of critical infrastructure
operators (24)
Cyber security and IT curriculum for all levels of the education, from elementary
schools to universities (25)
Special positions for cyber security experts in critical infrastructure operators (26)
National / sectorial products and service procurement standards or rules for critical
infrastructure operators (27)
The establishment of a system for the eligibility certifications of the IT companies to
provide IT services for critical infrastructure operators (28)
National or sectorial regulations that enforce the internal / external audit for critical
infrastructure operators (30)
o Regular cyber security audits performed by the regulatory authorities of the
sectors for critical infrastructure operators (31)
Experienced IT auditors who are employed within the internal audit units of critical
infrastructure operators (32)
Sanctions imposed by the regulatory authorities on critical infrastructure operators
for the nonconformities (33)
Regulations that render top level management of critical infrastructure operators
responsible for cyber security (34)
Regulations that enforce critical infrastructure owners to conduct the cyber security
risk management process (35)
Minimum security countermeasures that are obliged by regulations for critical
infrastructure owners (37)
Regulations that set out the properties of information systems and security
countermeasures that come into operation in critical infrastructure operators (38)
Sector-specific technical guidance documents for the secure design, set-up and
operation of the networks of critical infrastructure operators (39)
Security standards for the IT products to be used by critical infrastructure operators
(29) / Obligation of a comprehensive security standard, such as ISO 27001, for
critical infrastructure owners (36) / Sectorial or national security standards that set
out the best security practices for each critical sector (40)
Regulatory Approaches for the Mitigation of the Root Causes

The policy-level issues of critical infrastructure protection as an academic topic is mostly
studied in the developed countries like United States, European Union Members, and
Oceanian countries. In terms of developing policies and strategies, the governments of the
developed countries are ahead of the governments of the less developed ones Secondly, the
critical infrastructures are mostly owned and operated by private entities in the developed
countries. For example, the percentage of private sector ownership of infrastructures in the
US is eighty-five percent (de Bruijne & van Eeten 2007).
Developing countries like Turkey are mostly underway of the privatization of the
infrastructures. For example, the largest and national telecommunications company of
Turkey was privatized in 2005 (Turk Telekom 2015). Share transfer agreements between
government and private organizations that are responsible for electricity distribution were
completed as of August 2013 (TEDAS 2015). The approximate situation of the critical
infrastructure ownership of Turkey was shown in Table 3-2 at section 3.3.2. Despite the
98

ongoing privatizations, there are still a considerable weight of the government ownership of
the critical infrastructures in Turkey.
The regulation of critical infrastructures has been discussed for at least one decade.
However, it is still a hot topic for the academia and the governments. The strict government
intervention and regulations to CIP efforts are not considered as a suitable option by the
academia and governments in the developed countries. In these countries, there are a number
of academic studies that propose security management models for CIP. This topic can be
summarized by a question: “Which is suitable- Regulation or Innovation?” The section 2.5
of the literature review summarizes the academic studies that seek answers to this question.
These articles focus on or emphasize the importance of the cooperation, innovation, and nonregulation rather than emphasizing the importance of the regulations. The idea of nonregulation is accepted in a wider way in the developed countries, although there are still clear
objections by some security experts and government officials (Wiki 2015a).
Although the developed world discusses the topics like innovation, non-regulation, business
continuity, voluntary approaches, and network governance, the developing countries like
Turkey should be prudent while considering these options. As opposed to the developed
world, the approaches close to the deregulation of the infrastructures may not be a sound
option to establish effective CIP policies for the developing countries like Turkey. The
findings of the PhD research corroborate the situation as discussed in this section.
Currently, there is no or very limited disputes in Turkey on the intervention of the
government in the critical infrastructure protection, as opposed to the developed countries.
Two factors may result in or contribute to this phenomenon. Firstly, there is a considerable
weight of governmental critical infrastructure owners in Turkey. If the proportion of the
private sector ownership increases as a result of the privatization and globalization processes
in the forthcoming years, some disputes on government intervention may emerge. Secondly,
Turkey has a civil law system as opposed to the US and the commonwealth countries that
have common law system. In civil law system; the rules have to be in written forms, which
are structured in a hierarchy of norms. Therefore, well-defined and complete set of
regulations may be necessary for Turkey because of the law system. The similar needs may
emerge for the countries that resemble Turkey in terms of law system and critical
infrastructure ownerships.
Table 5-4 summarizes six critical sectors of Turkey in terms of ownership status, the
existence of regulatory authority, and the existence of cyber security regulations. It is seen
that the sectors that are dominated by private operators are the most thoroughly-regulated
critical sectors in Turkey. These sectors have regulatory authorities as well. The critical
sectors that are dominated by the government have neither cyber security regulations nor
associated regulatory authorities. Therefore, it can be stated that the private sector in Turkey
is controlled by regulatory authorities in a strict manner.
The telecommunications and finance sectors have the most complete, mature and oldest
regulations for information security and cyber security. The data analysis process of this PhD
thesis showed that there was a salient supremacy and maturity of the cyber security practices
in finance and telecommunications sectors compared to the other “government-dominated”
ones.
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Table 5-4: Summary of the Critical Sectors

Critical Sector

Prominent
Ownership

Energy

Government
Private sector
Private sector
Private sector
Government
Government
Government

Telecommunications
Finance
Transportation
Water management
Government services

Has
Regulatory
authority?
/ Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Has
cyber
security
regulation?
Limited
Comprehensive
Comprehensive
No
No
Limited

At first sight, the main problem of the Turkey can be regarded as the normlessness or
deregulation of the certain sectors like energy, transportation, water management, and
government services. As Turkey has a civil law system, written regulations can be
considered as imperatives to ensure an acceptable level of cyber security practices within
these sectors. However, as stated in section 4.1.6 where the findings of the first phase of
research were shared:
1) Independent of the sectors, private organizations are more mature compared to the
governmental organizations. The most of the extracted root causes are mainly
associated with the governmental organizations.
2) The security maturity of a sector does not mainly originate from the sectorial
security practices. A governmental operator in the finance sector had poor security
practices. A private operator in energy sector had state-of-the art security practices.
As a result, if a sector is dominated by the private organizations, the general security posture
of the sector is more mature; and vice versa. Therefore, cyber security problems may not
originate from the missing cyber security practices in certain sectors; cyber security
problems may rather be associated with the type of organization (government or private).
Therefore, the organizational dynamics like security culture and human factors may be more
effective for the improvement of security.
In the data analysis of the PhD study, most of interviewees also emphasized the prominence
of the establishment of a security culture instead of enacting rules and regulations for the
cyber security of the infrastructures.
The focus on the rules and regulations was more obvious in the Delphi survey. Security
experts agreed on the following rules and regulations.
a) Critical review and update of the existing legislation that may affect critical
infrastructures (especially for the needs of the governmental critical infrastructure
operators)
b) Making amendments to the regulations to hire outsourced personnel / qualified
government officials with higher salaries / contracted personnel in governmental
critical infrastructures
c) National or sectorial regulations that enforce the internal / external audit for critical
infrastructure operators
d) Sanctions imposed by the regulatory authorities on critical infrastructure operators
for the nonconformities
e) Obligation of a comprehensive security standard, such as ISO 27001, for critical
infrastructure owners
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f) Minimum security countermeasures that are obliged by regulations for critical
infrastructure owners
g) Regulations that set out the properties of information systems and security
countermeasures that come into operation in critical infrastructure operators
The experts agreed on the following principles that can be considered as a part of the
establishment of a security culture rather than emphasizing regulations.
a) The existence of a consultant who provides technical, regulatory and diplomatic
cyber security consultancy for the head of the state
b) A CSIRT organization dedicated to the protection of critical infrastructures
c) Nation-wide risk analysis and risk management activities which cover all critical
sectors / sector-wide wide risk analysis and risk management activities
d) A public-private partnership program which is developed and supported by the
government
e) The existence of an internationally recognized National CSIRT that performs
international cooperation with other CSIRTs
f) A technical infrastructure to fulfill the inner - inter sector information sharing needs
(online information sharing portals, statistics dashboards, data collections centers)
g) A National CSIRT that handles the warnings of cyber incidents related to critical
infrastructures by coordinating with the relevant sectorial CSIRTs and critical
infrastructure owners when needed
h) Government policies and strategies that position private sector as a key player in
national cyber security efforts
i) The participation of the private sector in the preparation of the national or sectorial
cyber security strategies
j) Permanent seat for the private sector in the national boards like the cyber security
council
k) Government leadership for innovation, research & development activities, and the
identification of the priority areas in cyber security by the government
l) The extensive participation of the private sector in the national cyber security
exercises
m) National capacity building plans and strategies
n) Preference of the internationally accepted certificate owners in the recruitments by
critical infrastructure owners
o) Qualified and sufficient number of cyber security training institutions (private,
academic or governmental) that support/train the personnel of critical infrastructure
operators
p) Cyber security and IT curriculum for all levels of the education, from elementary
schools to universities
q) Special positions for cyber security experts in critical infrastructure operators
It is important to note that, the number of the principles related with the regulations is less
than the number of the above-mentioned principles which are related with the security
culture. The opinions of the interviewees and experts can be summarized as follows:
i.
ii.

Regulations can be considered as an important gadget for the improvement in
security.
However, security cannot be ensured just by regulations and rules.
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iii.

The incentives like cooperation, innovation, information sharing, and security
culture should be taken into account while considering the regulations for
critical infrastructures.

By taking the findings of the PhD research and the sectorial situation of Turkey into account,
a hybrid CIP model can be adapted for Turkey. In this model, the enforcement of the
incentives like cooperation, innovation, information sharing can be flourished by using
regulations. This is what cyber security experts may imply in the Delphi survey. As an
example, the following four principles combine regulation and security culture together.
a) Regulations that specify the inner - inter sector information sharing and cooperation
principles
b) Sector based CSIRTs that have information sharing responsibilities determined by
the regulations
c) Regulations that render top level management of critical infrastructure operators
responsible for cyber security
d) Regulations that enforce critical infrastructure owners to conduct the cyber security
risk management process
It will not be wrong to say that regulations are the means of applying countermeasures of
different kinds. However, it is important to find the answer for the question: “how to apply
regulations?” Section 5.5.2 explains the details of future research topic.
5.5

Implications for Future Research

In this section, future research topics that originate from the PhD study are written. First
research topic is about the modeling of the interdependencies that may exist among root
causes. The second research topic is the specification of the regulation options. The third
research topic is the development of a more comprehensive maturity model for measuring
the national cyber security.
5.5.1

Modeling Interdependencies among Root Causes

There are some certain dependencies among the root causes. As an example, the
participation of private sector in national cyber security efforts depends on the perception of
the government of national cyber security. Some of the dependencies could be extracted
from the data; however, there was not enough data in this research to extract the all
dependencies among the root causes. Figure 5-1 shows the chart that show dependencies
among the extracted root causes, which were determined by using the data analysis. It is
important to note that the dependencies shown by dashed lines are not the certain and
definite results of the data analysis. No dependencies were extracted from the data for the
root causes 2 and 8. It should be noted that there might be more dependencies among root
causes than the dependencies shown in the Figure 5-1.
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Figure 5-1: Ad-hoc Dependencies among the Root Causes

A new research can be performed to determine and model the dependencies among the root
causes. However, this research will definitely necessitate to contact with the organizations to
gather new data.
After the identification of the possible dependencies, the maturity model may be updated by
adding a coefficient that represents the dependency. The more root causes are depended on a
specific root cause, the larger weight values are assigned to the principles associated with
that root cause. For example, three root causes are directly dependent on the root cause-1 and
four root causes indirectly depends on the same root cause through root cause-4, a coefficient
can be added to the maturity formula that augments the weights of the principles associated
with the root cause-1.
5.5.2

Determining the Options for Regulations

Before detailing the future research topic, the list of principles that were related with
regulations are given below:
a) Critical review and update of the existing legislation that may affect critical
infrastructures (especially for the needs of the governmental critical infrastructure
operators)
b) Making amendments to the regulations to hire outsourced personnel / qualified
government officials with higher salaries / contracted personnel in governmental
critical infrastructures
c) National or sectorial regulations that enforce the internal / external audit for critical
infrastructure operators
d) Sanctions imposed by the regulatory authorities on critical infrastructure operators
for the nonconformities
e) Obligation of a comprehensive security standard, such as ISO 27001, for critical
infrastructure owners
f) Minimum security countermeasures that are obliged by regulations for critical
infrastructure owners
g) Regulations that set out the properties of information systems and security
countermeasures that come into operation in critical infrastructure operators
h) Regulations that specify the inner - inter sector information sharing and cooperation
principles
i) Sector based CSIRTs that have information sharing responsibilities determined by
the regulations
j) Regulations that render top level management of critical infrastructure operators
responsible for cyber security
k) Regulations that enforce critical infrastructure owners to conduct the cyber security
risk management process
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The question of how to apply these principles is the topic of the future research. When the
regulations are taken into account, two approaches come to the forefront for the cyber
security management of the critical infrastructures. These are:
1. Pure government/state provision of CIP
2. Pure market provision of CIP (Assaf 2008)
According to the government provision, regulations are imperative for the security of the
infrastructures. Government provision is mostly supported by the national security officials
and some academics. In market provision, regulations are seen as obstacles in front of
innovation and cooperation. Market provisions are mostly demanded by the private sector
owners. Government ownership is the most interventionist approach for the management of
the critical infrastructures, whereas market is less interventionist (Assaf 2008).
It would be wrong to say that one approach is wrong and the other is right. Countries have
different legislative infrastructures and organizational structures. The proportion of the
private sector ownership of CI is different among countries as well. Countries may adopt
different approaches according to their unique features.
Another important point is that there are more than two approaches for the cyber security
management of the critical infrastructures. In fact, pure state provision and pure market
provision are the two extreme points of a management scale. There are many grey areas in
between. The following seven approaches can be listed as a regulatory continuum of critical
infrastructures (Assaf 2008):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Government ownership
Command and control
Delegation to agency
Delegation to agency and negotiation
Enforced self-regulation
Voluntary self-regulation
Market

The decision on how to regulate critical infrastructures depends on the regulatory,
organizational, and cultural aspects of the country. A future research on the cyber security
regulation options of critical infrastructures will be planned. A focus group interview will be
performed by the experts in different sectors. The following questions are planned to be
answered by this research by taking the set of principles into account:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Which approaches are suitable for the governmental critical infrastructure operators?
Which approaches are suitable for the private critical infrastructure operators?
Are there differences/similarities between government and private infrastructures?
Are there differences/similarities among sectors?

The outputs of the research may also be useful for the developing countries that have similar
regulatory and organizational infrastructures with Turkey.
5.5.3

Comprehensive Maturity Models

Information security is a mature domain for the organizations. It was already adapted by the
organizations when most systems were standalone. There are a number of internationally
recognized standards, frameworks, maturity models for information security that have been
used for years (ISO/IEC 2013a; ISO/IEC 2013b; ISO/IEC 2010; ISO/IEC 2009; ISO/IEC
2008). As the organizations depended more on information technologies and these
technologies were connected to the Internet, cyber security became a concern for
organizations. Nevertheless, cyber security can be regarded as a subdomain of information
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security from an organizational perspective (Wamala 2011), because the assets that have to
be protected are the same for cyber security. The difference is the source of the threats in the
context of cyber security. Cyber security is the prevention from the harm of cyber threats
that come mostly from the Internet. Hence, information security standards, frameworks and
models are also applicable to cyber security in the organizational context.
On contrary to organizational level, cyber security is a challenging domain for the countries.
It has a number of dimensions –containing unresolved ones- at this level (Wamala 2011).
There are a number of different types of domains that intersects with cyber security at the
national level. The list includes but not limited to national security, counter espionage,
organizational structures, legislative frameworks, privacy, and critical infrastructure
protection.
The measurement is a mature topic in information security domain as well. The ninth chapter
of ISO 27001 information security management standard is dedicated to the performance
evaluation in which monitoring, measurement, analysis, evaluation, internal audit, and
management review functions are described. There are a number of maturity assessment
studies based on the standards in the academia (Susanto et al. 2012; Shamsaei et al. 2011).
From this point of view, two improvements on the proposed model can be studied in the
future research. Firstly, a sectorial cyber security maturity model that makes use of the single
maturity levels of critical infrastructure operators can be developed. This research implies
the research on the organizational level maturity measurement as well. Nationwide Cyber
Security Review of United States assesses the current security posture of one hundred and
sixty-two agencies by using a questionnaire (DHS 2012). However, it does not convert the
results of the questionnaire to a maturity value for the organizations. In this research, the
following two questions will be answered.
a) How can the maturity level of each critical infrastructure owner be mathematically
calculated?
b) How can the maturity level of the critical sector be calculated by using the individual
maturity levels of the critical infrastructure owners?
The maturity criteria of the proposed model were the set of state-level principles. Instead of
the measurement of the state level maturity by using predefined set of principles, it will be
measured from a number of organizational maturity levels. This is in fact not an
improvement in the proposed model; this is a completely different approach.
The other future research is again related with the maturity assessment. A process based
maturity model may be developed to assess the national or sectorial level cyber security. The
proposed maturity model may check not only the existence of a national/sectorial-level
countermeasure but also its details of implementation based on the at least five level maturity
scale as in the CoBIT framework (ISACA 2012). In the proposed model, the completion
level of each principle was checked by using three possibilities; No action or very limited
action, Partial Action, and Comprehensive Action. The maturity level was represented as
percentage value. With this future work, the maturity level of each principle may be
represented separately in a scale of at least five levels. The improved model may help the
state representatives in assessing current cyber security posture more thoroughly.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Details of the Delphi Survey
The forms shown in Appendix A were sent to six experts separately by e-mail.
Round-1: Input
Held between 2012 and 2013, the project of “Information Security Management in Critical
Infrastructures” aimed the determination of the dependency of the critical infrastructures of
Turkey on information technologies, the diagnosis of the risks that result from the usage of
information technologies and the identification of the required countermeasures for the
reduction and termination of the risks. The project demonstrated that the critical
infrastructures of Turkey were not resilient against cyber threats. The leading root causes
were explained through the scientific method of qualitative data analysis. Ten root causes are
detailed in the table below.
Root causes of susceptibility to cyber threats
The set of principles
The cyber security of critical infrastructures is not perceived by
national security authorities as a vital part of national security.
The culture of information sharing, collaboration and cooperation
within the critical sectors and among the sectors is very limited.
The private sector is not perceived by the government and critical
infrastructure operators as an important stakeholder in national
cyber security efforts.
The laws of public procurements and civil servants have adverse
effects on the cyber security of governmental critical
infrastructure owners.1, 2
The number of qualified cyber security experts is limited.
The relationship management practices with the product/service
providers are insufficient in governmental critical infrastructure
operators.3
The IT audit mechanism is very limited or does not exist in
governmental critical infrastructure owners.
The managers of governmental critical infrastructure owners do
not perceive the information security as an area of responsibility.4
The methodical and formal risk management process is not
conducted by governmental critical infrastructure owners.

Many critical infrastructure operators uttered the following sentences: “We cannot have the qualified
personnel within our organization for a long time”, “We cannot pay higher salaries for them.
2
Many critical structure operators said that they cannot purchase the products they want to and they
have to be content with the unqualified products of the unqualified bidding companies.
3
All critical infrastructure operators receive considerable amounts of services in the private sector but
there have been no serious regulations pertaining to the cyber security rules to be obeyed before,
during and after the reception of the services.( on country-wide, sectorial and institutional bases.) This
situation also applies to the products sold. For instance, it is a very common case when the contractor
firm with full authority can connect to the SCADA network of the critical infrastructure operator
within the scope of warranty service, which is, as a practice, bound by no rules and logging
mechanisms.
4
The IT department owns the responsibility. And the aspects of a possible damage to be caused by the
cyber threats cannot be seriously assessed and the necessary precautions cannot be taken in time.
1
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Root causes of susceptibility to cyber threats
The set of principles
Security is considered by governmental critical infrastructure
owners as an add-on and not as a design construct.
A cyber security maturity model is to be designed on the cyber security principles which are
derived from the root causes stated in the table above.
You are requested to suggest principles (ranging from one to three in number for each) for
every root cause. The points that require attention are listed below.
1. The principle may indicate that a root cause doesn’t exist or is not experienced in a
country. (If the principle exists in a country, its root cause must also be nonexistent)
2. The principle may be a countermeasure that eliminates the root cause or a statistical
parameter. It may cover a range of subjects that extend from legal measures and
processes to organizational structures and budgets.
3. Please set at least one and at most three principles for each root cause.
Principles are the possible answers to the following kind of questions:
-

Which principles in a country show that cyber security is internalized by that
country?
Which principles in a country show that cyber security is a self-sustaining effort at
that country?
Which principles in a country show that cyber security is positioned as an
inseparable part of the national security by the government?
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Round-1: Output
Root
causes
of
susceptibility to cyber
threats
The cyber security of
critical infrastructures is
not perceived by national
security authorities as a
vital part of national
security.

The
culture
of
information
sharing,
collaboration
and
cooperation within the
critical sectors and among
the sectors is very
limited.
The private sector is not
perceived
by
the
government and critical
infrastructure operators as
an important stakeholder
in national cyber security
efforts.
The laws of public
procurements and civil
servants have adverse
effects on the cyber
security of governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.

Expert-1
The set of principles
Kritik altyapı sektörlerine yönelik siber güvenlik önlemlerini
almaya zorlayıcı ve denetleyici mevzuat yok. Sadece
bankacılık sektörü için BDDK nın kısıtlı regülasyonları var,
onlar da uluslararası PCI standartları ile uyumluluk
zorunluluğundan kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum.
Kritik altyapıları düzenlemekten sorumlu üst kurullar (epdk,
bddk v.s.) siber güvenlik konusunda yetkin değil,
bünyelerinde siber güvenlikten anlayan personel bulunmuyor.
Bulundurma konusunda da bir irade bulunmuyor. Bundan
dolayı da bu konunun önemi anlayacak, anlatacak ve
sonrasında bu konuda çalışmalar yapacak personel yok.
Tüm kritik altyapı sektörlerinde BDDK nın yaptığına benzer,
sektör spesifik siber güvenlik düzenlemeleri olmalı ve üst
kurul
bu
düzenlemelerin
yapılıp
yapılmadığını
denetlemelidir.
Sektörel ve ulusal bazda siber güvenlik konusunda bilgi
paylaşım mekanizmaları Türkiye’de mevcut değildir. Örn:
Amerika’da her sektör için bir bilgi paylaşım merkezi (ISACInformation Sharing Center) tesis edilmiştir. Bu merkezler
aracılığı ile sektör oyuncuları bilgi paylaşımında
bulunabilmektedir. Türkiye’de de benzer merkezlerin
oluşması ve çalışmaya başlaması gerekmektedir. Bunun için
mevzuat ve teknik altyapının hazırlanması gerekiyor.
Kritik altyapıların güvenliği konusunda uzmanlaşmış özel
sektör firması ve personeli pek yoktur. Ek olarak özel
sektörün bu alana girmeye teşvik edici faktörler (kar,
bilinirlik, repütasyon vs. ) yoktur.
Özel sektörün çalışmalara katılması için devlet ve sektör
işletmecileri tarafından maddi kaynak ayırılmalıdır.

Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinde çalışacak bilgi işlem ve siber
güvenlik personeline daha cazip ücretlerin verilmesi için
düzenleme yapılması gerekiyor.
Sözleşmeli personel çalıştırma imkanı olmalı. Böylece daha
yüksek ücretlerle daha tecrübeli personel çalıştırılabilir.
Ek olarak, outsource hizmet alımı ve personel kiralama için
düzenlemeler olmalı. Böylece tecrübeli kişiler tam zamanlı
olmasa da yarı zamanlı veya proje bazlı olarak kurumlara
hizmet verebilmeli.
The number of qualified Siber güvenlik eğitimleri veren özel, kamu ve akademik
cyber security experts is kurumların sayısı ve kalitesi arttırılmalı. Bunun için devlet
limited.
tarafından teşvik verilmeli ve kurumların çalışanları için belli
bir eğitim kotası koyması sağlanmalı.
Özellikle sektöre yönelik eğitim veren kurumların sayısı
artmalı. Amerika’daki SANS benzeri özel kurumlar olmalı.
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Root
causes
of
susceptibility to cyber
threats
The
relationship
management
practices
with the product/service
providers are insufficient
in governmental critical
infrastructure operators.
The IT audit mechanism
is very limited or does not
exist in governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
The
managers
of
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners do
not
perceive
the
information security as an
area of responsibility.
The
methodical
and
formal risk management
process is not conducted
by governmental critical
infrastructure owners.
Security is considered by
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners as
an add-on and not as a
design construct.

Root
causes
of
susceptibility to cyber
threats
The cyber security of
critical infrastructures is
not perceived by national
security authorities as a
vital part of national
security.

The set of principles
İşletmeciler ve ürün/hizmet sağlayıcıların katılacağı sektör
spesifik tatbikatlar ve konferanslar düzenlenmelidir. Bu
organizasyonlarda iki tarafın bir araya gelerek “networking”
yapması sağlanmalıdır.
Her sektör için üst kurul var ise, mevzuat ile denetim görevi
verilmeli, kurul da bu denetimi düzenli olarak yapmalıdır.
Denetim sonuçları işletmeciler için iş yapmasını etkilemeli,
sonuçların iyi çıkmaması lisans iptali veya iş alanının
kısıtlanmasına kadar gidebilmelidir.
Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için yöneticilere odaklı
bilgilendirme faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking yarışması,
seminer, eğitim v.s. ) yapılmalıdır.
Kurumda oluşacak siber olaylardan doğrudan kurum
yöneticisini sorumlu tutan düzenleme (kanun, yönetmelik v.s.
) getirilmelidir.
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerine yönelik risk yönetimi, BGYS
konusunda regülasyonlar olmalı ve üst kurul bu regülasyona
uyumluluk denetlenmelidir.
Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için bilgilendirme
faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking yarışması, seminer, eğitim
v.s. ) yapılmalıdır.
Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde kurulacak bilgi sistemleri için
mevzuatta düzenleme getirilmeli ve üst kurullar bunu
denetlemelidir.
Sektör spesifik bilgi sistemleri tasarımı ve kurulumu için
teknik kılavuzlar olmalıdır. Operatörler sistem kurar iken bu
kılavuzlardan faydalanabilmelidir.
Expert-2
The set of principles
Kritik altyapıların siber tehditlerden korunması çalışmalarına
özel olarak belirlenmiş yıllık bütçenin varlığı
Siber tehditleri dikkate alan bir kritik altyapıların korunması
programının (CIPP) varlığı
Kritik altyapıları siber tehditlere karşı korumaktan sorumlu
kurumun aynı zamanda ulusal güvenlik sorumlusu olması
(ABD’de DHS örneği)
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Root
causes
of
susceptibility to cyber
threats
The
culture
of
information
sharing,
collaboration
and
cooperation within the
critical sectors and among
the sectors is very
limited.
The private sector is not
perceived
by
the
government and critical
infrastructure operators as
an important stakeholder
in national cyber security
efforts.
The laws of public
procurements and civil
servants have adverse
effects on the cyber
security of governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
The number of qualified
cyber security experts is
limited.
The
relationship
management
practices
with the product/service
providers are insufficient
in governmental critical
infrastructure operators.
The IT audit mechanism
is very limited or does not
exist in governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
The
managers
of
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners do
not
perceive
the
information security as an
area of responsibility.
The
methodical
and
formal risk management
process is not conducted
by governmental critical
infrastructure owners.

The set of principles
Devlet tarafından geliştirilip desteklenen Public-private
partnership programının varlığı
Bilgileri gizliliğine göre sınıflandıran, bu sınıflandırmaya
göre de paylaşımı ile ilgili kuralların belirlenmesinde rol
oynayan bir veri koruma kanununun varlığı
Sektör içi ve sektörler arası belirlenmiş bilgi paylaşım
kurallarının varlığı
Kritik altyapı programında özel sektöre verilmiş somut
görevlerin varlığı
Girişimcilik, araştırma ve geliştirme faaliyetleri için devletin
liderlik yapması

Hâlihazırdaki yasaların kritik gözden geçirmesinin yapılması

Ulusal seviyede kapasite geliştirme çalışmalarının varlığı
Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal
seviye dış hizmet / ürün alım kuralları

Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal
iç/dış tetkik kurallarının varlığı

Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin siber güvenliğinden doğrudan
kurum yöneticilerini sorumlu tutan düzenlemelerin varlığı

Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal
risk yönetimi kurallarının varlığı
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Root
causes
of The set of principles
susceptibility to cyber
threats
Security is considered by Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde güvenlik süreçlerinin varlığı
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners as
an add-on and not as a
design construct.
Expert-3
of The set of principles
cyber

Root
causes
susceptibility to
threats
The cyber security of
critical infrastructures is
not perceived by national
security authorities as a
vital part of national
security.
The culture of information
sharing, collaboration and
cooperation within the
critical sectors and among
the sectors is very limited.

The private sector is not
perceived
by
the
government and critical
infrastructure operators as
an important stakeholder in
national cyber security
efforts.
The laws of public
procurements and civil
servants have adverse
effects on the cyber
security of governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
The number of qualified
cyber security experts is
limited.

Kamuda üst düzey yöneticiler siber güvenlik farkındalık
eğitimi almıştır.
Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisinde kritik altyapılara yönelik
düzenlemeler bulunmaktadır.
Ulusal CERT’ler kurulmuş ve uluslararası CERT’lerle
işbirliği sağlanmıştır.
CERT’ler yükümlülüğü kanun ve yönetmeliklerle tespit
edilmiştir.
Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliğini kolaylaştıracak teknik
çözümler hazırlanmıştır.
Özel sektörü teşvik edici maddi çözümler (vergi muafiyeti,
kamunun teknik imkânlarından ücretsiz faydalanma, ulusal
siber güvenlik kurumlarından ücretsiz danışmanlık alınması
vb.) yürürlüktedir.

Kaliteli personel alınmasını kolaylaştırıcı mevzuat
hazırlanmıştır. (Yüksek maaş ve geniş imkanlar vb.)
Kamu İhale Kanununda teknik satın almaları kolaylaştırıcı,
kaliteli ürün alınmasını sağlayıcı düzenlemeler yapılmıştır

Kamuda çalışmak üzere personel yetiştirme programları
hazırlanmıştır. Bu programlardan mezun olan öğrencilerin
uzun süreli (10 yıl vs.) zorunlu hizmet etmesi şart
koşulmuştur. (TSK’da pilot eğitimi gibi)
Personel sayısının yetersiz kaldığı durumlarda, yabancı
memur ve işçi alımının önünü açacak yasal düzenlemeler
yürürlüktedir. Bunun için klerans çıkarılması gibi güvenlik
soruşturmaları devreye alınmıştır.
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Root
causes
of
susceptibility to cyber
threats
The cyber security of
critical infrastructures is
not perceived by national
security authorities as a
vital part of national
security.
The culture of information
sharing, collaboration and
cooperation within the
critical sectors and among
the sectors is very limited.

The set of principles
ABD’de sağlık sektöründe çok sıkı takip edilen FDA
yükümlülükleri benzeri, kamuya alınacak her türlü ürün ve
hizmetin çok sıkı regüle edilmesine yönelik düzenlemeler
yapılmıştır.
Ürün/hizmet sağlayıcılarını bilgilendirici ve katılım
zorunluluğu olan eğitim/konferans/seminer vb. faaliyetler
yapılmaktadır.
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin BT denetim mekanizmalarına
uyumluluğu yasal zorunluluk ile düzenlenmiştir.
Denetimlerin yapılması ve çıktılarının merkezi bir ortamda
toplanıp düzenli olarak değerlendirilmesine imkan sağlayan
teknik çözümler devreye alınmıştır.
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin tepe yöneticilerine
bilgilendirme eğitimleri düzenli olarak verilmektedir.
Bu yöneticilerin görev tanımlarında siber güvenlik
sorumluluğu net olarak tanımlanmıştır.
Kritik altyapı işletmelerinde yazılı bir risk yönetim süreci,
tabi oldukları mevzuat düzenlenerek zorunlu kılınmıştır.

Operatörlerin iş geliştirme ve tasarım süreçlerinde güvenlik
farkındalığı düzenli olarak ölçülmektedir.
Güvenlik
tedbirlerinin
alınması
yasal
olarak
zorlanmaktadır.
Geliştirme yapacak personelin teknik olgunluğu ölçülmekte
ve gerekli görüldüğünde zorunlu eğitime gönderilmektedir.
Expert-4
The set of principles
Siber Güvenlik Kurulu Başkanının MGK toplantısına
(benzeri) zaman zaman katılması
Ulusal güvenlik belgesinde kritik altyapıların güvenliğin yer
alması
Kritik altyapı güvenliğinin bir kurumun kanuni olarak
sorumluluğunda olması ve ulusal güvenlikten sorumlu olan
kurumla eşgüdüm mekanizmalarının oluşturulmuş olması
Kritik sektörlerde yaşanan güvenlik olaylarının bir
merkezde toplanması ve istatistik oluşturulabilmesi
Sektör içi ve sektörler arası online bilgi paylaşım
platformlarının oluşturulmuş olması
Sektör içi ve sektörler arası organizasyonlar (konferans,
workshop vb) yapılması
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Root
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of
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threats
The private sector is not
perceived
by
the
government and critical
infrastructure operators as
an important stakeholder in
national cyber security
efforts.
The laws of public
procurements and civil
servants have adverse
effects on the cyber
security of governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
The number of qualified
cyber security experts is
limited.

The set of principles
Özel sektörün siber güvenlik kuruluna katılabilmesi
Özel sektörü temsil eden sivil inisiyatif gruplarının var
olması ve aktif faaliyetler yapması

Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların
memnuniyet oranlarının belirli bir değerden yukarıda olması
Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların
ürünlerden memnuniyet oranı

Sadece siber güvenlik üzerine çalışan kişi sayısının oranının
belirli bir değerden fazla olması
Sertifikalı devlet çalışanlarının oranı
Siber güvenlik tatbikatlarındaki takımların başarı durumu
The
relationship İşletmecilerle ürün sağlayıcılar arasında güvenlikle ilgili
management practices with sorunların iletildiği kanalların oluşturulup oluşturulmadığı
the
product/service Ürün güvenliği ile ilgili standartların belirli olması
providers are insufficient in
governmental
critical
infrastructure operators.
The IT audit mechanism is İç denetim birimlerinde IT denetim bilgi birikimine sahip
very limited or does not personel sayısı
exist in governmental IT denetim Planlarının varlığı
critical
infrastructure Genel sektörel durumun ölçümlendiği bir bilgi toplama
owners.
mekanizmasının varlığı ve işlerliği
The
managers
of Siber güvenlikle ilgili kurumsal sorumlu kişilerin
governmental
critical belirlenmesi
infrastructure owners do Kurumsal bilgi güvenliği politikasının varlığı
not
perceive
the Kurumsal yönetimsel toplantı tutanaklarında siber güvenlik
information security as an ile ilgili kararların bulunması
area of responsibility.
Yöneticilerin bir denetim mekanizması oluşturması
Kurumsal siber güvenlik metriklerinin belirlenmiş olması,
metriklerin hesaplanması ve raporlanması
The methodical and formal Kurumlarda siber güvenliği de kapsayan tanımlı bir risk
risk management process is yönetim sürecinin var olması
not
conducted
by Risk yönetim süreci işletimiyle ilgili kayıtların varlığı
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners.
Security is considered by governmental
critical
infrastructure owners as an
add-on and not as a design
construct.
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Root
causes
of
susceptibility to cyber
threats
The cyber security of
critical infrastructures is
not perceived by national
security authorities as a
vital part of national
security.

The culture of information
sharing, collaboration and
cooperation within the
critical sectors and among
the sectors is very limited.
The private sector is not
perceived
by
the
government and critical
infrastructure operators as
an important stakeholder in
national cyber security
efforts.
The laws of public
procurements and civil
servants have adverse
effects on the cyber
security of governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
The number of qualified
cyber security experts is
limited.

Expert-5
The set of principles
Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi kritik altyapıları ulusal
güvenliğinin bir parçası olarak değerlendirmektedir
Doğal gaz boru hatlarına yönelik 2007 yılında
gerçekleştirildiği iddia edilen siber saldırı yetkili makamlar
tarafından
yeterince
araştırılmamıştır.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-1210/mysterious-08-turkey-pipeline-blast-opened-newcyberwar
Bilgi paylaşımı USOM üzerinden yapılmaktadır.
2015 Ocak ayında USOM 431 adet ihbar aldığını
duyurmuştur. Bu ihbarlardan hangilerinin kritik altyapılarla
ilgili olduğu açıklanmamıştır.
Siber güvenlik tatbikatlarına özel sektörün katilimi sinirlidir.
Özel sektör siber güvenlik önlemlerini ilave masraf olarak
görmektedir. Yasal düzenlemeler özel sektörü gerekli
önlemleri almaya zorlamakta yetersizdir.
Özel sektör siber saldırılara ilişkin gerçek verileri
paylaşmaktan imtina etmektedir.
Kamu kurumlarında mevcut bilgi işlem personeli siber
güvenlik konularıyla ilgili sorumluluk almaktadır. Siber
güvenliğe ilişkin bir kadro bulunmamaktadır.

Siber güvenlik eğitimi veren akademik kurumlar sinirli
sayıdadır.
Uluslararası geçerliliği olan sertifikalar kamu kurumları
tarafından işe alımda tercih edilmemektedir.
The
relationship Çoğunlukla güvenliğe ilişkin düzenlemeler yükleniciye ilave
management practices with masraflar getirdiğinden, bütçe kaygısıyla sözleşmelerden son
the
product/service anda çıkarılması yoluna gidilmektedir.
providers are insufficient in
governmental
critical
infrastructure operators.
The IT audit mechanism is very limited or does not
exist in governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
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The set of principles
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cyber

Root
causes
susceptibility to
threats
The cyber security of
critical infrastructures is
not perceived by national
security authorities as a
vital part of national
security.
The culture of information
sharing, collaboration and
cooperation within the
critical sectors and among
the sectors is very limited.
The private sector is not
perceived
by
the
government and critical
infrastructure operators as
an important stakeholder in
national cyber security
efforts.
The laws of public
procurements and civil
servants have adverse
effects on the cyber
security of governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.

Önemli karar alma mekanizmalarında (Başkanlık,
başbakanlık, MGK gibi) siber güvenlikle ilgili bir birimin
olması (bilgi işlem içindeki kuruma iç hizmet veren birimi
kastetmiyorum)
Üst düzey karar alıcıların (başbakan, bakan vb.) siber
güvenlik danışmanı olması
İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi
paylaşımını koordine etmek üzere bir kurumun
görevlendirilmiş olması
İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi
paylaşımı esaslarının belirlenip yayınlanmış olması
Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisi ya da sektörel strateji hazırlık
aşamalarında özel sektörün de katkısının alınması
Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem
vendor hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de
regülatör) bir araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak
yapılıyor olması
Yetkin personeli yüksek maaşla çalıştırmak için imkanların
(sözleşmeli personel, özel firmadan personel kiralama) tesis
edilmiş olması
Kritik teknolojilerin hızlı tedarik edilebilmesi için
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Root
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of
susceptibility to cyber
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The number of qualified
cyber security experts is
limited.

The
relationship
management practices with
the
product/service
providers are insufficient in
governmental
critical
infrastructure operators.
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very limited or does not
exist in governmental
critical
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of
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critical
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the
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by
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Security is considered by
governmental
critical
infrastructure owners as an
add-on and not as a design
construct.

The set of principles
Devletin genel olarak ya da spesifik sektörlerin siber işgücü
geliştirme stratejisi/planı vardır
Siber güvenlik alanında insan kaynağı geliştirilmesini
koordine etmekle görevli/sorumlu kurum ya da kurul gibi bir
yapı vardır
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin dışardan hizmet aldıkları
kuruluşlarla (IT hizmeti burada önemli, yemek/temizlik gibi
hizmetler ilk etapta önemli değil) ilişkilerini hangi esaslara
göre yöneteceklerini belirleyen bir mevzuat olmalı
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin IT hizmeti alacakları
kuruluşları akredite eden bir sistem kurulmuş olmalı
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin ürün/hizmet sağlayıcıları ile bir
araya gelebildikleri STÖ ler vardır
Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün regülatör kuruluşu
sektördeki işletmecilere düzenli olarak BT denetimi yapar

Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün regülatör kuruluşu
sektördeki işletmecilere düzenli olarak BT denetimi (siber
güvenliği de kapsayacak şekilde) yapar
Kritik altyapı işletmelerinin uyması gereken minimum
güvenlik önemleri önlemleri dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
Kritik altyapı işletmecileri için ISO 27001 zorunluluğu vardır

Kritik altyapı işletmelerinin uyması gereken minimum
güvenlik önemleri önlemleri dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem
vendor hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de
regülatör) bir araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak
yapılıyor olması
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Round-2: Input
Root causes of the
susceptibility to The set of principles
the cyber threats
1. Siber tehditleri dikkate alan bir kritik altyapıların korunması
programının (CIPP) varlığı
2. Ulusal güvenlikten sorumlusu kurum ve kuruluşların aynı
zamanda kritik altyapıları siber tehditlere karşı koruma
sorumlulukları olması (ABD’de DHS örneği) / Kritik altyapıların
siber güvenliğinden kanunen sorumlu kurum ile ulusal güvenlikten
sorumlu kurum ve kuruluşlar arasında eşgüdüm mekanizmalarının
oluşturulmuş olması / Önemli karar alma mekanizmalarında
(Başkanlık, başbakanlık, MGK gibi) siber güvenlikle ilgili bir
birimin olması (bilgi işlem içindeki kuruma iç hizmet veren birimi
The cyber security kastetmiyorum) / Siber Güvenlik Kurulu Başkanının MGK
toplantısına (benzeri) zaman zaman katılması
of critical
infrastructures is not 3. Üst düzey karar alıcıların (başbakan, bakan vb.) siber güvenlik
danışmanı olması
perceived by
national security 4. Kamuda üst düzey yöneticilerin siber güvenlik farkındalık eğitimi
authorities as a vital almış olması
part of national
5. Kritik altyapıların siber tehditlerden korunması çalışmalarına özel
security.
olarak belirlenmiş yıllık bütçenin varlığı
6. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için oluşturulmuş siber güvenliği de
sorumluluk alanı olarak tanımlamış denetleyici / düzenleyici kurum
yapılanmasının varlığı
7. Ülkedeki her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için BDDK’nın yaptığına
benzer, sektör spesifik kanuni siber güvenlik düzenlemelerinin
varlığı
8. Kritik altyapıların ihtiyaçları dikkate alınarak kurulmuş bir CERT
yapılanmasının varlığı (ABD’deki ICS-CERT örneği)
9. Kritik altyapıları ulusal güvenliğinin bir parçası olarak
değerlendiren bir ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisinin varlığı
1. Devlet tarafından geliştirilip desteklenen public-private
partnership programının varlığı
2. Bilgileri gizliliğine göre sınıflandırmakta kullanılan, bu
The culture of
sınıflandırmaya göre de bilginin paylaşımı ile ilgili kuralların
information sharing,
belirlenmesinde rol oynayan bir veri koruma kanununun varlığı
collaboration and
3. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası belirlenmiş bilgi paylaşımı
cooperation within
kurallarının varlığı / Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için mevzuat
the critical sectors
altyapısının varlığı / İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili
and among the
bilgi paylaşımı esaslarının belirlenip yayınlanmış olması
sectors is very
4. Bilgi paylaşım yükümlülükleri kanun ve yönetmeliklerle tespit
limited.
edilmiş kurumsal, sektörel CERT’lerin varlığı
5. Kurulmuş bir Ulusal CERT’in varlığı ve bunun uluslararası
CERT’lerle işbirliği sağlıyor olması.
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6. Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için teknik altyapının varlığı / Bilgi
paylaşımı ve işbirliğini kolaylaştıracak teknik çözümler
hazırlanmıştır. / Kritik sektörlerde yaşanan güvenlik olaylarının bir
merkezde toplanması ve istatistik oluşturulabilmesi / Sektör içi ve
sektörler arası online bilgi paylaşım platformlarının oluşturulmuş
olması
7. İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi paylaşımını
koordine etmek üzere bir kurumun görevlendirilmiş olması /
Amerika’da her sektör için bir bilgi paylaşım merkezi (ISACInformation Sharing Center) tesis edilmiştir. Bu merkezler aracılığı
ile sektör oyuncuları bilgi paylaşımında bulunabilmektedir. Bu gibi
merkezlerin varlığı,
8. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası organizasyonların (konferans,
workshop vb) varlığı
9. Ulusal CSIRT (USOM) üzerinden yapılan bilgi paylaşımının
varlığı
10. Ulusal CSIRT'in kritik altyapılara yönelik yapılan ihbarları
koordine etmesi, ilgili operatörlere eşgüdüm içerisinde çalışması
11. Özel sektörün siber saldırılara ilişkin gerçek verileri
paylaşmaktan imtina etmesini engelleyecek yasal düzenlemelerin
varlığı
1. Özel sektörü siber güvenlik alanında önemli bir oyuncu yapacak
politika ve stratejilerin varlığı
2. Kritik altyapı programında özel sektöre verilmiş somut görevlerin
varlığı
3. Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisi ya da sektörel strateji hazırlık
aşamalarında özel sektörün de katkısının alınması
4. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik kurulu gibi yapılanmaların daimi
The private sector is üyesi olması
not perceived by the 5. Girişimcilik, araştırma ve geliştirme faaliyetleri için devletin
government and
liderlik yapması / Devlet tarafından öncelikli alanların belirlenmiş
critical
olması özel sektörün bu alanlara sevk edilmesi
infrastructure
6. Özel sektörü teşvik edici maddi çözümler (vergi muafiyeti,
operators as an
kamunun teknik imkânlarından ücretsiz faydalanma, ulusal siber
important
güvenlik kurumlarından ücretsiz danışmanlık alınması vb.)
stakeholder in
yürürlüktedir. / Özel sektörün çalışmalara katılması için devlet ve
national cyber
sektör işletmecileri tarafından maddi kaynak ayrılması
security efforts.
7. Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem
vendor hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de
regülatör) bir araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak yapılıyor
olması
8. Özel sektörü temsil eden sivil inisiyatif gruplarının var olması ve
aktif faaliyetler yapması
9. Ulusal siber güvenlik tatbikatlarına özel sektörün kapsamlı bir
şekilde katılıyor olması
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10. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik önlemlerini ilave masraf olarak
görerek uygulamamasının önüne geçerek Yasal düzenlemelerin
varlığı
1. Hâlihazırdaki önemli yasaların kritik gözden geçirmesinin
yapılmış olması (critical review of the current laws)
2. Yetkin personeli yüksek maaşla çalıştırmak için imkanların
(sözleşmeli personel, özel firmadan personel kiralama) tesis edilmiş
The laws of public olması / Sözleşmeli personel çalıştırma, outsource hizmet alımı ve
procurements and personel kiralama için yapılmış düzenlemeler / Kaliteli personel
civil servants have alınmasını kolaylaştırıcı mevzuat hazırlanmış olması (Yüksek maaş
adverse effects on ve geniş imkanlar vb.)/ Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinde çalışacak bilgi
the cyber security of işlem ve siber güvenlik personeline daha cazip ücretlerin verilmesi
için yapılmış düzenlemeler
governmental
critical
3. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların memnuniyet
infrastructure
oranlarının belirli bir değerden yukarıda olması
owners.
4. Kritik teknolojilerin hızlı tedarik edilebilmesi için yasa değişikliği
/ Kamu İhale Kanununda teknik satın almaları kolaylaştırıcı, kaliteli
ürün alınmasını sağlayıcı düzenlemelerin yapılmış olması
5. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların ürünlerden
memnuniyet oranı
1. Ulusal seviyede kapasite geliştirme çalışmalarının varlığı /
Devletin genel olarak ya da spesifik sektörlerin siber işgücü
geliştirme stratejisi/planının olması / Kamuda çalışmak üzere
personel yetiştirme programları hazırlanmıştır. Bu programlardan
mezun olan öğrencilerin uzun süreli (10 yıl vs.) zorunlu hizmet
etmesi şart koşulmuştur. (TSK’da pilot eğitimi gibi)
2. Siber güvenlik alanında insan kaynağı geliştirilmesini koordine
etmekle görevli/sorumlu kurum ya da kurul gibi bir yapının varlığı
3. Sadece siber güvenlik üzerine çalışan kişi sayısının oranının belirli
bir değerden fazla olması
4. Sertifikalı devlet çalışanlarının oranı / Uluslararası geçerliliği olan
sertifikaların kamu kurumları tarafından işe alımda tercih edilmesi
The number of
5. Siber güvenlik tatbikatlarındaki takımların başarı durumu
qualified cyber
security experts is 6. Siber güvenlik eğitimleri veren özel, kamu ve akademik
limited.
kurumların sayısı ve kalitesi / Özellikle sektöre yönelik eğitim veren
kurumların varlığı ve fazlalığı
7. Eğitim veren yerler için devlet tarafından teşvik verilmesi
8. Tüm eğitim seviyelerinde (ilkokuldan doktoraya) BT ve siber
güvenlik konularında müfredatın olması / Siber güvenlik eğitimi
veren akademik kurumlar yeterli sayıda olması
9. Personel sayısının yetersiz kaldığı durumlarda, yabancı memur ve
işçi alımının önünü açacak yasal düzenlemeler yürürlüktedir. Bunun
için klerans çıkarılması gibi güvenlik soruşturmaları devreye
alınmıştır
10. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde sadece siber güvenliğe ilişkin
kadroların varlığı
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1. Özel sektörden kabul edilebilir hizmet alma standartlarının
belirlenmesi / Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin uyacağı sektörel veya
ulusal seviye dış hizmet / ürün alım kuralları
2. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin dışardan IT hizmeti aldıkları
kuruluşlarla ilişkilerini hangi esaslara göre yöneteceklerini belirleyen
The
relationship bir mevzuat olmalı / ABD’de sağlık sektöründe çok sıkı takip edilen
management
FDA yükümlülükleri benzeri, kamuya alınacak her türlü ürün ve
practices with the hizmetin çok sıkı regüle edilmesine yönelik düzenlemeler yapılmıştır
product/service
3. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin IT hizmeti alacakları kuruluşları
providers
are akredite eden bir sistem kurulmuş olmalı
insufficient
in 4. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin ürün/hizmet sağlayıcıları ile bir
governmental
araya gelebildikleri sivil toplum örgütleri vardır
critical
5. İşletmecilerle ürün sağlayıcılar arasında güvenlikle ilgili
infrastructure
sorunların iletildiği kanalların oluşturulup oluşturulmadığı
operators.
6. Ürün güvenliği ile ilgili standartların belirli olması
7. Ürün/hizmet sağlayıcılarını bilgilendirici ve katılım zorunluluğu
olan eğitim/konferans/seminer vb. faaliyetler yapılmaktadır. /
İşletmeciler ve ürün/hizmet sağlayıcıların katılacağı sektör spesifik
tatbikatlar ve konferansların varlığı
1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal iç/dış
tetkik kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin BT denetim
mekanizmalarına uyumluluğu yasal zorunluluk ile düzenlenmiştir.
2. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün regülatör kuruluşu sektördeki
işletmecilere düzenli olarak BT denetimi (siber güvenliği de
The
IT
audit kapsayacak şekilde) yapar / Her sektörün üst kurulunun mevzuat ile
mechanism is very denetim yapması
limited or does not 3. İç denetim birimlerinde IT denetim bilgi birikimine sahip personel
exist
in sayısı
governmental
4. IT denetim Planlarının varlığı
critical
5. Genel sektörel durumun ölçümlendiği bir bilgi toplama
infrastructure
mekanizmasının varlığı ve işlerliği
owners.
6. Denetimlerin yapılması ve çıktılarının merkezi bir ortamda
toplanıp düzenli olarak değerlendirilmesine imkan sağlayan teknik
çözümler devreye alınmıştır.
7. Denetim sonuçlarının ciddi yaptırımlarının olması (örneğin lisans
iptali veya iş alanının kısıtlanmasına kadar gidebilmelidir)
The managers of 1. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin siber güvenliğinden doğrudan kurum
yöneticilerini sorumlu tutan düzenlemelerin varlığı
governmental
2. Kurumsal bilgi güvenliği politikasının varlığı
critical
infrastructure
3. Kurumsal yönetimsel toplantı tutanaklarında siber güvenlik ile
owners
do
not ilgili kararların bulunması
perceive
the 4. Kurumsal siber güvenlik metriklerinin belirlenmiş olması,
information security metriklerin hesaplanması ve raporlanması
as an area of 5. Bu yöneticilerin görev tanımlarında siber güvenlik sorumluluğu
responsibility.
net olarak tanımlanmıştır.
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6. Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için yöneticilere odaklı
bilgilendirme faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking yarışması, seminer,
eğitim v.s. ) / Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin tepe yöneticilerine
bilgilendirme eğitimleri düzenli olarak verilmektedir.
7. Siber güvenlikle ilgili kurumsal sorumlu kişilerin belirlenmesi
8. Yöneticilerin bir denetim mekanizması oluşturması
1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal risk
yönetimi kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı işletmelerinde yazılı bir
The methodical and risk yönetim süreci, tabi oldukları mevzuat düzenlenerek zorunlu
formal
risk kılınmıştır. / Kritik altyapı işletmecilerine yönelik risk yönetimi ve
BGYS konularında yaptırım getiren kanuni düzenleme ve
management
process
is
not düzenleyici kurulun buna göre denetimi
conducted
by 2. Kritik altyapı işletmecileri için ISO 27001 gibi bir güvenlik
standardı zorunluluğu olması
governmental
3. Kurumlarda siber güvenliği de kapsayan tanımlı bir risk yönetim
critical
sürecinin var olması
infrastructure
4. Risk yönetim süreci işletimiyle ilgili kayıtların varlığı
owners.
5. Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için bilgilendirme faaliyetleri
(konferans, hacking yarışması, seminer, eğitim v.s. )
1. Mevzuat ile zorunlu tutulan sektörel / ulusal minimum güvenlik
önlemlerinin varlığı / Kritik altyapı işletmelerinin uyması gereken
minimum güvenlik önemleri önlemleri dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
2. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde kurulacak bilgi sistemleri için
mevzuatta düzenleme getirilmesi / Güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması
Security
is yasal olarak zorlanmaktadır.
considered
by 3. Sektör spesifik bilgi sistemleri tasarımı ve kurulumu için teknik
kılavuzlar
governmental
critical
4. Sektör bazlı güvenlik standartlarının oluşturulmuş ve yayınlanmış
infrastructure
olması
owners as an add-on 5. Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem
and not as a design vendor hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de
construct.
regülatör) bir araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak yapılıyor
olması
6. Operatörlerin iş geliştirme ve tasarım süreçlerinde güvenlik
farkındalığı düzenli olarak ölçülmektedir.
7. Geliştirme yapacak personelin teknik olgunluğu ölçülmekte ve
gerekli görüldüğünde zorunlu eğitime gönderilmektedir.
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Round -2: Controlled opinion feedback
I would like to ask you to grade the attached maturity criteria (including your own)
determined by six experts. Could you please grade the criteria in accordance with the
attached grading reference table? You are requested to give three points for the criteria
(weights for the principles) that you consider the most important, and one point for the least
and zero for the criteria that you would like to eliminate from the list. The elimination may
be based on many reasons: Those criteria may be recurrent, irrelevant, illogical or too
technically detailed etc. Please feel free to eliminate the criteria. You may give far more zero
points than you do with the other grades. I even would like you to consider more on the zerograde criteria as I am planning to have at most two or three criteria, in other words the most
significant ones, for each root cause in my maturity model proposal. I would be glad to
answer if you have any questions.
Note: If a totally new criterion come to your mind during weighing the existing criteria,
please notice me as soon as possible as I will send it to the other experts in order to be
graded in this round.
Score Explanation
0

The principle is duplicate, nonsense, confusing, unrelated, imprecise (careless),
too detailed or too technical.

1

The lack of the principle can be compensated by other principles to some
extent. The country improves its critical infrastructure protection effort more
slowly than expected.

2

The maturity principle is important on its own. The lack of the principle cannot
be compensated by other principles. The lack of criterion indicates an obvious
problem for the critical infrastructure protection. The critical infrastructures
will not be resilient at some parts.

3

The lack of the maturity criterion indicates a major problem for the critical
infrastructure protection efforts of the country because of the dependencies of
the other criteria on this criterion. The country cannot improve the cyber
resilience of the critical infrastructures.

Round-2: Output
Each expert weighted the principles separately. Please see the input of the Round-3 (below)
for the individual weight values.

134

Round-3: Input
Root
cause The set of principles
#

1

2

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6

1. Siber tehditleri dikkate alan bir kritik altyapıların
korunması programının (CIPP) varlığı
2. Ulusal güvenlikten sorumlusu kurum ve
kuruluşların aynı zamanda kritik altyapıları siber
tehditlere karşı koruma sorumlulukları olması
(ABD’de DHS örneği) / Kritik altyapıların siber
güvenliğinden kanunen sorumlu kurum ile ulusal
güvenlikten sorumlu kurum ve kuruluşlar arasında
eşgüdüm mekanizmalarının oluşturulmuş olması /
Önemli karar alma mekanizmalarında (Başkanlık,
başbakanlık, MGK gibi) siber güvenlikle ilgili bir
birimin olması (bilgi işlem içindeki kuruma iç hizmet
veren birimi kastetmiyorum) / Siber Güvenlik Kurulu
Başkanının MGK toplantısına (benzeri) zaman zaman
katılması
3. Üst düzey karar alıcıların (başbakan, bakan vb.)
siber güvenlik danışmanı olması
4. Kamuda üst düzey yöneticilerin siber güvenlik
farkındalık eğitimi almış olması
5. Kritik altyapıların siber tehditlerden korunması
çalışmalarına özel olarak belirlenmiş yıllık bütçenin
varlığı
6. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için oluşturulmuş siber
güvenliği de sorumluluk alanı olarak tanımlamış
denetleyici / düzenleyici kurum yapılanmasının varlığı
7. Ülkedeki her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için
BDDK’nın yaptığına benzer, sektör spesifik kanuni
siber güvenlik düzenlemelerinin varlığı
8. Kritik altyapıların ihtiyaçları dikkate alınarak
kurulmuş bir CERT yapılanmasının varlığı (ABD’deki
ICS-CERT örneği)
9. Kritik altyapıları ulusal güvenliğinin bir parçası
olarak değerlendiren bir ulusal Siber Güvenlik
Stratejisinin varlığı
10. Sektör spesifik (sektörel) veya tüm kritik
altyapıları içine alan risk yönetimi sürecinin veya
teknik kılavuz, dokümantasyonun varlığı (Introduced
by Expert-1 as a result of the controlled opinion
feedback)
1. Devlet tarafından geliştirilip desteklenen publicprivate partnership programının varlığı
2. Bilgileri gizliliğine göre sınıflandırmakta kullanılan,
bu sınıflandırmaya göre de bilginin paylaşımı ile ilgili
kuralların belirlenmesinde rol oynayan bir veri koruma
kanununun varlığı
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cause The set of principles
#

3

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6

3. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası belirlenmiş bilgi
paylaşımı kurallarının varlığı / Bilgi paylaşımı ve
işbirliği için mevzuat altyapısının varlığı / İlgili
kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi
paylaşımı esaslarının belirlenip yayınlanmış olması
4. Bilgi paylaşım yükümlülükleri kanun ve
yönetmeliklerle tespit edilmiş kurumsal, sektörel
CERT’lerin varlığı
5. Kurulmuş bir Ulusal CERT’in varlığı ve bunun
uluslararası CERT’lerle işbirliği sağlıyor olması.
6. Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için teknik altyapının
varlığı / Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliğini kolaylaştıracak
teknik çözümler hazırlanmıştır. / Kritik sektörlerde
yaşanan güvenlik olaylarının bir merkezde toplanması
ve istatistik oluşturulabilmesi / Sektör içi ve sektörler
arası
online
bilgi
paylaşım
platformlarının
oluşturulmuş olması
7. İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi
paylaşımını koordine etmek üzere bir kurumun
görevlendirilmiş olması / Amerika’da her sektör için
bir bilgi paylaşım merkezi (ISAC- Information
Sharing Center) tesis edilmiştir. Bu merkezler aracılığı
ile
sektör
oyuncuları
bilgi
paylaşımında
bulunabilmektedir. Bu gibi merkezlerin varlığı,
8. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası organizasyonların
(konferans, workshop vb) varlığı
9. Ulusal CSIRT (USOM) üzerinden yapılan bilgi
paylaşımının varlığı
10. Ulusal CSIRT'in kritik altyapılara yönelik yapılan
ihbarları koordine etmesi, ilgili operatörlere eşgüdüm
içerisinde çalışması
11. Özel sektörün siber saldırılara ilişkin gerçek
verileri paylaşmaktan imtina etmesini engelleyecek
yasal düzenlemelerin varlığı
1. Özel sektörü siber güvenlik alanında önemli bir
oyuncu yapacak politika ve stratejilerin varlığı
2. Kritik altyapı programında özel sektöre verilmiş
somut görevlerin varlığı
3. Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisi ya da sektörel strateji
hazırlık aşamalarında özel sektörün de katkısının
alınması
4. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik kurulu gibi
yapılanmaların daimi üyesi olması
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Root
cause The set of principles
#

4

5

5. Girişimcilik, araştırma ve geliştirme faaliyetleri için
devletin liderlik yapması / Devlet tarafından öncelikli
alanların belirlenmiş olması özel sektörün bu alanlara
sevk edilmesi
6. Özel sektörü teşvik edici maddi çözümler (vergi
muafiyeti, kamunun teknik imkânlarından ücretsiz
faydalanma, ulusal siber güvenlik kurumlarından
ücretsiz danışmanlık alınması vb.) yürürlüktedir. /
Özel sektörün çalışmalara katılması için devlet ve
sektör işletmecileri tarafından maddi kaynak ayrılması
7. Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel
sektör (hem vendor hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun
(hem işletmeci hem de regülatör) bir araya geldiği
etkinliklerin düzenli olarak yapılıyor olması
8. Özel sektörü temsil eden sivil inisiyatif gruplarının
var olması ve aktif faaliyetler yapması
9. Ulusal siber güvenlik tatbikatlarına özel sektörün
kapsamlı bir şekilde katılıyor olması
10. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik önlemlerini ilave
masraf olarak görerek uygulamamasının önüne
geçerek Yasal düzenlemelerin varlığı
1. Hâlihazırdaki önemli yasaların kritik gözden
geçirmesinin yapılmış olması (critical review of the
current laws)
2. Yetkin personeli yüksek maaşla çalıştırmak için
imkanların (sözleşmeli personel, özel firmadan
personel kiralama) tesis edilmiş olması / Sözleşmeli
personel çalıştırma, outsource hizmet alımı ve personel
kiralama için yapılmış düzenlemeler / Kaliteli personel
alınmasını kolaylaştırıcı mevzuat hazırlanmış olması
(Yüksek maaş ve geniş imkanlar vb.)/ Kritik altyapı
işletmecilerinde çalışacak bilgi işlem ve siber güvenlik
personeline daha cazip ücretlerin verilmesi için
yapılmış düzenlemeler
3. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların
memnuniyet oranlarının belirli bir değerden yukarıda
olması
4. Kritik teknolojilerin hızlı tedarik edilebilmesi için
yasa değişikliği / Kamu İhale Kanununda teknik satın
almaları kolaylaştırıcı, kaliteli ürün alınmasını
sağlayıcı düzenlemelerin yapılmış olması
5. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların
ürünlerden memnuniyet oranı
1. Ulusal seviyede kapasite geliştirme çalışmalarının
varlığı / Devletin genel olarak ya da spesifik
sektörlerin siber işgücü geliştirme stratejisi/planının
olması
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2. Siber güvenlik alanında insan kaynağı
geliştirilmesini koordine etmekle görevli/sorumlu
kurum ya da kurul gibi bir yapının varlığı
3. Sadece siber güvenlik üzerine çalışan kişi sayısının
oranının belirli bir değerden fazla olması
4. Sertifikalı devlet çalışanlarının oranı / Uluslararası
geçerliliği olan sertifikaların kamu kurumları
tarafından işe alımda tercih edilmesi
5. Siber güvenlik tatbikatlarındaki takımların başarı
durumu
6. Siber güvenlik eğitimleri veren özel, kamu ve
akademik kurumların sayısı ve kalitesi / Özellikle
sektöre yönelik eğitim veren kurumların varlığı ve
fazlalığı
7. Eğitim veren yerler için devlet tarafından teşvik
verilmesi
8. Tüm eğitim seviyelerinde (ilkokuldan doktoraya)
BT ve siber güvenlik konularında müfredatın olması /
Siber güvenlik eğitimi veren akademik kurumlar
yeterli sayıda olması
9. Personel sayısının yetersiz kaldığı durumlarda,
yabancı memur ve işçi alımının önünü açacak yasal
düzenlemeler yürürlüktedir. Bunun için klerans
çıkarılması gibi güvenlik soruşturmaları devreye
alınmıştır
10. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde sadece siber
güvenliğe ilişkin kadroların varlığı
1. Özel sektörden kabul edilebilir hizmet alma
standartlarının belirlenmesi / Kritik altyapı
operatörlerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal seviye dış
hizmet / ürün alım kuralları
2. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin dışardan IT hizmeti
aldıkları kuruluşlarla ilişkilerini hangi esaslara göre
yöneteceklerini belirleyen bir mevzuat olmalı /
ABD’de sağlık sektöründe çok sıkı takip edilen FDA
yükümlülükleri benzeri, kamuya alınacak her türlü
ürün ve hizmetin çok sıkı regüle edilmesine yönelik
düzenlemeler yapılmıştır
3. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin IT hizmeti alacakları
kuruluşları akredite eden bir sistem kurulmuş olmalı
4. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin ürün/hizmet
sağlayıcıları ile bir araya gelebildikleri sivil toplum
örgütleri vardır
5. İşletmecilerle ürün sağlayıcılar arasında güvenlikle
ilgili sorunların iletildiği kanalların oluşturulup
oluşturulmadığı
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6. Ürün güvenliği ile ilgili standartların belirli olması
7. Ürün/hizmet sağlayıcılarını bilgilendirici ve katılım
zorunluluğu olan eğitim/konferans/seminer vb.
faaliyetler yapılmaktadır. / İşletmeciler ve ürün/hizmet
sağlayıcıların katılacağı sektör spesifik tatbikatlar ve
konferansların varlığı
1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya
ulusal iç/dış tetkik kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı
işletmecilerinin BT denetim mekanizmalarına
uyumluluğu yasal zorunluluk ile düzenlenmiştir.
2. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün regülatör kuruluşu
sektördeki işletmecilere düzenli olarak BT denetimi
(siber güvenliği de kapsayacak şekilde) yapar / Her
sektörün üst kurulunun mevzuat ile denetim yapması
3. İç denetim birimlerinde IT denetim bilgi birikimine
sahip personel sayısı
4. IT denetim Planlarının varlığı
5. Genel sektörel durumun ölçümlendiği bir bilgi
toplama mekanizmasının varlığı ve işlerliği
6. Denetimlerin yapılması ve çıktılarının merkezi bir
ortamda toplanıp düzenli olarak değerlendirilmesine
imkan sağlayan teknik çözümler devreye alınmıştır.
7. Denetim sonuçlarının ciddi yaptırımlarının olması
(örneğin lisans iptali veya iş alanının kısıtlanmasına
kadar gidebilmelidir)
1. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin siber güvenliğinden
doğrudan kurum yöneticilerini sorumlu tutan
düzenlemelerin varlığı
2. Kurumsal bilgi güvenliği politikasının varlığı
3. Kurumsal yönetimsel toplantı tutanaklarında siber
güvenlik ile ilgili kararların bulunması
4. Kurumsal siber güvenlik metriklerinin belirlenmiş
olması, metriklerin hesaplanması ve raporlanması
5. Bu yöneticilerin görev tanımlarında siber güvenlik
sorumluluğu net olarak tanımlanmıştır.
6. Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için yöneticilere
odaklı bilgilendirme faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking
yarışması, seminer, eğitim v.s. ) / Kritik altyapı
işletmecilerinin tepe yöneticilerine bilgilendirme
eğitimleri düzenli olarak verilmektedir.
7. Siber güvenlikle ilgili kurumsal sorumlu kişilerin
belirlenmesi
8. Yöneticilerin bir denetim mekanizması oluşturması
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1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya
ulusal risk yönetimi kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı
işletmelerinde yazılı bir risk yönetim süreci, tabi
oldukları mevzuat düzenlenerek zorunlu kılınmıştır. /
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerine yönelik risk yönetimi ve
BGYS konularında yaptırım getiren kanuni düzenleme
ve düzenleyici kurulun buna göre denetimi
2. Kritik altyapı işletmecileri için ISO 27001 gibi bir
güvenlik standardı zorunluluğu olması
3. Kurumlarda siber güvenliği de kapsayan tanımlı bir
risk yönetim sürecinin var olması
4. Risk yönetim süreci işletimiyle ilgili kayıtların
varlığı
5. Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için bilgilendirme
faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking yarışması, seminer,
eğitim v.s. )
1. Mevzuat ile zorunlu tutulan sektörel / ulusal
minimum güvenlik önlemlerinin varlığı / Kritik altyapı
işletmelerinin uyması gereken minimum güvenlik
önemleri önlemleri dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
2. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde kurulacak bilgi
sistemleri için mevzuatta düzenleme getirilmesi /
Güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması yasal olarak
zorlanmaktadır.
3. Sektör spesifik bilgi sistemleri tasarımı ve kurulumu
için teknik kılavuzlar
4. Sektör bazlı güvenlik standartlarının oluşturulmuş
ve yayınlanmış olması
5. Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel
sektör (hem vendor hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun
(hem işletmeci hem de regülatör) bir araya geldiği
etkinliklerin düzenli olarak yapılıyor olması
6. Operatörlerin iş geliştirme ve tasarım süreçlerinde
güvenlik farkındalığı düzenli olarak ölçülmektedir.
7. Geliştirme yapacak personelin teknik olgunluğu
ölçülmekte ve gerekli görüldüğünde zorunlu eğitime
gönderilmektedir.
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Round -3: Controlled opinion feedback
We are in the third round of Delphi. You will see the others’ grades (weights of the
principles) for the criteria, along with your own. Your grades are in the Points-x column.
You can change your grades if you like, after you look at the grades by the other experts.
In the last right column, there are the arithmetic averages of the grades as to assist you in
your decisions. And the frequency of each arithmetic average is shown in another chart.

Root
cause Principles
#

1

Average
weight

1. Siber tehditleri dikkate alan bir kritik altyapıların korunması
programının (CIPP) varlığı
2. Ulusal güvenlikten sorumlusu kurum ve kuruluşların aynı zamanda
kritik altyapıları siber tehditlere karşı koruma sorumlulukları olması
(ABD’de DHS örneği) / Kritik altyapıların siber güvenliğinden
kanunen sorumlu kurum ile ulusal güvenlikten sorumlu kurum ve
kuruluşlar arasında eşgüdüm mekanizmalarının oluşturulmuş olması /
Önemli karar alma mekanizmalarında (Başkanlık, başbakanlık, MGK
gibi) siber güvenlikle ilgili bir birimin olması (bilgi işlem içindeki
kuruma iç hizmet veren birimi kastetmiyorum) / Siber Güvenlik Kurulu
Başkanının MGK toplantısına (benzeri) zaman zaman katılması
3. Üst düzey karar alıcıların (başbakan, bakan vb.) siber güvenlik
danışmanı olması
4. Kamuda üst düzey yöneticilerin siber güvenlik farkındalık eğitimi
almış olması
5. Kritik altyapıların siber tehditlerden korunması çalışmalarına özel
olarak belirlenmiş yıllık bütçenin varlığı
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Root
cause Principles
#
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3
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weight

6. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için oluşturulmuş siber güvenliği de
sorumluluk alanı olarak tanımlamış denetleyici / düzenleyici kurum
yapılanmasının varlığı
7. Ülkedeki her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için BDDK’nın yaptığına
benzer, sektör spesifik kanuni siber güvenlik düzenlemelerinin varlığı
8. Kritik altyapıların ihtiyaçları dikkate alınarak kurulmuş bir CERT
yapılanmasının varlığı (ABD’deki ICS-CERT örneği)
9. Kritik altyapıları ulusal güvenliğinin bir parçası olarak değerlendiren
bir ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisinin varlığı
10. Sektör spesifik (sektörel) veya tüm kritik altyapıları içine alan risk
yönetimi sürecinin veya teknik kılavuz, dokümantasyonun varlığı
1. Devlet tarafından geliştirilip desteklenen public-private partnership
programının varlığı
2. Bilgileri gizliliğine göre sınıflandırmakta kullanılan, bu
sınıflandırmaya göre de bilginin paylaşımı ile ilgili kuralların
belirlenmesinde rol oynayan bir veri koruma kanununun varlığı
3. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası belirlenmiş bilgi paylaşımı kurallarının
varlığı / Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için mevzuat altyapısının varlığı /
İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi paylaşımı
esaslarının belirlenip yayınlanmış olması
4. Bilgi paylaşım yükümlülükleri kanun ve yönetmeliklerle tespit
edilmiş kurumsal, sektörel CERT’lerin varlığı
5. Kurulmuş bir Ulusal CERT’in varlığı ve bunun uluslararası
CERT’lerle işbirliği sağlıyor olması.
6. Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için teknik altyapının varlığı / Bilgi
paylaşımı ve işbirliğini kolaylaştıracak teknik çözümler hazırlanmıştır.
/ Kritik sektörlerde yaşanan güvenlik olaylarının bir merkezde
toplanması ve istatistik oluşturulabilmesi / Sektör içi ve sektörler arası
online bilgi paylaşım platformlarının oluşturulmuş olması
7. İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi paylaşımını
koordine etmek üzere bir kurumun görevlendirilmiş olması /
Amerika’da her sektör için bir bilgi paylaşım merkezi (ISACInformation Sharing Center) tesis edilmiştir. Bu merkezler aracılığı ile
sektör oyuncuları bilgi paylaşımında bulunabilmektedir. Bu gibi
merkezlerin varlığı,
8. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası organizasyonların (konferans, workshop
vb) varlığı
9. Ulusal CSIRT (USOM) üzerinden yapılan bilgi paylaşımının varlığı
10. Ulusal CSIRT'in kritik altyapılara yönelik yapılan ihbarları
koordine etmesi, ilgili operatörlere eşgüdüm içerisinde çalışması
11. Özel sektörün siber saldırılara ilişkin gerçek verileri paylaşmaktan
imtina etmesini engelleyecek yasal düzenlemelerin varlığı
1. Özel sektörü siber güvenlik alanında önemli bir oyuncu yapacak
politika ve stratejilerin varlığı
2. Kritik altyapı programında özel sektöre verilmiş somut görevlerin
varlığı
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3. Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisi ya da sektörel strateji hazırlık
aşamalarında özel sektörün de katkısının alınması
4. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik kurulu gibi yapılanmaların daimi üyesi
olması
5. Girişimcilik, araştırma ve geliştirme faaliyetleri için devletin liderlik
yapması / Devlet tarafından öncelikli alanların belirlenmiş olması özel
sektörün bu alanlara sevk edilmesi
6. Özel sektörü teşvik edici maddi çözümler (vergi muafiyeti, kamunun
teknik imkânlarından ücretsiz faydalanma, ulusal siber güvenlik
kurumlarından ücretsiz danışmanlık alınması vb.) yürürlüktedir. / Özel
sektörün çalışmalara katılması için devlet ve sektör işletmecileri
tarafından maddi kaynak ayrılması
7. Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem vendor
hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de regülatör) bir
araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak yapılıyor olması
8. Özel sektörü temsil eden sivil inisiyatif gruplarının var olması ve
aktif faaliyetler yapması
9. Ulusal siber güvenlik tatbikatlarına özel sektörün kapsamlı bir
şekilde katılıyor olması
10. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik önlemlerini ilave masraf olarak
görerek uygulamamasının önüne geçerek Yasal düzenlemelerin varlığı
1. Hâlihazırdaki önemli yasaların kritik gözden geçirmesinin yapılmış
olması (critical review of the current laws)
2. Yetkin personeli yüksek maaşla çalıştırmak için imkanların
(sözleşmeli personel, özel firmadan personel kiralama) tesis edilmiş
olması / Sözleşmeli personel çalıştırma, outsource hizmet alımı ve
personel kiralama için yapılmış düzenlemeler / Kaliteli personel
alınmasını kolaylaştırıcı mevzuat hazırlanmış olması (Yüksek maaş ve
geniş imkanlar vb.)/ Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinde çalışacak bilgi işlem
ve siber güvenlik personeline daha cazip ücretlerin verilmesi için
yapılmış düzenlemeler
3. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların memnuniyet
oranlarının belirli bir değerden yukarıda olması
4. Kritik teknolojilerin hızlı tedarik edilebilmesi için yasa değişikliği /
Kamu İhale Kanununda teknik satın almaları kolaylaştırıcı, kaliteli ürün
alınmasını sağlayıcı düzenlemelerin yapılmış olması
5. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan memurların ürünlerden
memnuniyet oranı
1. Ulusal seviyede kapasite geliştirme çalışmalarının varlığı / Devletin
genel olarak ya da spesifik sektörlerin siber işgücü geliştirme
stratejisi/planının olması
2. Siber güvenlik alanında insan kaynağı geliştirilmesini koordine
etmekle görevli/sorumlu kurum ya da kurul gibi bir yapının varlığı
3. Sadece siber güvenlik üzerine çalışan kişi sayısının oranının belirli
bir değerden fazla olması
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4. Sertifikalı devlet çalışanlarının oranı / Uluslararası geçerliliği olan
sertifikaların kamu kurumları tarafından işe alımda tercih edilmesi
5. Siber güvenlik tatbikatlarındaki takımların başarı durumu
6. Siber güvenlik eğitimleri veren özel, kamu ve akademik kurumların
sayısı ve kalitesi / Özellikle sektöre yönelik eğitim veren kurumların
varlığı ve fazlalığı
7. Eğitim veren yerler için devlet tarafından teşvik verilmesi
8. Tüm eğitim seviyelerinde (ilkokuldan doktoraya) BT ve siber
güvenlik konularında müfredatın olması / Siber güvenlik eğitimi veren
akademik kurumlar yeterli sayıda olması
9. Personel sayısının yetersiz kaldığı durumlarda, yabancı memur ve
işçi alımının önünü açacak yasal düzenlemeler yürürlüktedir. Bunun
için klerans çıkarılması gibi güvenlik soruşturmaları devreye alınmıştır
10. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde sadece siber güvenliğe ilişkin
kadroların varlığı
1. Özel sektörden kabul edilebilir hizmet alma standartlarının
belirlenmesi / Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin uyacağı sektörel veya
ulusal seviye dış hizmet / ürün alım kuralları
2. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin dışardan IT hizmeti aldıkları
kuruluşlarla ilişkilerini hangi esaslara göre yöneteceklerini belirleyen
bir mevzuat olmalı / ABD’de sağlık sektöründe çok sıkı takip edilen
FDA yükümlülükleri benzeri, kamuya alınacak her türlü ürün ve
hizmetin çok sıkı regüle edilmesine yönelik düzenlemeler yapılmıştır
3. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin IT hizmeti alacakları kuruluşları
akredite eden bir sistem kurulmuş olmalı
4. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin ürün/hizmet sağlayıcıları ile bir araya
gelebildikleri sivil toplum örgütleri vardır
5. İşletmecilerle ürün sağlayıcılar arasında güvenlikle ilgili sorunların
iletildiği kanalların oluşturulup oluşturulmadığı
6. Ürün güvenliği ile ilgili standartların belirli olması
7. Ürün/hizmet sağlayıcılarını bilgilendirici ve katılım zorunluluğu olan
eğitim/konferans/seminer vb. faaliyetler yapılmaktadır. / İşletmeciler ve
ürün/hizmet sağlayıcıların katılacağı sektör spesifik tatbikatlar ve
konferansların varlığı
1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal iç/dış
tetkik kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin BT denetim
mekanizmalarına uyumluluğu yasal zorunluluk ile düzenlenmiştir.
2. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün regülatör kuruluşu sektördeki
işletmecilere düzenli olarak BT denetimi (siber güvenliği de
kapsayacak şekilde) yapar / Her sektörün üst kurulunun mevzuat ile
denetim yapması
3. İç denetim birimlerinde IT denetim bilgi birikimine sahip personel
sayısı
4. IT denetim Planlarının varlığı
5. Genel sektörel durumun ölçümlendiği bir bilgi toplama
mekanizmasının varlığı ve işlerliği
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Average
weight
1,83
0,50

1,67
1,00

1,83

0,50
1,33

2,17

2,17
2,00
0,50
0,67
1,33

0,60

2,67

2,83
1,50
1,33
0,50

Root
cause Principles
#

8

9

10

Average
weight

6. Denetimlerin yapılması ve çıktılarının merkezi bir ortamda toplanıp
düzenli olarak değerlendirilmesine imkan sağlayan teknik çözümler
devreye alınmıştır.
7. Denetim sonuçlarının ciddi yaptırımlarının olması (örneğin lisans
iptali veya iş alanının kısıtlanmasına kadar gidebilmelidir)
1. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin siber güvenliğinden doğrudan kurum
yöneticilerini sorumlu tutan düzenlemelerin varlığı
2. Kurumsal bilgi güvenliği politikasının varlığı
3. Kurumsal yönetimsel toplantı tutanaklarında siber güvenlik ile ilgili
kararların bulunması
4. Kurumsal siber güvenlik metriklerinin belirlenmiş olması,
metriklerin hesaplanması ve raporlanması
5. Bu yöneticilerin görev tanımlarında siber güvenlik sorumluluğu net
olarak tanımlanmıştır.
6. Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için yöneticilere odaklı
bilgilendirme faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking yarışması, seminer,
eğitim v.s. ) / Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin tepe yöneticilerine
bilgilendirme eğitimleri düzenli olarak verilmektedir.
7. Siber güvenlikle ilgili kurumsal sorumlu kişilerin belirlenmesi
8. Yöneticilerin bir denetim mekanizması oluşturması
1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal risk
yönetimi kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı işletmelerinde yazılı bir
risk yönetim süreci, tabi oldukları mevzuat düzenlenerek zorunlu
kılınmıştır. / Kritik altyapı işletmecilerine yönelik risk yönetimi ve
BGYS konularında yaptırım getiren kanuni düzenleme ve düzenleyici
kurulun buna göre denetimi
2. Kritik altyapı işletmecileri için ISO 27001 gibi bir güvenlik standardı
zorunluluğu olması
3. Kurumlarda siber güvenliği de kapsayan tanımlı bir risk yönetim
sürecinin var olması
4. Risk yönetim süreci işletimiyle ilgili kayıtların varlığı
5. Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için bilgilendirme faaliyetleri
(konferans, hacking yarışması, seminer, eğitim v.s. )
1. Mevzuat ile zorunlu tutulan sektörel / ulusal minimum güvenlik
önlemlerinin varlığı / Kritik altyapı işletmelerinin uyması gereken
minimum güvenlik önemleri önlemleri dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
2. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde kurulacak bilgi sistemleri için
mevzuatta düzenleme getirilmesi / Güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması
yasal olarak zorlanmaktadır.
3. Sektör spesifik bilgi sistemleri tasarımı ve kurulumu için teknik
kılavuzlar
4. Sektör bazlı güvenlik standartlarının oluşturulmuş ve yayınlanmış
olması
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0,50
1,67
2,80
1,50
1,50
1,17
2,00

1,33
1,17
1,33

2,83
2,20
1,67
0,67
0,67

2,33

2,40
1,50
1,83

Root
cause Principles
#

Average
weight

5. Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem vendor
hem de işletmeci) ve kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de regülatör) bir
araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak yapılıyor olması
6. Operatörlerin iş geliştirme ve tasarım süreçlerinde güvenlik
farkındalığı düzenli olarak ölçülmektedir.
7. Geliştirme yapacak personelin teknik olgunluğu ölçülmekte ve
gerekli görüldüğünde zorunlu eğitime gönderilmektedir.

0,50
0,67
1,00

Round-3: Output
Each expert reviewed their weights separately by looking at the weights of the others experts
and arithmetic averages. Please see the input of the Round-4 (below) for the individual
weight values.
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Round-4: Input
Principles
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average
Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün regülatör
kuruluşu sektördeki işletmecilere düzenli
olarak BT denetimi (siber güvenliği de
kapsayacak şekilde) yapar / Her sektörün üst
kurulunun mevzuat ile denetim yapması
3
3
3
3
3
3
3,00
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel
veya ulusal risk yönetimi kurallarının varlığı /
Kritik altyapı işletmelerinde yazılı bir risk
yönetim süreci, tabi oldukları mevzuat
düzenlenerek zorunlu kılınmıştır. / Kritik
altyapı işletmecilerine yönelik risk yönetimi
ve BGYS konularında yaptırım getiren kanuni
düzenleme ve düzenleyici kurulun buna göre
denetimi
3
3
3
3
3
3
3,00
Kritik
altyapı
operatörlerinin
siber
güvenliğinden doğrudan kurum yöneticilerini
sorumlu tutan düzenlemelerin varlığı
3
3
3
3
2
3
2,83
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin dışardan IT
hizmeti aldıkları kuruluşlarla ilişkilerini hangi
esaslara göre yöneteceklerini belirleyen bir
mevzuat olmalı / ABD’de sağlık sektöründe
çok sıkı takip edilen FDA yükümlülükleri
benzeri, kamuya alınacak her türlü ürün ve
hizmetin çok sıkı regüle edilmesine yönelik
düzenlemeler yapılmıştır
3
3
2
2
3
3
2,67
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel
veya ulusal iç/dış tetkik kurallarının varlığı /
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin BT denetim
mekanizmalarına
uyumluluğu
yasal
zorunluluk ile düzenlenmiştir.
3
3
2
3
2
3
2,67
Siber tehditleri dikkate alan bir kritik
altyapıların korunması programının (CIPP)
varlığı
2
3
3
2
3
2
2,50
Ulusal güvenlikten sorumlusu kurum ve
kuruluşların aynı zamanda kritik altyapıları
siber tehditlere karşı koruma sorumlulukları
olması (ABD’de DHS örneği) / Kritik
altyapıların siber güvenliğinden kanunen
sorumlu kurum ile ulusal güvenlikten sorumlu
kurum ve kuruluşlar arasında eşgüdüm
mekanizmalarının oluşturulmuş olması /
Önemli karar alma mekanizmalarında
(Başkanlık, başbakanlık, MGK gibi) siber
güvenlikle ilgili bir birimin olması (bilgi
işlem içindeki kuruma iç hizmet veren birimi
kastetmiyorum) / Siber Güvenlik Kurulu
Başkanının MGK toplantısına (benzeri)
zaman zaman katılması
2
3
2
3
3
2
2,50
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Principles
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average
Özel sektörü siber güvenlik alanında önemli
bir oyuncu yapacak politika ve stratejilerin
varlığı
2
3
3
3
2
2
2,50
Yetkin personeli yüksek maaşla çalıştırmak
için imkanların (sözleşmeli personel, özel
firmadan personel kiralama) tesis edilmiş
olması / Sözleşmeli personel çalıştırma,
outsource hizmet alımı ve personel kiralama
için yapılmış düzenlemeler / Kaliteli personel
alınmasını kolaylaştırıcı mevzuat hazırlanmış
olması (Yüksek maaş ve geniş imkanlar vb.)/
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinde çalışacak bilgi
işlem ve siber güvenlik personeline daha
cazip ücretlerin verilmesi için yapılmış
düzenlemeler
3
2
3
2
2
3
2,50
Özel sektörden kabul edilebilir hizmet alma
standartlarının belirlenmesi / Kritik altyapı
operatörlerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal
seviye dış hizmet / ürün alım kuralları
1
3
3
3
2
3
2,50
Sektör spesifik (sektörel) veya tüm kritik
altyapıları içine alan risk yönetimi sürecinin
veya teknik kılavuz, dokümantasyonun varlığı
3
3
2
3
2
2
2,50
Mevzuat ile zorunlu tutulan sektörel / ulusal
minimum güvenlik önlemlerinin varlığı /
Kritik altyapı işletmelerinin uyması gereken
minimum güvenlik önemleri önlemleri
dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
3
3
2
3
2
2
2,50
Kritik
altyapıların
siber
tehditlerden
korunması
çalışmalarına
özel
olarak
belirlenmiş yıllık bütçenin varlığı
3
3
2
2
3
1
2,33
Devlet tarafından geliştirilip desteklenen
public-private partnership programının varlığı
1
3
3
3
2
2
2,33
Girişimcilik,
araştırma
ve
geliştirme
faaliyetleri için devletin liderlik yapması /
Devlet
tarafından
öncelikli
alanların
belirlenmiş olması özel sektörün bu alanlara
sevk edilmesi
3
3
2
2
2
2
2,33
Ulusal
seviyede
kapasite
geliştirme
çalışmalarının varlığı / Devletin genel olarak
ya da spesifik sektörlerin siber işgücü
geliştirme stratejisi/planının olması
2
3
3
3
1
2
2,33
Tüm eğitim seviyelerinde (ilkokuldan
doktoraya) BT ve siber güvenlik konularında
müfredatın olması / Siber güvenlik eğitimi
veren akademik kurumlar yeterli sayıda
olması
3
2
2
2
3
2
2,33
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Principles
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average
Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde kurulacak bilgi
sistemleri
için
mevzuatta
düzenleme
getirilmesi / Güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması
yasal olarak zorlanmaktadır.
3
2
3
2
2
2
2,33
Kritik altyapıları ulusal güvenliğinin bir
parçası olarak değerlendiren bir ulusal Siber
Güvenlik Stratejisinin varlığı
3
1
2
3
3
1
2,17
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin IT hizmeti
alacakları kuruluşları akredite eden bir sistem
kurulmuş olmalı
2
2
1
3
3
2
2,17
Kritik altyapı işletmecileri için ISO 27001
gibi bir güvenlik standardı zorunluluğu olması
1
3
2
2
3
2
2,17
Sektör içi ve sektörler arası belirlenmiş bilgi
paylaşımı kurallarının varlığı / Bilgi paylaşımı
ve işbirliği için mevzuat altyapısının varlığı /
İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili
bilgi
paylaşımı
esaslarının
belirlenip
yayınlanmış olması
1
3
2
2
2
2
2,00
Kurulmuş bir Ulusal CERT’in varlığı ve
bunun uluslararası CERT’lerle işbirliği
sağlıyor olması.
2
2
1
3
3
1
2,00
Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisi ya da sektörel
strateji hazırlık aşamalarında özel sektörün de
katkısının alınması
3
2
1
3
2
1
2,00
Siber güvenlik eğitimleri veren özel, kamu ve
akademik kurumların sayısı ve kalitesi /
Özellikle sektöre yönelik eğitim veren
kurumların varlığı ve fazlalığı
3
2
1
2
2
2
2,00
Bu yöneticilerin görev tanımlarında siber
güvenlik
sorumluluğu
net
olarak
tanımlanmıştır.
1
2
2
3
2
2
2,00
Kurumlarda siber güvenliği de kapsayan
tanımlı bir risk yönetim sürecinin var olması
2
1
1
3
3
2
2,00
Ulusal CSIRT'in kritik altyapılara yönelik
yapılan ihbarları koordine etmesi, ilgili
operatörlere eşgüdüm içerisinde çalışması
2
1
1
3
2
2
1,83
Sertifikalı devlet çalışanlarının oranı /
Uluslararası geçerliliği olan sertifikaların
kamu kurumları tarafından işe alımda tercih
edilmesi
2
2
1
2
2
2
1,83
Sektör
bazlı
güvenlik
standartlarının
oluşturulmuş ve yayınlanmış olması
2
3
1
2
2
1
1,83
Ülkedeki her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için
BDDK’nın yaptığına benzer, sektör spesifik
kanuni siber güvenlik düzenlemelerinin
varlığı
2
1
1
2
2
2
1,67
Kritik altyapıların ihtiyaçları dikkate alınarak
kurulmuş bir CERT yapılanmasının varlığı
(ABD’deki ICS-CERT örneği)
3
0
2
2
2
1
1,67
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Principles
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average
Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için teknik
altyapının varlığı / Bilgi paylaşımı ve
işbirliğini kolaylaştıracak teknik çözümler
hazırlanmıştır. / Kritik sektörlerde yaşanan
güvenlik olaylarının bir merkezde toplanması
ve istatistik oluşturulabilmesi / Sektör içi ve
sektörler arası online bilgi paylaşım
platformlarının oluşturulmuş olması
3
1
1
3
1
1
1,67
İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber güvenlikle ilgili
bilgi paylaşımını koordine etmek üzere bir
kurumun
görevlendirilmiş
olması
/
Amerika’da her sektör için bir bilgi paylaşım
merkezi (ISAC- Information Sharing Center)
tesis edilmiştir. Bu merkezler aracılığı ile
sektör
oyuncuları
bilgi
paylaşımında
bulunabilmektedir. Bu gibi merkezlerin
varlığı,
3
1
2
2
0
2
1,67
Kritik altyapı programında özel sektöre
verilmiş somut görevlerin varlığı
0
2
2
2
2
2
1,67
Kritik teknolojilerin hızlı tedarik edilebilmesi
için yasa değişikliği / Kamu İhale Kanununda
teknik satın almaları kolaylaştırıcı, kaliteli
ürün alınmasını sağlayıcı düzenlemelerin
yapılmış olması
2
2
2
2
0
2
1,67
Ürün güvenliği ile ilgili standartların belirli
olması
3
2
1
2
1
1
1,67
İç denetim birimlerinde IT denetim bilgi
birikimine sahip personel sayısı
2
2
1
2
2
1
1,67
Denetim sonuçlarının ciddi yaptırımlarının
olması (örneğin lisans iptali veya iş alanının
kısıtlanmasına kadar gidebilmelidir)
3
1
1
3
2
0
1,67
Kurumsal bilgi güvenliği politikasının varlığı
1
1
1
3
3
1
1,67
Kurumsal yönetimsel toplantı tutanaklarında
siber güvenlik ile ilgili kararların bulunması
2
1
1
2
3
1
1,67
Her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için
oluşturulmuş siber güvenliği de sorumluluk
alanı olarak tanımlamış denetleyici /
düzenleyici kurum yapılanmasının varlığı
0
2
2
3
1
1
1,50
Bilgi paylaşım yükümlülükleri kanun ve
yönetmeliklerle tespit edilmiş kurumsal,
sektörel CERT’lerin varlığı
2
1
1
1
2
2
1,50
Ulusal siber güvenlik tatbikatlarına özel
sektörün kapsamlı bir şekilde katılıyor olması
1
1
1
3
2
1
1,50
Sektör spesifik bilgi sistemleri tasarımı ve
kurulumu için teknik kılavuzlar
2
1
1
2
2
1
1,50
Sadece siber güvenlik üzerine çalışan kişi
sayısının oranının belirli bir değerden fazla
olması
2
2
1
2
0
1
1,33
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Principles
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average
Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde sadece siber
güvenliğe ilişkin kadroların varlığı
2
2
0
2
0
2
1,33
IT denetim Planlarının varlığı
0
1
1
3
2
1
1,33
Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için
yöneticilere odaklı bilgilendirme faaliyetleri
(konferans, hacking yarışması, seminer,
eğitim v.s. ) / Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin
tepe yöneticilerine bilgilendirme eğitimleri
düzenli olarak verilmektedir.
2
0
1
3
1
1
1,33
Ulusal CSIRT (USOM) üzerinden yapılan
bilgi paylaşımının varlığı
2
1
1
0
2
1
1,17
Özel sektörün siber güvenlik kurulu gibi
yapılanmaların daimi üyesi olması
1
2
1
0
1
2
1,17
Hâlihazırdaki önemli yasaların kritik gözden
geçirmesinin yapılmış olması (critical review
of the current laws)
2
3
1
0
1
0
1,17
Kurumsal siber güvenlik metriklerinin
belirlenmiş olması, metriklerin hesaplanması
ve raporlanması
2
0
0
2
2
1
1,17
Siber güvenlikle ilgili kurumsal sorumlu
kişilerin belirlenmesi
2
0
0
3
1
1
1,17
Yöneticilerin bir denetim mekanizması
oluşturması
1
0
1
3
1
1
1,17
Üst düzey karar alıcıların (başbakan, bakan
vb.) siber güvenlik danışmanı olması
0
0
2
1
0
1,00
3
Özel sektörü teşvik edici maddi çözümler
(vergi
muafiyeti,
kamunun
teknik
imkânlarından ücretsiz faydalanma, ulusal
siber güvenlik kurumlarından ücretsiz
danışmanlık alınması vb.) yürürlüktedir. /
Özel sektörün çalışmalara katılması için
devlet ve sektör işletmecileri tarafından maddi
kaynak ayrılması
3
0
1
0
1
1
1,00
Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan
memurların memnuniyet oranlarının belirli bir
değerden yukarıda olması
1
1
1
1
1
1
1,00
Eğitim veren yerler için devlet tarafından
teşvik verilmesi
3
1
1
0
0
1
1,00
Özel sektörün siber saldırılara ilişkin gerçek
verileri paylaşmaktan imtina etmesini
engelleyecek yasal düzenlemelerin varlığı
0
0
1
0
2
2
0,83
Özel sektörün siber güvenlik önlemlerini ilave
masraf olarak görerek uygulamamasının
önüne geçerek Yasal düzenlemelerin varlığı
0
0
2
0
2
1
0,83
Geliştirme yapacak personelin teknik
olgunluğu
ölçülmekte
ve
gerekli
görüldüğünde
zorunlu
eğitime
gönderilmektedir.
2
0
0
1
1
1
0,83
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Principles
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average
Kamuda üst düzey yöneticilerin siber
güvenlik farkındalık eğitimi almış olması
1
0
1
1
1
0
0,67
Bilgileri gizliliğine göre sınıflandırmakta
kullanılan, bu sınıflandırmaya göre de bilginin
paylaşımı ile ilgili kuralların belirlenmesinde
rol oynayan bir veri koruma kanununun
varlığı
1
1
0
0
2
0
0,67
Sektör içi ve sektörler arası organizasyonların
(konferans, workshop vb) varlığı
1
0
0
1
1
1
0,67
Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu,
özel sektör (hem vendor hem de işletmeci) ve
kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de regülatör) bir
araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak
yapılıyor olması
1
0
0
1
1
1
0,67
Özel sektörü temsil eden sivil inisiyatif
gruplarının var olması ve aktif faaliyetler
yapması
0
0
0
3
0
1
0,67
Risk yönetim süreci işletimiyle ilgili
kayıtların varlığı
1
0
0
2
0
1
0,67
Konunun önemine dikkat çekmek için
bilgilendirme faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking
yarışması, seminer, eğitim v.s. )
2
0
1
0
1
0
0,67
Siber güvenlik alanında insan kaynağı
geliştirilmesini
koordine
etmekle
görevli/sorumlu kurum ya da kurul gibi bir
yapının varlığı
0
0
1
0
0
2
0,50
İşletmecilerle ürün sağlayıcılar arasında
güvenlikle ilgili sorunların iletildiği kanalların
oluşturulup oluşturulmadığı
0
0
0
3
0
0
0,50
Ürün/hizmet sağlayıcılarını bilgilendirici ve
katılım
zorunluluğu
olan
eğitim/konferans/seminer
vb.
faaliyetler
yapılmaktadır. / İşletmeciler ve ürün/hizmet
sağlayıcıların katılacağı sektör spesifik
tatbikatlar ve konferansların varlığı
1
0
0
1
0
1
0,50
Genel sektörel durumun ölçümlendiği bir bilgi
toplama mekanizmasının varlığı ve işlerliği
0
0
0
3
0
0
0,50
Denetimlerin yapılması ve çıktılarının
merkezi bir ortamda toplanıp düzenli olarak
değerlendirilmesine imkan sağlayan teknik
çözümler devreye alınmıştır.
1
0
0
2
0
0
0,50
Operatörlerin iş geliştirme ve tasarım
süreçlerinde güvenlik farkındalığı düzenli
olarak ölçülmektedir.
1
0
1
0
1
0
0,50
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Principles
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average
Personel
sayısının
yetersiz
kaldığı
durumlarda, yabancı memur ve işçi alımının
önünü
açacak
yasal
düzenlemeler
yürürlüktedir. Bunun için klerans çıkarılması
gibi
güvenlik
soruşturmaları
devreye
alınmıştır
1
0
1
0
0
0
0,33
Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin ürün/hizmet
sağlayıcıları ile bir araya gelebildikleri sivil
toplum örgütleri vardır
0
0
0
2
0
0
0,33
Kritik altyapılarda Siber Güvenlik konulu,
özel sektör (hem vendor hem de işletmeci) ve
kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de regülatör) bir
araya geldiği etkinliklerin düzenli olarak
yapılıyor olması
1
0
0
1
0
0
0,33
Siber güvenlik tatbikatlarındaki takımların
başarı durumu
1
0
0
0
0
0
0,17
Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak çalışan
memurların ürünlerden memnuniyet oranı
0
0
0
0
0
0
0,00
Round-4: Controlled Opinion Feedback
We are in the last round of the Delphi survey. In this round, I have organized the criteria
according to their arithmetic averages, from the highest to the lowest.
As it was in the third round, I would like you to review your grades (weights of the
principles) in the face of those of others. And again as in the third round, your grades are in
the Points-x column.
Additionally, I would like you to evaluate your zero points for the criteria with an average of
one or higher. The important matter in the Delphi survey is the consensus of the experts.
Therefore, I will not include the criteria with at least one zero weight in the maturity model
as the situation shows that there has been no consensus on those criteria. Please look at your
zero points once more and if you still insist on a zero weight, please send me your reason not
to give at least one point for them. When you are one of the few experts with zero points,
you can see that the related parts are shaded gray.
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Round-4: Output
Root Causes

Principles

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

1. Siber tehditleri dikkate alan bir
kritik
altyapıların
korunması
programının (CIPP) varlığı
2. Ulusal güvenlikten sorumlusu
kurum ve kuruluşların aynı
zamanda kritik altyapıları siber
tehditlere
karşı
koruma
sorumlulukları olması (ABD’de
DHS örneği) / Kritik altyapıların
siber
güvenliğinden
kanunen
sorumlu
kurum
ile
ulusal
güvenlikten sorumlu kurum ve
kuruluşlar
arasında
eşgüdüm
mekanizmalarının
oluşturulmuş
olması / Önemli karar alma
mekanizmalarında
(Başkanlık,
başbakanlık, MGK gibi) siber
The cyber
güvenlikle ilgili bir birimin olması
security of
(bilgi işlem içindeki kuruma iç
critical
hizmet
veren
birimi
infrastructures kastetmiyorum) / Siber Güvenlik
is not
Kurulu
Başkanının
MGK
perceived by
toplantısına
(benzeri)
zaman
national
zaman katılması
security
3. Devletin en üst düzey
authorities as a
yöneticilerinin siber güvenlik
vital part of
konusunda ciddi uzmanlığa sahip
national
danışmanları bulunmaktadır. Bu
security.
danışmanlar teknik, hukuki ve
uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında
gerekli ve yeterli bilgilendirmeleri
yapmaktadır.
4. Kamuda üst düzey yöneticilerin
siber güvenlik farkındalık eğitimi
almış olması
5. Kritik altyapıların siber
tehditlerden
korunması
çalışmalarına
özel
olarak
belirlenmiş yıllık bütçenin varlığı
6. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörü
için oluşturulmuş siber güvenliği
de sorumluluk alanı olarak
tanımlamış
denetleyici
/
düzenleyici kurum yapılanmasının
varlığı
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Root Causes

The culture of
information
sharing,
collaboration
and
cooperation
within the
critical sectors
and among the
sectors is very
limited.

Principles

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

7. Ülkedeki her bir kritik altyapı
sektörü için BDDK’nın yaptığına
benzer, sektör spesifik kanuni siber
güvenlik düzenlemelerinin varlığı
8. Kritik altyapıların ihtiyaçları
dikkate alınarak kurulmuş bir
CERT yapılanmasının varlığı
(ABD’deki ICS-CERT örneği)
9.
Kritik
altyapıları
ulusal
güvenliğinin bir parçası olarak
değerlendiren bir ulusal Siber
Güvenlik Stratejisinin varlığı
10. Sektör spesifik (sektörel) veya
tüm kritik altyapıları içine alan risk
yönetimi sürecinin veya teknik
kılavuz, dokümantasyonun varlığı
1. Devlet tarafından geliştirilip
desteklenen
public-private
partnership programının varlığı
2. Bilgileri gizliliğine göre
sınıflandırmakta kullanılan, bu
sınıflandırmaya göre de bilginin
paylaşımı ile ilgili kuralların
belirlenmesinde rol oynayan bir
veri koruma kanununun varlığı
3. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası
belirlenmiş
bilgi
paylaşımı
kurallarının
varlığı
/
Bilgi
paylaşımı ve işbirliği için mevzuat
altyapısının
varlığı
/
İlgili
kuruluşlar
arasında
siber
güvenlikle ilgili bilgi paylaşımı
esaslarının belirlenip yayınlanmış
olması
4. Bilgi paylaşım yükümlülükleri
kanun ve yönetmeliklerle tespit
edilmiş
kurumsal,
sektörel
CERT’lerin varlığı
5. Kurulmuş bir Ulusal CERT’in
varlığı ve bunun uluslararası
CERT’lerle
işbirliği
sağlıyor
olması.
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Root Causes

Principles

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

The private
sector is not
perceived by
the
government
and critical
infrastructure

6. Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için
teknik altyapının varlığı / Bilgi
paylaşımı
ve
işbirliğini
kolaylaştıracak teknik çözümler
hazırlanmıştır. / Kritik sektörlerde
yaşanan güvenlik olaylarının bir
merkezde toplanması ve istatistik
oluşturulabilmesi / Sektör içi ve
sektörler arası online bilgi
paylaşım
platformlarının
oluşturulmuş olması
7. İlgili kuruluşlar arasında siber
güvenlikle ilgili bilgi paylaşımını
koordine etmek üzere bir kurumun
görevlendirilmiş
olması
/
Amerika’da her sektör için bir
bilgi paylaşım merkezi (ISACInformation Sharing Center) tesis
edilmiştir. Bu merkezler aracılığı
ile
sektör
oyuncuları
bilgi
paylaşımında bulunabilmektedir.
Bu gibi merkezlerin varlığı,
8. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası
organizasyonların
(konferans,
workshop vb) varlığı
9. Ulusal CSIRT (USOM)
üzerinden
yapılan
bilgi
paylaşımının varlığı
10. Ulusal CSIRT'in kritik
altyapılara
yönelik
yapılan
ihbarları koordine etmesi, ilgili
operatörlere eşgüdüm içerisinde
çalışması
11. Özel sektörün siber saldırılara
ilişkin
gerçek
verileri
paylaşmaktan imtina etmesini
engelleyecek yasal düzenlemelerin
varlığı
1. Özel sektörü siber güvenlik
alanında önemli bir oyuncu
yapacak politika ve stratejilerin
varlığı
2. Kritik altyapı programında özel
sektöre verilmiş somut görevlerin
varlığı
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Root Causes

Principles

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

3. Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisi
ya da sektörel strateji hazırlık
aşamalarında özel sektörün de
katkısının alınması
4. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik
kurulu gibi yapılanmaların daimi
üyesi olması
5. Girişimcilik, araştırma ve
geliştirme faaliyetleri için devletin
liderlik
yapması
/
Devlet
tarafından
öncelikli
alanların
belirlenmiş olması özel sektörün
bu alanlara sevk edilmesi
6. Özel sektörü teşvik edici maddi
çözümler
(vergi
muafiyeti,
kamunun teknik imkânlarından
ücretsiz faydalanma, ulusal siber
güvenlik kurumlarından ücretsiz
danışmanlık
alınması
vb.)
yürürlüktedir. / Özel sektörün
çalışmalara katılması için devlet ve
sektör işletmecileri tarafından
maddi kaynak ayrılması
7. Kritik altyapılarda Siber
Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem
vendor hem de işletmeci) ve
kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de
regülatör) bir araya geldiği
etkinliklerin
düzenli
olarak
yapılıyor olması
8. Özel sektörü temsil eden sivil
inisiyatif gruplarının var olması ve
aktif faaliyetler yapması
9.
Ulusal
siber
güvenlik
tatbikatlarına
özel
sektörün
kapsamlı bir şekilde katılıyor
olması
10. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik
önlemlerini ilave masraf olarak
görerek uygulamamasının önüne
geçerek Yasal düzenlemelerin
varlığı
The laws of 1. Hâlihazırdaki önemli yasaların
public
kritik
gözden
geçirmesinin
procurements yapılmış olması (critical review of
and
civil the current laws)
operators as an
important
stakeholder in
national cyber
security
efforts.
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Root Causes

Principles

2. Yetkin personeli yüksek maaşla
çalıştırmak
için
imkanların
(sözleşmeli
personel,
özel
firmadan personel kiralama) tesis
edilmiş olması / Sözleşmeli
personel çalıştırma, outsource
hizmet alımı ve personel kiralama
için yapılmış düzenlemeler /
Kaliteli
personel
alınmasını
kolaylaştırıcı mevzuat hazırlanmış
olması (Yüksek maaş ve geniş
imkanlar vb.)/ Kritik altyapı
işletmecilerinde çalışacak bilgi
işlem
ve
siber
güvenlik
personeline daha cazip ücretlerin
verilmesi
için
yapılmış
düzenlemeler
3. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak
çalışan memurların memnuniyet
oranlarının belirli bir değerden
yukarıda olması
4. Kritik teknolojilerin hızlı tedarik
edilebilmesi için yasa değişikliği /
Kamu İhale Kanununda teknik
satın
almaları
kolaylaştırıcı,
kaliteli ürün alınmasını sağlayıcı
düzenlemelerin yapılmış olması
5. Devlette güvenlik uzmanı olarak
çalışan memurların ürünlerden
memnuniyet oranı
1. Ulusal seviyede kapasite
geliştirme çalışmalarının varlığı /
Devletin genel olarak ya da
spesifik sektörlerin siber işgücü
geliştirme stratejisi/planının olması
2. Siber güvenlik alanında insan
The number of kaynağı geliştirilmesini koordine
qualified cyber etmekle görevli/sorumlu kurum ya
da kurul gibi bir yapının varlığı
security
experts is
3. Sadece siber güvenlik üzerine
limited.
çalışan kişi sayısının oranının
belirli bir değerden fazla olması
4. Sertifikalı devlet çalışanlarının
oranı / Uluslararası geçerliliği olan
sertifikaların kamu kurumları
tarafından işe alımda tercih
edilmesi
158

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

servants have
adverse effects
on the cyber
security
of
governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.
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Root Causes

Principles

5. Siber güvenlik tatbikatlarındaki
takımların başarı durumu
6. Siber güvenlik eğitimleri veren
özel,
kamu
ve
akademik
kurumların sayısı ve kalitesi /
Özellikle sektöre yönelik eğitim
veren kurumların varlığı ve
fazlalığı
7. Eğitim veren yerler için devlet
tarafından teşvik verilmesi
8. Tüm eğitim seviyelerinde
(ilkokuldan doktoraya) BT ve siber
güvenlik konularında müfredatın
olması / Siber güvenlik eğitimi
veren akademik kurumlar yeterli
sayıda olması
9. Personel sayısının yetersiz
kaldığı
durumlarda,
yabancı
memur ve işçi alımının önünü
açacak
yasal
düzenlemeler
yürürlüktedir. Bunun için klerans
çıkarılması
gibi
güvenlik
soruşturmaları devreye alınmıştır
10. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde
sadece siber güvenliğe ilişkin
kadroların varlığı
1. Özel sektörden kabul edilebilir
hizmet
alma
standartlarının
belirlenmesi / Kritik altyapı
operatörlerinin uyacağı sektörel
veya ulusal seviye dış hizmet /
The
ürün alım kuralları
relationship
2. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin
management
dışardan IT hizmeti aldıkları
practices with
kuruluşlarla
ilişkilerini
hangi
the
esaslara
göre
yöneteceklerini
product/servic
belirleyen bir mevzuat olmalı /
e providers are
ABD’de sağlık sektöründe çok sıkı
insufficient in
takip edilen FDA yükümlülükleri
governmental
benzeri, kamuya alınacak her türlü
critical
ürün ve hizmetin çok sıkı regüle
infrastructure
edilmesine yönelik düzenlemeler
operators.
yapılmıştır
3. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin IT
hizmeti alacakları kuruluşları
akredite eden bir sistem kurulmuş
olmalı
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Root Causes

The IT audit
mechanism is
very limited or
does not exist
in
governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.

Principles

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

4. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin
ürün/hizmet sağlayıcıları ile bir
araya gelebildikleri sivil toplum
örgütleri vardır
5. İşletmecilerle ürün sağlayıcılar
arasında
güvenlikle
ilgili
sorunların iletildiği kanalların
oluşturulup oluşturulmadığı
6. Ürün güvenliği ile ilgili
standartların belirli olması
7. Ürün/hizmet sağlayıcılarını
bilgilendirici
ve
katılım
zorunluluğu
olan
eğitim/konferans/seminer
vb.
faaliyetler
yapılmaktadır.
/
İşletmeciler
ve
ürün/hizmet
sağlayıcıların katılacağı sektör
spesifik
tatbikatlar
ve
konferansların varlığı
1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin
uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal iç/dış
tetkik kurallarının varlığı / Kritik
altyapı
işletmecilerinin
BT
denetim
mekanizmalarına
uyumluluğu yasal zorunluluk ile
düzenlenmiştir.
2. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün
regülatör kuruluşu sektördeki
işletmecilere düzenli olarak BT
denetimi (siber güvenliği de
kapsayacak şekilde) yapar / Her
sektörün üst kurulunun mevzuat ile
denetim yapması
3. İç denetim birimlerinde IT
denetim bilgi birikimine sahip
personel sayısı
4. IT denetim Planlarının varlığı
5. Genel sektörel durumun
ölçümlendiği bir bilgi toplama
mekanizmasının varlığı ve işlerliği
6. Denetimlerin yapılması ve
çıktılarının merkezi bir ortamda
toplanıp
düzenli
olarak
değerlendirilmesine
imkan
sağlayan teknik çözümler devreye
alınmıştır.
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Root Causes

The managers
of
governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners do not
perceive
the
information
security as an
area
of
responsibility.

The
methodical
and formal risk
management
process is not
conducted by
governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners.

Principles
7. Denetim sonuçlarının ciddi
yaptırımlarının olması (örneğin
lisans iptali veya iş alanının
kısıtlanmasına
kadar
gidebilmelidir)
1. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin
siber güvenliğinden doğrudan
kurum yöneticilerini sorumlu tutan
düzenlemelerin varlığı
2. Kurumsal bilgi güvenliği
politikasının varlığı
3. Kurumsal yönetimsel toplantı
tutanaklarında siber güvenlik ile
ilgili kararların bulunması
4. Kurumsal siber güvenlik
metriklerinin belirlenmiş olması,
metriklerin
hesaplanması
ve
raporlanması
5.
Bu
yöneticilerin
görev
tanımlarında
siber
güvenlik
sorumluluğu
net
olarak
tanımlanmıştır.
6. Konunun önemine dikkat
çekmek için yöneticilere odaklı
bilgilendirme
faaliyetleri
(konferans, hacking yarışması,
seminer, eğitim v.s. ) / Kritik
altyapı
işletmecilerinin
tepe
yöneticilerine
bilgilendirme
eğitimleri
düzenli
olarak
verilmektedir.
7. Siber güvenlikle ilgili kurumsal
sorumlu kişilerin belirlenmesi
8. Yöneticilerin bir denetim
mekanizması oluşturması
1. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin
uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal risk
yönetimi kurallarının varlığı /
Kritik altyapı işletmelerinde yazılı
bir risk yönetim süreci, tabi
oldukları mevzuat düzenlenerek
zorunlu kılınmıştır. / Kritik altyapı
işletmecilerine
yönelik
risk
yönetimi ve BGYS konularında
yaptırım getiren kanuni düzenleme
ve düzenleyici kurulun buna göre
denetimi
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W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

3

1

1

2

2

2

1,83

3

3

3

3

2

3

2,83

1

0

1

3

3

1

1,50

2

0

1

2

2

1

1,33

2

0

0

2

2

1

1,17

1

0

2

3

2

2

1,67

2

0

1

2

1

1

1,17

2

0

0

3

1

0

1,00

1

0

1

3

1

1

1,17

3

3

3

3

3

3

3,00

Root Causes

Security
is
considered by
governmental
critical
infrastructure
owners as an
add-on and not
as a design
construct.

Principles

W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 Average

2. Kritik altyapı işletmecileri için
ISO 27001 gibi bir güvenlik
standardı zorunluluğu olması
3. Kurumlarda siber güvenliği de
kapsayan tanımlı bir risk yönetim
sürecinin var olması
4. Risk yönetim süreci işletimiyle
ilgili kayıtların varlığı
5. Konunun önemine dikkat
çekmek
için
bilgilendirme
faaliyetleri (konferans, hacking
yarışması, seminer, eğitim v.s. )
1. Mevzuat ile zorunlu tutulan
sektörel / ulusal minimum
güvenlik önlemlerinin varlığı /
Kritik
altyapı
işletmelerinin
uyması
gereken
minimum
güvenlik
önemleri
önlemleri
dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
2. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde
kurulacak bilgi sistemleri için
mevzuatta düzenleme getirilmesi /
Güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması
yasal olarak zorlanmaktadır.
3. Sektör spesifik bilgi sistemleri
tasarımı ve kurulumu için teknik
kılavuzlar
4.
Sektör
bazlı
güvenlik
standartlarının oluşturulmuş ve
yayınlanmış olması
5. Kritik altyapılarda Siber
Güvenlik konulu, özel sektör (hem
vendor hem de işletmeci) ve
kamunun (hem işletmeci hem de
regülatör) bir araya geldiği
etkinliklerin
düzenli
olarak
yapılıyor olması
6. Operatörlerin iş geliştirme ve
tasarım süreçlerinde güvenlik
farkındalığı
düzenli
olarak
ölçülmektedir.
7. Geliştirme yapacak personelin
teknik olgunluğu ölçülmekte ve
gerekli görüldüğünde zorunlu
eğitime gönderilmektedir.
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0
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0
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1
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Round-5: Input
No
1

Türkçe
A. Siber tehditleri dikkate alan bir kritik altyapıların
korunması programı (CIPP) var mıdır?

2

B.

3

C.

4

D.

5

E.

6

F.

7

G.

8

H.

9

I.

English
1) A Critical Infrastructure
Protection Program (CIPP)
that considers cyber threats
Ulusal güvenlikten sorumlusu kurum ve kuruluşların aynı 2) The management of the
CIPP by a governmental
zamanda kritik altyapıları siber tehditlere karşı koruma
organization which has
sorumlulukları olması (ABD’de DHS örneği) / Kritik
responsibilities on national
altyapıların siber güvenliğinden kanunen sorumlu kurum
security as well OR the
ile ulusal güvenlikten sorumlu kurum ve kuruluşlar
communication between
arasında eşgüdüm mekanizmalarının oluşturulmuş olması /
CIPP body and national
Önemli karar alma mekanizmalarında (Başkanlık,
security body
başbakanlık, MGK gibi) siber güvenlikle ilgili bir birimin
olması (bilgi işlem içindeki kuruma iç hizmet veren birimi
kastetmiyorum) / Siber Güvenlik Kurulu Başkanının MGK
toplantısına (benzeri) zaman zaman katılması
Devletin en üst düzey yöneticilerinin siber güvenlik
3) The existence of the staff
who provides technical,
konusunda ciddi uzmanlığa sahip danışmanları
regulatory and diplomatic
bulunmaktadır. Bu danışmanlar teknik, hukuki ve
cyber security consultancy
uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında gerekli ve yeterli
to the head of the state
bilgilendirmeleri yapmaktadır.
Kritik altyapıların siber tehditlerden korunması
4) The dedicated budget to
critical infrastructure
çalışmalarına özel olarak belirlenmiş yıllık bütçenin varlığı
protection efforts
Her bir kritik altyapı sektörü için oluşturulmuş siber
5) The regulatory and
supervision agencies for
güvenliği de sorumluluk alanı olarak tanımlamış
each critical sector that
denetleyici / düzenleyici kurum yapılanmasının varlığı
control and direct the
critical infrastructure
owners on cyber security
Kritik altyapıların ihtiyaçları dikkate alınarak kurulmuş bir 6) CSIRT organization
dedicated to the protection
CERT yapılanmasının varlığı (ABD’deki ICS-CERT
of the critical
örneği)
infrastructures
Kritik altyapıları ulusal güvenliğinin bir parçası olarak
7) Up-to-date National cyber
security strategy that
değerlendiren bir ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisinin varlığı
considers cyber security of
critical infrastructures as
part of national security
Sektör spesifik (sektörel) veya tüm kritik altyapıları içine 8) Nation-wide or sector-wide
risk analysis and risk
alan risk yönetimi sürecinin veya teknik kılavuz,
management activities
dokümantasyonun varlığı
Devlet tarafından geliştirilip desteklenen public-private
9) Public-private partnership
program which is
partnership programının varlığı
developed and supported by
the government
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No Türkçe
English
10 J. Sektör içi ve sektörler arası belirlenmiş bilgi paylaşımı
10) Regulation that specifies
the inter/intra sector
kurallarının varlığı / Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için
information sharing and
mevzuat altyapısının varlığı / İlgili kuruluşlar arasında
cooperation principals
siber güvenlikle ilgili bilgi paylaşımı esaslarının belirlenip
yayınlanmış olması
11 K. Bilgi paylaşım yükümlülükleri kanun ve yönetmeliklerle 11) Sector based CSIRTs that
have information sharing
tespit edilmiş kurumsal, sektörel CERT’lerin varlığı
responsibilities determined
by the regulations
12 L. Kurulmuş bir Ulusal CERT’in varlığı ve bunun uluslararası 12) National CSIRT and the
international cooperation of
CERT’lerle işbirliği sağlıyor olması.
the National CSIRT with
other CSIRTs
13 M. Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliği için teknik altyapının varlığı / 13) The technical setup to
fulfill the inter/intra sector
Bilgi paylaşımı ve işbirliğini kolaylaştıracak teknik
information sharing needs
çözümler hazırlanmıştır. / Kritik sektörlerde yaşanan
(online information sharing
güvenlik olaylarının bir merkezde toplanması ve istatistik
portals, statistics
oluşturulabilmesi / Sektör içi ve sektörler arası online bilgi
dashboards, data collections
paylaşım platformlarının oluşturulmuş olması
centers)
14 N. Ulusal CSIRT'in kritik altyapılara yönelik yapılan ihbarları 14) National CSIRT that
coordinates the cyber
koordine etmesi, ilgili operatörlere eşgüdüm içerisinde
incidents related to critical
çalışması
infrastructures by including
the relevant sectorial
CSIRTs and critical
infrastructure owners as
needed
15 O. Özel sektörü siber güvenlik alanında önemli bir oyuncu
15) The government policies
that position private sector
yapacak politika ve stratejilerin varlığı
as a key player in national
cyber security efforts
16 P. Ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisi ya da sektörel strateji
16) The participation of the
private sector in preparation
hazırlık aşamalarında özel sektörün de katkısının alınması
of the national or sectorial
cyber security strategies
(Should the principle-16
be chosen as a unique
principle or considered as
a part of the principle15?)
PRINCIPLE-1
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No
17

Türkçe
Q. Özel sektörün siber güvenlik kurulu gibi yapılanmaların
daimi üyesi olması

18

R. Girişimcilik, araştırma ve geliştirme faaliyetleri için
devletin liderlik yapması / Devlet tarafından öncelikli
alanların belirlenmiş olması özel sektörün bu alanlara sevk
edilmesi

19

S. Ulusal siber güvenlik tatbikatlarına özel sektörün kapsamlı
bir şekilde katılıyor olması

20

T. Hâlihazırdaki önemli yasaların kritik gözden geçirmesinin
yapılmış olması (critical review of the current laws)

21

U. Yetkin personeli yüksek maaşla çalıştırmak için imkanların
(sözleşmeli personel, özel firmadan personel kiralama)
tesis edilmiş olması / Sözleşmeli personel çalıştırma,
outsource hizmet alımı ve personel kiralama için yapılmış
düzenlemeler / Kaliteli personel alınmasını kolaylaştırıcı
mevzuat hazırlanmış olması (Yüksek maaş ve geniş
imkanlar vb.)/ Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinde çalışacak
bilgi işlem ve siber güvenlik personeline daha cazip
ücretlerin verilmesi için yapılmış düzenlemeler

22

V. Ulusal seviyede kapasite geliştirme çalışmalarının varlığı /
Devletin genel olarak ya da spesifik sektörlerin siber
işgücü geliştirme stratejisi/planının olması
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English
17) The permanent seat of
private sector at the
national boards like cyber
security council (Should
the principle-17 be chosen
as a unique principle or
considered as a part of the
principle-15?)
PRINCIPLE-2
18) The government leadership
for the identification of the
priority areas in cyber
security, innovation, and
research & development
19) The participation of the
private sector in the
national cyber security
exercises extensively
(Should the principle-19
be chosen as a unique
principle or considered as
a part of the principle15?)
PRINCIPLE-3
20) Critical review and update
of the existing legislation
especially for governmental
critical infrastructure
operators
21) Making amendments to
regulations so that
outsourced personnel /
qualified government
officials with higher
salaries / contracted
personnel can be hired in
governmental critical
infrastructures (Should the
principle-21 be chosen as
a unique principle or
considered as a part of the
principle-20?)
PRINCIPLE-4
22) National capacity building
efforts such as the existence
of national / sectorial plans
and strategies on cyber
security capacity building

No Türkçe
English
23 W. Sertifikalı devlet çalışanlarının oranı / Uluslararası
23) The requirement of the
internationally accepted
geçerliliği olan sertifikaların kamu kurumları tarafından işe
certificates in the
alımda tercih edilmesi
recruitments at the critical
infrastructure owners
24 X. Siber güvenlik eğitimleri veren özel, kamu ve akademik
24) Qualified cyber security
training institutions
kurumların sayısı ve kalitesi / Özellikle sektöre yönelik
(private, academic or
eğitim veren kurumların varlığı ve fazlalığı
governmental) dedicated to
the critical infrastructure
operators
25 Y. Tüm eğitim seviyelerinde (ilkokuldan doktoraya) BT ve
25) Cyber security and IT
curriculum for all levels of
siber güvenlik konularında müfredatın olması / Siber
the education from
güvenlik eğitimi veren akademik kurumlar yeterli sayıda
elementary schools to
olması
universities
26 Z. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde sadece siber güvenliğe ilişkin 26) The dedicated cyber
security personnel at critical
kadroların varlığı
infrastructure operators
27 AA. Özel sektörden kabul edilebilir hizmet alma
27) National / sectorial product
and service procurement
standartlarının belirlenmesi / Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin
standards or rules for
uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal seviye dış hizmet / ürün alım
critical infrastructure
kuralları
operators
28 BB. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin dışardan IT hizmeti aldıkları 28) Regulation that specifies
the fundamentals of the
kuruluşlarla ilişkilerini hangi esaslara göre yöneteceklerini
relations with third parties
belirleyen bir mevzuat olmalı / ABD’de sağlık sektöründe
(Is the principle-28 same
çok sıkı takip edilen FDA yükümlülükleri benzeri, kamuya
as the principle-27 or are
alınacak her türlü ürün ve hizmetin çok sıkı regüle
they different?)
edilmesine yönelik düzenlemeler yapılmıştır
PRINCIPLE-5
29 CC. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin IT hizmeti alacakları
29) The certification of IT
companies that are eligible
kuruluşları akredite eden bir sistem kurulmuş olmalı
for IT service procurements
by critical infrastructure
operators
30 DD. Ürün güvenliği ile ilgili standartların belirli olması
30) The security standards for
the IT products to be used
by critical infrastructure
operators
31 EE. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal 31) The national or sectorial
regulations that enforce the
iç/dış tetkik kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı
internal / external audit for
işletmecilerinin BT denetim mekanizmalarına uyumluluğu
critical infrastructure
yasal zorunluluk ile düzenlenmiştir.
operators
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No
32

33

34

35

36

37

38

Türkçe
English
FF. Her bir kritik altyapı sektörünün regülatör kuruluşu
32) The regular cyber security
audits for critical
sektördeki işletmecilere düzenli olarak BT denetimi (siber
infrastructure operators
güvenliği de kapsayacak şekilde) yapar / Her sektörün üst
performed by the regulatory
kurulunun mevzuat ile denetim yapması
agencies of the sectors
GG. İç denetim birimlerinde IT denetim bilgi birikimine
33) The experienced IT auditors
who are employed within
sahip personel sayısı
the internal audit units of
the critical infrastructure
operators
HH. Denetim sonuçlarının ciddi yaptırımlarının olması
34) The sanctions imposed by
the regulatory agencies to
(örneğin lisans iptali veya iş alanının kısıtlanmasına kadar
the critical infrastructure
gidebilmelidir)
operators for the
nonconformities
II. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinin siber güvenliğinden doğrudan 35) The regulation that makes
top level management of
kurum yöneticilerini sorumlu tutan düzenlemelerin varlığı
the critical infrastructure
operators responsible for
the cyber security by
imposing information
security governance
JJ. Kritik altyapı işletmecilerinin uyacağı sektörel veya ulusal 36) The regulation that enforces
the cyber security risk
risk yönetimi kurallarının varlığı / Kritik altyapı
management process to be
işletmelerinde yazılı bir risk yönetim süreci, tabi oldukları
conducted by critical
mevzuat düzenlenerek zorunlu kılınmıştır. / Kritik altyapı
infrastructure owners
işletmecilerine yönelik risk yönetimi ve BGYS konularında
yaptırım getiren kanuni düzenleme ve düzenleyici kurulun
buna göre denetimi
KK. Kritik altyapı işletmecileri için ISO 27001 gibi bir
37) The obligation of a
comprehensive security
güvenlik standardı zorunluluğu olması
standard such as ISO 27001
for the critical infrastructure
owners (Should the
principle-37 be chosen as
a unique principle or
considered as a part of the
principle-40?)
PRINCIPLE-6
LL. Mevzuat ile zorunlu tutulan sektörel / ulusal minimum
38) Minimum security
countermeasures for the
güvenlik önlemlerinin varlığı / Kritik altyapı işletmelerinin
critical infrastructure
uyması gereken minimum güvenlik önemleri önlemleri
owners that are obliged by
dokümanı yayımlanmıştır
regulations
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No Türkçe
39 MM. Kritik altyapı operatörlerinde kurulacak bilgi sistemleri
için mevzuatta düzenleme getirilmesi / Güvenlik
tedbirlerinin alınması yasal olarak zorlanmaktadır.

40

41

English
39) The regulations for
information system and
security countermeasures to
be installed at critical
infrastructure operators
(Should the principle-39
chosen as a unique
principle or considered as
a part of the principle38?)
PRINCIPLE-7
NN. Sektör spesifik bilgi sistemleri tasarımı ve kurulumu için 40) Sector-specific technical
guidance documents for the
teknik kılavuzlar
secure design, set-up and
operation of the networks
of critical infrastructure
operators
OO. Sektör bazlı güvenlik standartlarının oluşturulmuş ve
41) The sectorial or national
security standard for critical
yayınlanmış olması
infrastructure operators that
sets outs the security best
practices for the sectors

Round -5: Controlled opinion feedback
Do you have comments on the English translations of the principles?
What is your answer for the questions in the second column of the rows of 16, 17, 19, 21, 28,
37, and 39?
Round -5: Output
Principle under Expert-1
consideration*

Expert-2

Expert-3

Expert-4

Expert-5

Expert-6

PRINCIPLE-1

Keep

Keep

Keep

Keep

Keep

Keep

PRINCIPLE-2

Hesitant

Discard

Keep

Keep

Keep

Keep

PRINCIPLE-3

Keep

Discard

Keep

Keep

Discard

Keep

PRINCIPLE-4

Keep

Discard

Keep

Keep

Keep

Keep

PRINCIPLE-5

Discard

Discard

Discard

Discard

Discard

Discard

PRINCIPLE-6

Keep

Keep

Keep

Keep

Keep

Hesitant

PRINCIPLE-7

Discard

Keep

Discard

Keep

Discard

Discard

* The descriptions of the principles are at the second column of the table under the section “Round-5:
Input”.
Selected principles: Principle-1, Principle-2, Principle-3, Principle-4, Principle-6, Principle-7
Discarded principle: Principle-5
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1. A Critical Infrastructure Protection
Program (CIPP) that considers cyber
threats

English Translation – Comments of the
Experts Reflected (Output of the Round-5)
1) A Critical Infrastructure Protection
Program (CIPP) that considers cyber
threats

2. The management of the CIPP by a
governmental organization which has
responsibilities on national security as
well OR the communication between
CIPP body and national security body

2) The management of the CIPP by a
governmental organization which has
responsibilities for the national security as
well / the communication between CIPP
and national security bodies

English Translation (Input of the Round-5)

3. The existence of the staff who provides
3) The existence of a consultant who
technical, regulatory and diplomatic cyber
provides technical, regulatory and
security consultancy to the head of the
diplomatic cyber security consultancy for
state
the head of the state
4. The dedicated budget to critical
infrastructure protection efforts

4) Budget allocated to critical infrastructure
protection efforts

5. The regulatory and supervision agencies
5) Regulatory agencies that set cyber
for each critical sector that control and
security regulations and check their
direct the critical infrastructure owners on
applications for each critical sector
cyber security
6. CSIRT organization dedicated to the
6) A CSIRT organization dedicated to the
protection of the critical infrastructures
protection of critical infrastructures
7. Up-to-date National cyber security
strategy that considers cyber security of
critical infrastructures as part of national
security
8. Nation-wide or sector-wide risk analysis
and risk management activities

7) A national cyber security strategy that
considers the cyber security of critical
infrastructures as part of national security
8) Nation-wide risk analysis and risk
management activities which cover all
critical sectors / sector-wide wide risk
analysis and risk management activities

9. Public-private partnership program which 9) A public-private partnership program
is developed and supported by the
which is developed and supported by the
government
government
10. Regulation that specifies the inter/intra
sector information sharing and
cooperation principals

10) Regulations that specify the inner - inter
sector information sharing and
cooperation principles

11. Sector based CSIRTs that have
information sharing responsibilities
determined by the regulations

11) Sector based CSIRTs that have
information sharing responsibilities
determined by the regulations
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English Translation (Input of the Round-5)
12. National CSIRT and the international
cooperation of the National CSIRT with
other CSIRTs

English Translation – Comments of the
Experts Reflected (Output of the Round-5)
12) The existence of an internationally
recognized National CSIRT that performs
international cooperation with other
CSIRTs

13. The technical setup to fulfill the inter/intra 13) A technical infrastructure to fulfill the
sector information sharing needs (online
inner - inter sector information sharing
information sharing portals, statistics
needs (online information sharing portals,
dashboards, data collections centers)
statistics dashboards, data collections
centers)
14. National CSIRT that coordinates the
cyber incidents related to critical
infrastructures by including the relevant
sectorial CSIRTs and critical
infrastructure owners as needed

14) A National CSIRT that handles the
warnings of cyber incidents related to
critical infrastructures by coordinating
with the relevant sectorial CSIRTs and
critical infrastructure owners when needed

15. The government policies that position
private sector as a key player in national
cyber security efforts

15) Government policies and strategies that
position private sector as a key player in
national cyber security efforts

16. The participation of the private sector in
preparation of the national or sectorial
cyber security strategies

16) The participation of the private sector in
the preparation of the national or sectorial
cyber security strategies

17. The permanent seat of private sector at the 17) Permanent seat for the private sector in
national boards like cyber security council
the national boards like the cyber security
council
18. The government leadership for the
18) Government leadership for innovation,
identification of the priority areas in cyber
research & development activities, and the
security, innovation, and research &
identification of the priority areas in cyber
development
security by the government
19. The participation of the private sector in
the national cyber security exercises
extensively

19) The extensive participation of the private
sector in the national cyber security
exercises

20. Critical review and update of the existing
legislation especially for governmental
critical infrastructure operators

20) Critical review and update of the existing
legislation that may affect critical
infrastructures (especially for the needs of
the governmental critical infrastructure
operators)
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English Translation – Comments of the
Experts Reflected (Output of the Round-5)
21. Making amendments to regulations so that 21) Making amendments to the regulations to
outsourced personnel / qualified
hire outsourced personnel / qualified
government officials with higher salaries /
government officials with higher salaries /
contracted personnel can be hired in
contracted personnel in governmental
governmental critical infrastructures
critical infrastructures
English Translation (Input of the Round-5)

22. National capacity building efforts such as 22) National capacity building plans and
the existence of national / sectorial plans
strategies
and strategies on cyber security capacity
building
23. The requirement of the internationally
23) Preference of the internationally accepted
accepted certificates in the recruitments at
certificate owners in the recruitments by
the critical infrastructure owners
critical infrastructure owners
24. Qualified cyber security training
institutions (private, academic or
governmental) dedicated to the critical
infrastructure operators

24) Qualified and sufficient number of cyber
security training institutions (private,
academic or governmental) that
support/train the personnel of critical
infrastructure operators

25. Cyber security and IT curriculum for all
levels of the education from elementary
schools to universities

25) Cyber security and IT curriculum for all
levels of the education, from elementary
schools to universities

26. The dedicated cyber security personnel at
critical infrastructure operators

26) Special positions for cyber security
experts in critical infrastructure operators

27. National / sectorial product and service
27) National / sectorial products and service
procurement standards or rules for critical
procurement standards or rules for critical
infrastructure operators
infrastructure operators
28. Regulation that specifies the fundamentals Discarded
of the relations with third parties
29. The certification of IT companies that are
eligible for IT service procurements by
critical infrastructure operators

28) The establishment of a system for the
eligibility certifications of the IT
companies to provide IT services for
critical infrastructure operators

30. The security standards for the IT products 29) Security standards for the IT products to
to be used by critical infrastructure
be used by critical infrastructure operators
operators
31. The national or sectorial regulations that 30) National or sectorial regulations that
enforce the internal / external audit for
enforce the internal / external audit for
critical infrastructure operators
critical infrastructure operators
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English Translation – Comments of the
Experts Reflected (Output of the Round-5)
32. The regular cyber security audits for
31) Regular cyber security audits performed
critical infrastructure operators performed
by the regulatory authorities of the sectors
by the regulatory agencies of the sectors
for critical infrastructure operators
English Translation (Input of the Round-5)

33. The experienced IT auditors who are
32) Experienced IT auditors who are
employed within the internal audit units of
employed within the internal audit units of
the critical infrastructure operators
critical infrastructure operators
34. The sanctions imposed by the regulatory
agencies to the critical infrastructure
operators for the nonconformities

33) Sanctions imposed by the regulatory
authorities on critical infrastructure
operators for the nonconformities

35. The regulation that makes top level
34) Regulations that render top level
management of the critical infrastructure
management of critical infrastructure
operators responsible for the cyber
operators responsible for cyber security
security by imposing information security
governance
36. The regulation that enforces the cyber
35) Regulations that enforce critical
security risk management process to be
infrastructure owners to conduct the cyber
conducted by critical infrastructure
security risk management process
owners
37. The obligation of a comprehensive
36) Obligation of a comprehensive security
security standard such as ISO 27001 for
standard, such as ISO 27001, for critical
the critical infrastructure owners
infrastructure owners
38. Minimum security countermeasures for
the critical infrastructure owners that are
obliged by regulations

37) Minimum security countermeasures that
are obliged by regulations for critical
infrastructure owners

39. The regulations for information system
38) Regulations that set out the properties of
and security countermeasures to be
information systems and security
installed at critical infrastructure operators
countermeasures that come into operation
in critical infrastructure operators
40. Sector-specific technical guidance
documents for the secure design, set-up
and operation of the networks of critical
infrastructure operators

39) Sector-specific technical guidance
documents for the secure design, set-up
and operation of the networks of critical
infrastructure operators

41. The sectorial or national security standard 40) Sectorial or national security standards
for critical infrastructure operators that
that set out the best security practices for
sets outs the security best practices for the
each critical sector
sectors
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Appendix B: Maturity Survey
Questionnaire Form
No Question

No action or very Partial Action (1)
limited action (0)

Comprehensive
Action (2)

1.

Is
there
a
Critical No CIPP
Infrastructure
Protection
Program (CIPP) that considers
cyber threats?

CIPP does not
consider
cyber
threats or consider
insufficiently.

CIPP
considers
cyber threats and
physical
threats
equally.

2.

Is the management of the
CIPP
performed
by
a
governmental
organization
which has responsibilities for
the national security as well? /
Is there the communication
between CIPP body and
national
security
body?
(Please answer the most
applicable one)

Critical
infrastructure
protection program
is managed by a
governmental
organization that
has
no
responsibility on
national security.
There is a weak
communication
path between two
bodies.

Yes, CIP program
is managed by a
governmental
organization that
has
the
responsibilities on
national security.
OR There is a
strong
communication
path between two
bodies.

3.

Is there a consultant who No
provides technical, regulatory
and diplomatic cyber security
consultancy for the head of the
state?

4.

Is there an allocated budget for No or very limited There
is
no
critical
infrastructure dedicated budget
dedicated budget;
protection efforts?
however
government gives
some funding to
the projects.

Dedicated
and
sufficient amount
of
budget
is
assigned
for
critical
infrastructure
protection
program.

5.

Are there regulatory agencies
that set cyber security
regulations and check the
application of them for each
critical sector?

There
is
comprehensive
direction on cyber
security.

There
is
no
assigned
responsibility.
There
is
no
communication.

There is no official There
is
a
appointment.
nationally
recognized staff.

No
regulatory There is limited
authority or no direction on cyber
cyber
security security.
regulation.
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No Question

No action or very Partial Action (1)
limited action (0)

Comprehensive
Action (2)

6.

Is there a CSIRT organization No
dedicated to the protection of
critical infrastructures?

Existing –national- There is dedicated
CSIRT performs CSIRT for critical
some
limited infrastructures.
efforts for critical
infrastructures.

7.

Is there a national cyber No
security strategy that considers
the cyber security of critical
infrastructures as part of
national security?

There is a national Yes
cyber
security
strategy, however
limited
consideration for
the cyber security
of
critical
infrastructures.

8.

Is there nation-wide risk No
analysis and risk management
activities which cover all
critical sectors? / is there
sector-wide risk analysis and
risk management activities?
(Please answer the most
applicable one)

There are limited There is periodic
action in some and formal nationsectors.
wide/sector wide
risk management
process.

9.

Is there a public-private
partnership program which is
developed and supported by
the government?

There is no publicprogram
partnership
program or any
apparent publicprivate partnership
practices.

There are some
practices; however
these are not the
result
of
a
program.

Yes, there is an
active
publicprivate partnership
program managed
by government.

10.

Are there regulations that There is no rule on
specify inner – inter sector information
information
sharing
and sharing.
cooperation principles?

There are no /
immature
rules.
There are some
practices
on
information
sharing. However
these are sector or
operator specific.

Yes,
there
is
written set of rules
on
information
sharing.
Every
critical
infrastructure
operator performs
information
sharing according
to these rules.

11.

Are
there
sector-based No
CSIRTs that have information
sharing
responsibilities
determined by the regulations?

In some sectors

Yes. There are
CSIRTs for all
critical sectors.
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No Question

No action or very Partial Action (1)
limited action (0)

Comprehensive
Action (2)

12.

Is there an internationally No
recognized national CSIRT
that performs international
cooperation
with
other
CSIRTs?

Yes; however it Yes.
does not have
international
actions.

13.

Is
there
a
technical No
infrastructure to fulfill the
inner - inter sector information
sharing
needs?
(online
information sharing portals,
statistics dashboards, data
collections centers)

There are some There
are
limited utilities.
necessary
technical
infrastructures and
utilities.

14.

Does the National CSIRT No
handle the warnings of cyber
incidents related to critical
infrastructures by coordinating
with the relevant sectorial
CSIRTs
and
critical
infrastructure owners when
needed?

There are some Yes
limited actions. It
coordinates some
events.

15.

Are there government policies No
and strategies that position
private sector as a key player
in national cyber security
efforts?

There are some There
is
a
isolated efforts.
comprehensive
policy,
strategy
and
associated
action items.

16.

Does the private sector No, there are some
participate in the preparation minor
of the national or sectorial engagements
cyber security strategies?

In some sectors /
for some operators,
private sector is an
important
role
player. However
this is not the
result of high level
policy.

17.

Does the private sector have No
permanent seat in the national
boards like the cyber security
council?

Private sector is Yes
invited sometimes.
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Private sector is
positioned as an
essential partner in
the preparation of
the strategies. It
sometimes directs
the
efforts,
produces
solutions.

No Question

No action or very Partial Action (1)
limited action (0)

Comprehensive
Action (2)

18.

Does the government show No
leadership for innovation,
research
&
development
activities,
and
the
identification of the priority
areas in cyber security?

Limited efforts

Government direct
the private sector
in producing cyber
security products.

19.

Does the private sector No
participate in the national
cyber
security
exercises
extensively?

Limited

Yes

20.

Is the existing legislation that No
may
affect
critical
infrastructures reviewed and
updated especially for the
needs of the governmental
critical
infrastructure
operators?

Some
sector
specific
efforts
may
appear.
However there is
no
exclusive
practices.

Yes. The required
amendments are
determined
and
applied for all
sectors.

21.

Is the necessary amendments No
to the regulations performed to
hire outsourced personnel /
qualified government officials
with
higher
salaries
/
contracted
personnel
in
governmental
critical
infrastructures?

There are some Yes
limited efforts for
some sectors.

22.

Are there national capacity No
building plans and strategies?

There are some
practices.
However, these are
not sufficient for
capacity building.

23.

Are internationally accepted No
or
certificate owners preferred in practices
the recruitments by critical
infrastructure owners?

There are national
efforts that covers
formal education,
universities. There
are
personnel
certification
schemes.

Few Some
There are common
organizations
or practices for all
sectors urges the critical sectors.
certifications.
However it is not
prevalent.
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No Question

No action or very Partial Action (1)
limited action (0)

Comprehensive
Action (2)

24.

Are there qualified and Very limited
sufficient number of cyber
security training institutions
(private,
academic
or
governmental)
that
support/train the personnel of
critical
infrastructure
operators?

There are some
institutions;
however they are
not enough in
number or there
are specific to
some of the critical
sectors.

There are adept
and plenty of
institutions for all
of the critical
sectors.

25.

Is there cyber security and IT Very limited
curriculum for all levels of the
education from elementary
schools to universities?

There are some
efforts in some
universities.
However
the
percentage of these
universities
are
quiet low.

There
sufficient
curriculum
considerable
amount
universities.

are
in
of

26.

Are there special positions for No
cyber security experts in
critical
infrastructure
operators?

There are limited
qualified staff or
there are enough
number
of
qualified staff in
some
of
the
infrastructures.

There are enough
number
of
qualified staff in
all of the critical
infrastructure
operators.

27.

Are there national / sectorial No
products
and
service
procurement standards or rules
for
critical
infrastructure
operators?

There are some
limited
rules.
However these are
not widespread or
mature.

Yes, the critical
infrastructure
operators procure
products / services
according to these
rules.

28.

Is a system established for the No
eligibility certifications of the
IT companies to provide IT
services
for
critical
infrastructure operators?

There are some Yes. There is a
informal lists for governmentcredible firms.
controlled
accreditation
scheme.

29.

Are there security standards No
for the IT products to be used
by
critical
infrastructure
operators?

There are some
standards; however
they
are
not
detailed enough or
they are specific to
some
of
the
sectors.
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There are detailed
security standards
for all of the
sectors.

No Question

No action or very Partial Action (1)
limited action (0)

Comprehensive
Action (2)

30.

Are there national or sectorial
regulations that enforce the
internal / external audit for
critical
infrastructure
operators?

No.
critical
infrastructure
operators are not
audited regularly.
Also internal audit
process does not
exist.

There are some
audit
practices.
However these are
not enough to
improve
the
national security
posture.

Audit
is
an
essential process
for
critical
infrastructure
operators.

31.

Are there regular cyber No
security audits performed by
the regulatory authorities of
the sectors for critical
infrastructure operators?

There are limited
efforts. However
they are specific to
only some sectors
or they are not
detailed enough.

There are regular
and
qualified
audits
for
all
sectors.

32.

Are there experienced IT No or very limited
auditors who are employed
within the internal audit units
of
critical
infrastructure
operators?

There are some
security auditor in
some
sectors.
However they are
not
experienced
enough.

Most / all of the
organizations in all
sectors
employ
experienced
auditors.

33.

Are there sanctions imposed No or very limited There are some
by the regulatory authorities practices
practices in only
on
critical
infrastructure
small portion of
operators
for
the
the sectors.
nonconformities?

There are written
rules for sanction
for all sectors.
They are imposed
as needed.

34.

Are there regulations that No
renders top level management
of
critical
infrastructure
operators responsible for cyber
security?

There are some
sector
specific
enforcement;
however these are
not enough in
terms of national
security.

There
are
particular set of
rules that makes
manager of the
critical
infrastructures
responsible
for
cyber security.

35.

Are there regulations that No
enforce critical infrastructure
owners to conduct the cyber
security risk management
process?

There are some
sector
specific
enforcement;
however these are
not enough in
terms of national
security.

Yes, regular risk
management
proves is a mustdo process for
every operators in
every sector.
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No Question

No action or very Partial Action (1)
limited action (0)

Comprehensive
Action (2)

36.

Is there an obligation of a No
comprehensive
security
standard such as ISO 27001
for
critical
infrastructure
owners?

There
obligations
some sectors.

is Yes
for

37.

Are
minimum
security No.
countermeasures obliged by
regulations
for
critical
infrastructure owners?

There are some Yes.
limited works for
some sectors.

38.

Are there regulations that set No
out
the
properties
of
information
systems
and
security countermeasures that
come into operation in critical
infrastructure operators?

There are some Yes
regulations
for
some sectors.

39.

Are
there
sector-specific No
technical guidance documents
for the secure design, set-up
and operation of the networks
of
critical
infrastructure
operators?

There are some
limited guidance
documents
for
some sectors.

There
are
comprehensive
documents for all
sectors.

40.

Are there sectorial or national No
security standards that set out
the best security practices for
each critical sector?

There
are
standards for some
sectors. However
there
are
not
detailed enough or
the covered sectors
are very limited.

There
are
comprehensive
national
or
sectorial standards
for all critical
sectors.

Answers of the Participants of the Pilot Survey

Question-1
Question-2
Question-3
Question-4
Question-5
Question-6
Question-7
Question-8

P1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

P2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

P3
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0

P4
1
1
0
0
0
1
2
0

P5
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
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P6
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1

P7
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

P8
1
1
0
0
0
1
2
0

P9
1
2
1
0
1
0
1
0

P10
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0

Question-9
Question-10
Question-11
Question-12
Question-13
Question-14
Question-15
Question-16
Question-17
Question-18
Question-19
Question-20
Question-21
Question-22
Question-23
Question-24
Question-25
Question-26
Question-27
Question-28
Question-29
Question-30
Question-31
Question-32
Question-33
Question-34
Question-35
Question-36
Question-37
Question-38
Question-39
Question-40

P1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

P2
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

P3
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0

P4
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0

P5
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
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P6
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

P7
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1

P8
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0

P9
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

P10
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
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